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How are countries affected 
by migration?
An ‘inside-out’ approach to change in sending  
and receiving countries
Anne White
In December 2016, Polish television broadcast an advertisement for Alle-
gro, an online shopping site. The advertisement features Robert, a pen-
sioner, purchasing English for Beginners and practising basic words and 
sentences on the tram and in the bath. Robert then travels to the United 
Kingdom for Christmas and greets a small mixed-race girl who comes to 
the door, with the words ‘Hello, I’m your grandpa.’ The video was watched 
by millions around the world and was the most popular Youtube film of 
the year in Poland, where a journalist for a leading newspaper claimed 
that ‘it would be hard to find a Pole who hadn’t seen it’ (Wątor 2017). The 
film depicted a poignantly familiar situation in a society where almost 
everyone has family and friends abroad. It was somehow also puzzling, 
given widespread stereotypes that older people are passive victims of 
migration and, moreover, do not learn foreign languages.
This book is, as far as we know, the first with the title ‘The Impact of 
Migration on Country X’, and is the most ambitious attempt to date to 
understand how migration influences social change in a specific sending 
country. It is not a historical study of migration’s cumulative effect on 
Poland, but, as the reference to EU mobility in the subtitle suggests, an 
exploration of how Poland today is changing. We consider some overall 
economic trends, but are particularly interested in how and why Polish 
society is evolving and how this is, to some extent, because migration 
affects Poles in their everyday lives. Although we do not try to answer the 
question of the extent to which social change is caused by migration, 
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migration rarely seems to be the main factor. However, once one 
begins to investigate, it seems there are many social trends which are 
reinforced – or in other cases held back – as a result of migration. For 
example, we present figures showing that more and more retired Poles 
are in adult education, and that active English-language knowledge has 
been increasing overall in the Polish population and even in older age 
groups. One reason is that – as we know from our own and other research-
ers’ interviews and participant observation – grandparents are indeed 
learning foreign languages to communicate with family members abroad.
Our book is unusual, as a work of migration scholarship, for its 
emphasis not on migrants but on stayers – people, like Robert, who live 
in sending countries but who also inhabit transnational social spaces, with 
multiple reference points thanks to their communications with people 
abroad and visits to foreign countries. Moreover, Polish society has been 
filling up with a particularly significant type of stayer: return migrants. 
According to survey data, 12 per cent of Poles resident in Poland have 
worked abroad in the last ten years, including 27 per cent of 25–34 year 
olds (Cybulska 2016, 1). Social change also occurs thanks to the addition 
of these returnees, changing the composition of society in Poland. For 
example, as discussed in chapter 8, the number of Poles in Poland who 
know openly gay people or Muslims (neither often encountered in Poland) 
has considerably increased in recent years.
The book identifies a number of important trends in Poland, taking 
into account imperfections in the data, complexities with regard to which 
subgroups of society are changing, and the presence of counter-trends. In 
each case we explore why these trends might be occurring, and consider 
how migration fits into this picture. The book also probes into deeper types 
of change: not just changing practices, but also the norms, beliefs and even 
values that can change as a result of those changing practices. For example, 
an important trend in Poland, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), is towards more meaningful rights for women and minorities 
than existed under the communist regime. Gender equality is one of these, 
although it has received notable setbacks in Poland recently. Nonethe-
less, an accumulation of practices linked to migration do promote the 
underlying trend towards more equal gender roles. One example is ris-
ing numbers of women drivers in very recent years. In 2007, 30 per 
cent of women had a driving licence. In 2015, the figure was 48 per 
cent (Panek, Czapiński and Kotowska 2007, 42; 2015, 34). This trend 
towards ‘motor-parity’ (Bąk 2012) has many causes, but in small towns 
where many men are working abroad, the increase is especially notice-
able (Kurczewski and Fuszara 2012, 92–3).
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The book is deliberately broad in scope. A comprehensive account 
of migration impact on any country would be impossible, but our aim is 
to cover as many facets as space permits, keeping an eye out particularly 
for influences which may be contributing to key social trends. These, as 
discussed below, are trends which we identify as being especially signifi-
cant in contemporary CEE. In other words, by keeping in mind at all times 
our aim of explaining certain social phenomena, we create a robust frame-
work of analysis which helps us keep our potentially unwieldy mass of 
migration influences from spilling out in disorder.
Except in chapter 5, on labour market impacts, we depart from the 
conventional framework of analysis which, in utilitarian fashion, consid-
ers only social impacts that can be divided into ‘bad’ (e.g. brain drain and 
care drain) or ‘good’ (e.g. investment in education thanks to economic 
remittances, and knowledge transfer from receiving to sending countries). 
Scholars tend to conceptualise such influences as promoting or impeding 
development, and the overarching concept of development does impart 
a certain solidity to such cost-benefit framings of the topic. However, 
a  ‘migration-development nexus’ is usually perceived to exist only in 
non-European countries or, exceptionally, in south-east Europe, not coun-
tries like Poland. This is not to deny that migration plays a role in eco-
nomic development locally in some parts of Poland and could play more 
of a role in the future; we hope that our book will be useful to policy-
makers in this regard. However, since our aim is to achieve a wide-ranging 
account, a developmental lens is insufficient because it maintains a nar-
row normativity which renders many kinds of impact invisible to the 
researcher. Rather than proceeding from a mental list of development 
goals and thinking how migration could be a tool to their achievement, 
our analysis, by contrast, is ‘inside-out’ because we look inside a changing 
society first, and then outwards into the transnational social space in 
which that society is located.
The originality of our approach to social change in sending countries 
is curious, in view of the fact that one part of migration scholarship  – 
migration economics  –  does already sometimes pursue an ‘inside-out’ 
approach. Economists of both sending and receiving countries pursue a 
counterfactual (‘what if?’) approach to calculate, for example, the extent 
to which economic remittances may be contributing to overall GDP 
growth, or how the departure or arrival of workers affect overall trends 
on labour markets – for example, as one factor contributing to falling 
unemployment in the sending country. Demographers, by the nature of 
their topic, inevitably consider how migration feeds into other demo-
graphic trends such as birth rates (Fihel and Solga 2014, 97–8).
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Sociologists, by contrast, seem blinkered by a ‘methodological 
nationalism’, which leads them to seek the causes of phenomena only 
within society conceived as existing within the borders of the nation-state 
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). This is well illustrated in the case of 
Poland, with its abundance of both mainstream sociological and migra-
tion research, but limited overlap between disciplines. Sociologists study 
people living in Poland, usually not even taking into account whether indi-
vidual respondents within their samples have any migration experience. 
Migration scholars naturally study migrants and return migrants.
The dangers of failing to consider migration factors are illustrated 
by the story of Ireland’s ‘devotional revolution’ in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The causes of this blossoming of religiosity have long remained a 
 mystery – hard to explain with reference to trends in Ireland itself. How-
ever, Roddy (2017) has recently argued that the cause was exposure to 
religious literature produced in the United States. In other words, social 
historians had been looking in the wrong place for the explanation, seeking 
causes in Ireland, and failing to notice that the influences were coming 
from Irish migrants abroad. Already in the late nineteenth century, Irish 
people in Ireland were located in a transnational social space, and this is 
the space in which social trends were being formed.
We argue, therefore, that migration scholars can use knowledge of 
trends already identified by mainstream social science to look for what is 
changing as a result of migration. In turn, migration researchers can help 
non-migration scholars to decipher the social trends which their method-
ological nationalism is impeding them from fully understanding. We also 
argue for combining sending and receiving society scholarship. Our book 
shows how this can be achieved.
Analysts of receiving countries – at least since the transnational turn 
in the 1990s – are less blinkered by methodological nationalism. Receiv-
ing-society migration researchers could themselves benefit from more 
‘talking across disciplines’ (Brettell and Hollifield 2008), and migration 
scholars and mainstream sociologists do not usually team up to write 
wide-ranging studies of impact on a single receiving country.1 Nonethe-
less, within narrower remits they adopt an inside-out approach. They are 
also preoccupied with stayers  –  citizens of the countries affected by 
immigration. Their research provides pointers for how to study impact on 
sending societies. The first pointer is simply to indicate the significance 
of migration. If we ask how a country is affected socially by international 
migration, and then think of the United Kingdom or almost any other 
western European country, we can readily see that the existence of immi-
gration is an election-swinging issue, generating lively debate about the 
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cultural impact of migration, as society becomes more diverse. Scholars 
are particularly interested in how contacts between citizens and newcom-
ers affect developments in race relations, ‘cosmopolitan’ attitudes and 
social cohesion. This combines with recognition that migrants’ lives often 
straddle two or more societies, involving everyday communication with, 
and frequent return to, their countries of origin. Ethnically diverse loca-
tions in receiving societies form part of a transnational social space. The 
receiving country literature asks how neighbourhoods change when 
more local people have contact with difference, while simultaneously 
being affected by media and political interpretations of cultural change. 
Identical questions can be asked about the other ‘end’ of the trans-
national fields: the societies sending migrants into diverse neighbour-
hoods abroad, migrants who then return to countries like Poland for 
visits or to resettle.
Very recently indeed, scholars developing Levitt’s (1998) concept of 
social remittances have begun to study how attitudes towards diversity 
travel back and forth between sending and receiving countries, and the 
impact of this on sending-country stayers. Our book builds on the work 
of Nedelcu (2012, writing about Romanians in Toronto) and a number of 
Polish colleagues (notably Garapich 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, and Gawlewicz 
2015a, 2015b), as well as on our own research. Chapter 4 puts social 
remittances under the microscope. It scrutinises the concept, identifies 
how it can be used more precisely and suggests aspects that deserve 
greater attention than they usually receive. In particular, we emphasise 
the need to examine more closely how remittances ‘circulate’, travelling 
from sending to receiving countries, as well as vice versa.
We do not view social trends as unidirectional, since levels of relig-
iosity, tolerance, democracy, prosperity and so forth in a particular coun-
try can rise, fall and rise again over time. All such phenomena are of course 
complex and can be variously defined. In order to understand the broader 
trends, it is helpful to consider the conclusions of anthropological and soci-
ological non-migration literature on CEE. Though highlighting differ-
ences between countries, scholars also describe many twenty-first-century 
social phenomena and trends which are equally relevant in Poland. These 
include the growing strength of social movements and a somewhat une-
ven trend towards more equality for women and minorities, somewhat 
more trust and respect for the rule of law, but also the continuation of 
informal practices, pockets of nostalgia for ‘socialism’ and widespread 
scepticism and resistance towards top-down narratives.
Despite competing and complex tendencies, we do, however, see two 
clear-cut trends in CEE since 1989. One is that societies are now much 
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more like societies in western Europe, although it is better to view this as 
being about coexistence within a common transnational space rather than 
as a process of the East ‘catching up’ with the West, or as the distorted 
modernisation (Bafoil 2009) of the communist period being replaced by 
‘real’ modernisation. The other, connected, development is that the post-
1989 opening of borders let the genie out of the bottle. Even Poland, which 
had much more open borders than most of its neighbours, was a country 
where in 1990 most of the population had never been abroad. Travel and 
work abroad are eye-opening experiences, bringing recognition that there 
is more than one way to do things (although this does not always result 
in acceptance that alternative cultures and viewpoints are equally valid: 
see the discussion of ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ cosmopolitanism in chapter 8). 
One of our interviewees, a barman in Wrocław, expressed this idea in 
simple terms: ‘Poland is a more open country since communism ended. 
Some Poles began going abroad and saw how people lived . . .  and Poles 
who came back to Poland passed that on. That’s probably how change 
takes place here.’ The granddaughter’s appearance in the Allegro adver-
tisement was a revealing moment. The little girl and her mother’s skin col-
our was perhaps dictated by technical reasons – to imply that they needed 
to be spoken to in English. Nonetheless, the implied normality of mixed 
marriages abroad, in this true-to-life advertisement, is highly significant 
in white, mono-ethnic Poland.
Overall, migration often contributes to social trends by virtue of a 
levelling effect which enables certain categories of the population to 
become part of that trend. For instance, the proportion of people in Poland 
who have been abroad has risen sharply since 1989, from under half to 
more than three-quarters. Retired people, who often lack the resources 
to travel on holiday, disproportionately travel to visit family and friends 
(Boguszewski 2016). In other words, this gives them an opportunity which 
they would not otherwise enjoy, as well as providing more exposure to dif-
ference for a social group which often shows up in Polish survey data as 
being more closed and intolerant. If more Poles speak English, this is 
mostly because almost all young people now have the opportunity to learn 
it at school. However, some grandparents (who all studied Russian at 
school) also learn it because they visit abroad, so they too become con-
tributors to the trend of increasing competence in English. If more women 
are learning to drive, this is partly because wealthier families living in cit-
ies and suburbs can afford to have two cars. However, if poorer women in 
small towns also learn to drive – since their husbands are away working 
abroad – then this gives this relatively underprivileged category the oppor-
tunity to participate in ‘motor-parity’. As this example also shows, not all 
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migration effects are intended, and in fact women’s increased equality in 
particular often seems to be an unintended result of migration.
We use the word ‘migration’2 rather than ‘mobility’ in the book’s title. 
This is largely because the book is situated within scholarship on the 
impact of ‘migration’. However, the subtitle mentions ‘mobility’, the word 
preferred by EU institutions and by many scholars of transnationalism. 
Our book frequently returns to the matter of how EU free movement of 
people makes impacts on the origin country different from those of 
more traditional migration. On the centenary of Thomas and Znaniecki’s 
classic The Polish Peasant in Europe and America it is appropriate to ask: 
what is different about migration impact today?
The EU mobility experiment, together with the unique historical 
phenomenon of the post-communist system transformation and the long 
shadow that it casts over twenty-first-century CEE, create a doubly inter-
esting laboratory in which to develop new methods for understanding 
migration impact. Poland, as one of the most significant sending countries, 
the democratisation trailblazer and the possessor of the richest sociolog-
ical tradition in the region, is a perfect case study. Of course, only 14 years 
have elapsed since Poland’s EU accession, and it would be better to study 
the phenomenon with the benefit of some historical hindsight. It may be 
that some of the impacts we describe prove to be ephemeral. Nonetheless, 
we hope that our study will provide clues for future researchers who wish 
to apply our methodology as a tool to understand migration impact in 
other EU countries, or explore still further aspects of migration-related 
change in Poland.
The book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is an overview chapter 
which provides background on Polish social change and migration trends 
necessary to understand the rest of the book; summarises the findings of 
all the chapters; and ties together threads, discussing the specific migra-
tion impact of EU citizens’ twenty-first-century mobility. It is written in lay-
person’s language and, if read with chapter 1, will give a good idea of our 
evidence and arguments. The interested reader is invited to read further 
into the book for more detailed and extensively referenced content.
Chapter 3, by Anne White and Izabela Grabowska, discusses exist-
ing research on the impact of migration on sending countries, especially 
in CEE; refines further the concept of social remittances; and explains how 
an inside-out approach can reveal the mechanisms of how migration 
relates to social trends. Chapter 4, by Izabela Grabowska, shows how social 
remittances work in practice. Grabowska argues that workplaces are par-
ticularly important sites for diffusing social remittances; that in one sig-
nificant respect, acquisition of skills and competences abroad, it is possible 
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to find data on the extent to which Polish society is changing thanks to 
migration; and that qualitative research in specific locations in Poland can 
illuminate the features of those individual return migrants who make a 
difference.
Chapter  5, by Paweł Kaczmarczyk, investigates labour market 
impacts of post-2004 migration from Poland. He argues that migration 
effects – to a large extent unexpectedly – are small or negligible in the 
short and medium term, on the national level. This is mostly due to struc-
tural conditions dating back to the early 1990s and, in particular, to a 
persistent oversupply of labour, which mitigates the effects of migration 
from Poland. However, the long-term impacts of contemporary Polish 
mobility might be substantial for the geographical distribution of the 
Polish population, as many working-age people from areas with limited 
job opportunities settle abroad. This raises questions about the transna-
tional family ties which will continue to bind extended families across 
national borders.
Chapter 6, by Krystyna Slany, considers such family relations, show-
ing how the continuing high value placed on family life by Poles in Poland 
is not undermined by Poles living abroad and how, in fact, transnational 
families maintain a strong sense of solidarity; how slow progress towards 
more sharing of roles within households in Poland is mirrored, and to a 
limited extent anticipated, among families abroad, especially in countries 
with strong gender equality programmes, such as Norway; and how 
female circular migrants add to the share of independently minded and 
self-confident women in conservative rural areas.
Chapters 7 and 8, by Anne White, consider how different aspects of 
livelihoods, lifestyles, culture and identity are changing in Poland and how 
migration contributes to such changes in different localities. She argues 
that migration-wrought change may happen more often in cities, where 
it meets less resistance, but that when it happens in small towns and 
among less well-educated sections of society, where other influences for 
change are fewer, it has more ‘value-added’. In chapter 9 White puts for-
ward the concept of ‘Polish society abroad’ and argues that social change 
among Poles abroad is an intrinsic part of social change in Poland. Chap-
ter 10 considers the impact of immigration on Poland. This was originally 
conceived as a short chapter on immigration as a prospect, but while White 
was writing this chapter, migration from Ukraine massively accelerated, 
and Poland suddenly became a ‘country of immigration’. Chapter  11 
briefly reviews how we used the inside-out approach to create a more 
‘transnational’ method for understanding social change in Poland. It 
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makes suggestions for applying the approach to other countries. The book 
concludes with a bibliography shared by all chapters.
Notes
1 Exceptions include Fanning and Munck (2011), an edited volume considering a 
broad range of immigration impacts on Ireland.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, ‘migration’ refers to international migration. However, 
we do in places consider international migration side by side with internal migration.
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The impact of migration from 
and to Poland since EU accession
Anne White, izAbelA GrAboWskA, PAWeł kAczmArczyk 
And krystynA slAny
1. Introduction
Chapters 1 and 2, taken together, offer a short version of our book for the 
general reader. Alternatively, they serve as an extended introduction for 
readers who wish also to read the remaining chapters. The first part of 
chapter 2 discusses how we understand ‘social change’ and provides back-
ground on social change in Poland, Polish migration and its impacts. The 
second part summarises the main content of the rest of the book. How-
ever, it is not just dry conclusions, and is plentifully illustrated with sup-
porting evidence. It also includes a section on poverty and remittances, 
a topic that is not covered later in the book. Finally, we comment on how 
our approach could be applied to any country, particularly other EU 
member states. We have tried not to clutter the chapter with too many 
citations. Where arguments from the main part of the book are summa-
rised, the reader will find fuller referencing in the later chapters. Chap-
ters 4, 6 and 7 contain detail on the methodology of the various research 
projects on which this book is partly based.
2. Social change
This book is about society in change: we are interested in change as an 
ongoing process, continuous but also unpredictable (Sztompka 2000, 17). 
We have tried to use data that is as up-to-date as possible. However, recent 
developments in Poland have taken everyone by surprise. Thanks to the 
11tHe ImPACt of mIGrAtIon from And to PolAnd SInCe eu ACCeSSIon
arrival of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, Poland has suddenly expe-
rienced mass immigration; the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU 
has left Poles in Britain in limbo; and the post-2015 Polish government’s 
‘Good Change’ policy has had some striking effects, particularly with 
regard to enhancing income equality and hardening attitudes towards 
refugees.
Surveys in Poland provide information about change among the per-
manently settled population, but also about former migrants who have 
returned from living abroad. Returnees cannot usually be singled out in 
the data, but if they change as a result of migration, they alter the overall 
composition of society. Social change partly takes place precisely because 
of returnees’ presence in their society of origin. Polish society within 
Poland can be imagined as a patchwork: each migrant who returns is 
another piece sewn on. However, returnees also represent potential for 
additional, future change, change that is not easily captured in survey evi-
dence. For example, many returnees have acquired skills abroad, or have 
ideas for businesses, that cannot at present be realised in their home loca-
tion in Poland.
By the same token, if Polish society is imagined as existing only 
within the state borders of Poland, each time a Pole moves abroad this 
is a loss to society – also a kind of social change. With regard to demo-
graphic trends, this is particularly obvious. For example, migration usually 
decreases the economically active population of childbearing age. How-
ever, people today rarely ‘disappear’ from Polish society when they move 
abroad, and in most cases they remain closely connected with Poland. 
Poles abroad are therefore part of social change; it is artificial to sepa-
rate Polish society at home and in foreign countries. Chapter 9 presents 
arguments for considering the existence of ‘Polish society abroad’ in 
countries such as the United Kingdom, where there is a large and diverse 
Polish population closely tied to Poland. The changes that Polish migrants 
experience abroad are to varying extents interconnected with change 
inside Poland. There exists what migration scholars would label a sin-
gle transnational social space  –  society that transcends international 
borders.
In this book, we use the term ‘social’ change broadly, to encompass 
also economic change, and we discuss change at various levels, as for 
example set out by Portes (2010, 1544):
As a cause of change, migration has been analysed from a cultural 
perspective that emphasises its potential for value/normative trans-
formation, and from a structural perspective that highlights its 
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demographic and economic significance. . . .  Effects may simply 
scratch the surface of society, affecting some economic organisa-
tions, role expectations, or norms. On the other hand, they may go 
deep into the culture, transforming the value system, or into the 
social structure, transforming the distribution of power.
Since deep change, for example in religiosity or gender equality, tends to 
result from an accumulation of small superficial changes, our discussion 
includes some apparently quite trivial everyday practices. By understand-
ing how returnees actively diffuse new practices, or fail to do so (see 
especially chapter  4), we can understand some mechanisms of social 
change, including how change can be stalled or even reversed. However, 
we also discovered many indirect impacts as, for example, when a univer-
sity lecturer in Lublin1 complained, ‘You can forget students preparing 
their dissertations during the summer vacation – they’re working abroad 
instead.’
Our view of social change is of an all-encompassing phenomenon, 
not just positive change, although the term is sometimes used in the sense 
of successful outcomes of campaigning social movements or revolutions. 
We do not theorise social change in this book, and the book is not intended 
as a contribution to social theory. Nor are we adhering to any one school 
of sociological thought. We are interested in how ordinary Poles under-
stand change they see around them; modest about claiming we have dis-
covered ‘facts’ rather than interpretations; conscious of the limitations of 
both quantitative and qualitative methods; and aware that our own pre-
conceptions will have affected how we conducted our research. We try to 
think outside the box. Most importantly, we avoid methodological nation-
alism, instead seeing social change as the product of interaction between 
people who happen to be located in different countries.
3. Patterns of change and continuity in Poland
3.1 Social trends, 1989–2017
In 1989, Lech Wałęsa asserted, ‘We know very well which political and 
economic models in Europe and in the world have passed the test of time, 
and it is to these models that we must turn’ (Brown 1991, 56). To some 
extent the story of social change in Poland is a consequence of that deci-
sion, as Poland set off down the path of neo-liberal economic reforms and 
democratisation, also experiencing many associated processes of social 
change similar to those occurring in the West. Jacobsson comments (2015, 
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10) that ‘the radical transformations of [CEE] societies – socio-economi-
cally, politically and in terms of urban development – gives rise to some 
distinctive features – if not so much in the direction of change as in its pace 
and scale.’ For example, the share of the population attending university 
has increased since the 1980s everywhere in Europe, but especially in 
CEE. In 2002, 14 per cent of 30–34-year-olds in Poland had completed ter-
tiary education; by 2016, the figure was 45 per cent. Corresponding fig-
ures for the United Kingdom were 31 per cent and 48 per cent (Eurostat 
2017). Between 1989 and 2013, private car ownership rose from 125 to 
500 per 1000 population (Dmochowska 2014, 74). Poland acquired a 
more recognisable middle class than could exist in the communist era, 
although Domański argues that even if numbers self-identifying as mid-
dle class grew in Poland (from 41 per cent to 48 per cent between 1992 
and 2002),2 barriers to upward social mobility remained fairly constant 
from the early 1980s (2015, 226, 244).
The legacy of the command economy presented obstacles that could 
not quickly be overcome. Even though Poland recovered as early as 1996 
from the recession following the introduction of a market economy, much 
hardship was still to follow. Income inequality, poverty and unemployment 
all peaked later, at around 2004. Deindustrialisation, as elsewhere in CEE, 
was a painful process, especially afflicting localities heavily dependent on 
a single factory or industry. Unlike its neighbours, communist-era Poland 
had a large private agricultural sector; in 2013, more than half of farms 
were still less than five hectares in size (Dmochowska 2014, 66). The dys-
functionality of the communist economy had facilitated the emergence 
of a sizeable informal sector and promoted habits of resourcefulness and 
self-reliance among ordinary Poles. As in other CEE countries, in the 1990s 
and in some areas up to 2004, many people were thrown back on informal 
livelihood strategies and reliance on personal networks. In the twenty-first 
century, the need for these has partly disappeared. The period since 2004 
has witnessed remarkable drops in unemployment (though it is still a sig-
nificant problem in some locations), a decline in levels of relative and 
absolute poverty, and rising prosperity in the Polish countryside, particu-
larly in the vicinity of cities.
A factor specific to Poland was the prestige of the Catholic Church, 
which, under Pope John Paul II, had been strongly identified with oppo-
sition to the communist regime. Catholic bishops used their political 
influence to secure the passage in 1993 of one of the most restrictive abor-
tion laws in Europe and have continued to promote conservative views of 
gender roles. This was despite widespread opposition in 1993, and, over 
subsequent decades, increasing popular support for gender equality, with 
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some evidence of more societal tolerance towards sexual minorities. In 
general, as elsewhere in CEE, women and minorities benefited to some 
extent from anti-discrimination legislation passed in connection with EU 
accession and membership (Plomien 2010), although they have also had 
to defend these rights through social activism. Polish support for EU mem-
bership, which had been enthusiastic in the early 1990s but somewhat 
wavered thereafter, jumped after 2004 as the benefits of membership 
became obvious and in June 2017 stood at 88 per cent,3 although survey 
evidence suggests that this support is partly conditional upon Poland not 
participating in EU arrangements for refugee resettlement (Anon. 2017).
Table 2.1 shows some ways in which Poles themselves considered 
society had changed during the first twenty-five years after 1989. How-
ever, as discussed later, people’s perceptions of social change do not always 
match survey evidence about individuals’ attitudes and behaviour.
3.2 differentiated change at regional and local level
There is no ‘average Pole’. Change of all kinds, including migration 
impacts, is sometimes not perceptible in national statistics, but more 
 evident in certain geographical locations. Place matters partly because of 
differences in social composition. For example, city inhabitants are 
wealthier on average (see table 2.2), and the largest cities, especially the 
Warsaw metropolitan area and Wrocław, have a higher concentration of 
Table 2.1 Assessment of changes in Poland, 1989–2014 (selected changes)
Percentage 
believing in change 
for better/more
Percentage 
believing in change 
for worse/less
State of the Polish economy 53 28
Poles’ work ethic 50 19
Tolerance for other people’s 
 views
47 20
Social security 32 46
Readiness to help others 30 40
Healthcare in Poland 22 62
Strength of family ties 16 54
Poles’ honesty 14 47
Poles’ religiosity 10 67
Source: Boguszewski (2014a, 93). A total of twenty changes were identified, but we 
list only the most relevant, omitting, for example, foreign policy.
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well-educated residents (Herbst 2012, 68). For many indicators there is 
an association between size of population and more liberal attitudes.
Spatial inequality in Poland grew unchecked in the 1990s. In the 
twenty-first century, in line with EU social cohesion policy, investment 
programmes for underdeveloped areas have attempted to narrow the 
gap, but differences remain pronounced (Golinowska and Kocot 2013, 
223–4). One of the main trends in the 1990s was ‘metropolitanisation’, 
as a handful of major cities became globally competitive (Gorzelak 2016, 
202–3; Smętkowski 2013, 1529), leaving other places behind. The 
metropolises also cultivated identities as cosmopolitan cultural centres, 
encapsulated, for example, in Wrocław’s tag, ‘Wrocław the meeting place’ 
and status as 2016 European Capital of Culture. There has been a certain 
process of catching up in recent years, with some cities such as Rzeszów 
receiving more investment and inward migration (see chapter 7). The 
different sizes and wealth of different cities help shape the identities 
of  individual regions, although in some cases  –  such as Warsaw and 
Kraków  –  prosperity in the regional capital can mask deprivation else-
where (Golinowska and Kocot 2013). The East-West divide at the Vistula 
River also continues to be significant. Eastern Poland remains more rural 
and underdeveloped, receives less foreign investment and votes more con-
servatively than western Poland. However, social change in individual 
locations depends, of course, on unique combinations of localised trends. 
Kinowska (2015, 12), writing about rural women activists, observes that 
each Polish locality makes its own specific contribution to aggregated 
change in Poland, and therefore each merits separate, micro-level research. 
By extension, one can argue, each experiences its own migration impact.
Trends can reinforce one another, but they can also cancel each other 
out. Michalska (2013, 129), for example, mentions that the increased 
availability of higher education since 1989 promoted a rise in status for 
many rural women. However, the continuing trend of limited childcare 
in rural areas cancels out these advantages and makes it hard for women 
to realise more ambitious career plans, thwarting progress towards 
gender equality. In Podkarpacie, the most Catholic region of Poland, 
three-quarters of inhabitants attend church at least weekly (Panek, 
Czapiński and Kotowska 2015, 267). Catholic family values are deeply 
engrained (Pstrąg 2014). However, when asked whether it was acceptable 
for lone mothers in financial difficulties to temporarily leave their children 
to work abroad, over half of respondents in a 2008 opinion poll agreed, 
confirming the findings of qualitative research that pragmatism can trump 
other considerations about appropriate behaviour in regions where migra-
tion is a normal livelihood strategy (White 2017, 69).
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4. Migration from and return to Poland
4.1 migration from Poland
Over the last two hundred years, migration has been central to the social 
history of Poland, including areas lying outside today’s borders. Poland 
has an identity as an ‘emigration country’, where migration is ‘surrounded 
by myths, symbols, cultural codes and stereotyped framings’ (Garapich 
2014, 284). On the one hand, political exiles of the nineteenth century, 
post-Second World War refugees from communism, Jewish intellectuals 
expelled in 1968 and the highly educated two-million strong ‘Solidarity’ 
emigration of the 1980s have created a tradition of elite exile that makes 
it easy to understand framings of the post-2004 wave of highly educated 
Poles to the United Kingdom and Ireland as a tragic brain drain. On the 
other hand, Babiński and Praszałowicz (2016, 98) argue that ‘migration 
has become inscribed in Polish tradition as a popular, rational and effec-
tive livelihood strategy’. Poles have worked temporarily in Germany since 
the early nineteenth century (Nowosielski 2012, 4). Christians and Jews 
from partitioned Poland constituted approximately 3.5 million of the 
wave of European labour migrants4 to North America in the five decades 
before the First World War; a further two million economic migrants left 
Poland between the world wars. The communist regime, more ineffec-
tual and somewhat more liberal than its neighbours in the Soviet bloc, 
allowed migration to continue, giving permission for Poles with US con-
nections to go to the United States and, from the 1970s, turning a blind 
eye to ‘tourists’ travelling to western Europe to engage in illegal trade 
and temporary work on a remarkable scale (Stola 2010). Between 1.4 
and 2.2 million illegal work trips abroad occurred in 1983–8 (Stola 
2016, 94).
In the 1990s, migration of highly skilled people and migration for 
settlement reduced. In Warsaw, however, ‘migration’ consisted largely of 
professional people on short work-related trips (Jaźwińska, Łukowski and 
Okólski 1997, 51).5 Young Poles also began to settle, partly for lifestyle 
reasons, in cities such as London (Garapich 2016c), to some extent simi-
lar to West European adventure-seeking ‘Eurostars’ (Favell and Recchi 
2011). However, circular and temporary labour migration to Germany, 
Belgium, Italy and other continental European countries predominated 
(Kaczmarczyk 2005). Okólski (2001) coined the term ‘incomplete migra-
tion’ for migrants who earned a living abroad but ‘lived’ in Poland, where 
their families remained and to which they frequently returned. This term 
referred to all types of movement that, due to their nature (short-term, 
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circular and often irregular), easily escaped statistical systems developed 
to trace and describe settlement-type migration. In structural terms, 
incomplete migration stemmed from communist-era underdevelopment 
and under-urbanisation: many factory workers lived in small towns and 
villages, but commuted to work in cities on state-subsidised transport. 
After 1989, factories closed, and commuting became more expensive, so 
international migration began to seem a better livelihood strategy. Incom-
plete migrants typically were men with vocational education from 
peripheral regions in eastern Poland or Silesia (Okólski 2001, 2004; Kacz-
marczyk 2005).
Poland’s EU accession opened doors to better work, at lower per-
sonal cost, and to combining work and travel for adventure. The labour 
market was buoyant in countries such as the United Kingdom and Ire-
land, wages were higher than in Poland, and there was a wave of popu-
lar enthusiasm to experience a short spell of life abroad. Around EU 
accession, many migrants were young people with open-ended plans 
who set off with their friends and siblings. That ‘nearly one in ten people 
in their late twenties left Poland [from May 2004 to January 2007] is 
probably the most conspicuous fact’ (Anacka and Okólski 2010, 155). 
The following two quotations, from 2016 and 2011, give a flavour of the 
period. In the first, Rafał had gone from the eastern city of Lublin to the 
United Kingdom in 2002:
When I first went . . .  a lot of graduates who didn’t have a job here 
in Poland were considering whether to go abroad, everyone was 
thinking about it. What was the point of staying in Poland without 
a job, it would be better to go abroad. And because I was in England, 
I always helped someone get work, well, I was there, so it was easier 
to help out my friends.
Rafał’s sense of not having other options was shared by many young peo-
ple from less prosperous locations, including many small towns and vil-
lages.6 Konrad, from Poznań – one of the metropolises – had a different 
perspective:7
[In 2005] I was finishing my studies, like lots of people were going 
to Ireland, to Great Britain, and, well I thought, I could try as well. 
Specially that quite a lot of my friends were in Dublin. That’s why 
Dublin was the place to go. . . .  They were like, yeah, it’s quite fun, 
it’s nice, you will see and learn lots of new things, so why not.
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In 2004, when the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden opened their 
labour markets to new EU citizens, Britain, with its familiar culture and 
language, overtook Germany as the chief destination,8 a lead that nar-
rowed once other EU member states lifted restrictions over the next 
seven years. Poles took up the ‘Europeanisation of the Polish labour 
market’ (Stola 2016, 95) with enthusiasm. Countries such as Ireland, 
Norway and Iceland, with barely any Poles before EU accession, soon 
found that Poles were their largest ethnic minority population. In the 
first post-accession years, the stock of Polish migrants temporarily abroad 
jumped from around 786,000 (2002) to 1 million (2004) to 2.3 mil-
lion (2007) – equivalent to 6.6 per cent of the Polish population (GUS 
2009, 458). In the first years after accession there was an exodus even 
from the largest cities (Strzelecki et al. 2015, 144), and since 2004, peo-
ple have been migrating abroad from all regions in Poland (Kostrzewa 
and Szałtys 2013, 52).9 Flows from traditional sending regions partly 
reoriented themselves, particularly at first towards the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, and later to a wide range of European countries.
Solo-parent, ‘incomplete’ migration dropped by about 7 per cent 
between 2010 and 2014 (Walczak 2014, 60), as parents already abroad 
with their children persuaded others to follow their example (White 
2017). Migrant families, especially with children at school, tended not to 
return to Poland, and the stream of family migration from Poland is a main 
reason for the rapid transformation of much open-ended and temporary 
migration around 2004–7 into what now appears to be migration for settle-
ment (Janicka and Kaczmarczyk 2017; White 2017, 238–9).
The global economic crisis slightly reduced the stock of Poles living 
in western Europe, but numbers then recovered so that, by Decem-
ber 2016, an estimated 2.52 million people with permanent residence in 
Poland had been living abroad for over three months, 2.2 million of them 
in the EU. By far the most popular destinations were the United Kingdom 
(788,000) and Germany (687,000) (GUS 2017).10
EU migration was facilitated by new communications technology 
and cheap transport, which helped potential migrants inform themselves 
about promising destinations quickly, and contributed to a sense that it 
would be easy to return if the migration experiment failed (White 2017). 
Moreover, the emotional costs of parting were partly reduced because it 
had become easier to keep in touch with friends and family in Poland 
thanks to ‘transnational practices’ such as phoning, Skyping and visiting. 
Many migrants, feeling that they had feet in two countries, began to 
acquire a sense of dual belonging. Typically, Poles in Poland and abroad 
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know Poles in multiple foreign destinations, and their networks consist 
of unique combinations of ties between different places. It is rarely the case 
today that many people from a specific place in Poland go to a single des-
tination abroad.11
4.2 return to Poland
There was no permanent return wave after 1989. Some Polish émigrés 
experimented with return to Poland but often decided not to settle (Górny 
and Kolankiewicz 2002; Stola 2016, 93). No recent quantitative study 
exists of returnees to Poland,12 but our qualitative research13 backs up find-
ings of scholars publishing circa 2010. Although return migration is 
diverse, one can draw a crude distinction between two categories of 
migrant. On the one hand is the large body of young people, often grad-
uates like Rafał and Konrad, who left around 2004 even from cities, and 
mostly went to the United Kingdom and Ireland. They either returned to 
Poland, apparently permanently, or are still abroad. Another category is 
the many thousands of incomplete, often slightly older migrants from 
smaller towns and villages, who in some cases started migrating before 
2004. They are more likely than highly educated migrants to return, some-
times with the intention of settling, but often to continue to engage in 
various kinds of ‘back-and-forth’ migration (Anacka and Fihel 2013, 69; 
Fihel and Grabowska-Lusińska 2014; White 2014b). For some returnees, 
the experience of trying to resettle in Poland persuades them that home 
is in the foreign country, and they engage in ‘double return’: a second 
return, but this time to the foreign country, for which they have begun to 
feel homesick (Raczyński 2015, 146; White 2014a and 2014b). Return-
ees are more economically active than the general population, but most 
surveys show that they are also more likely to be unemployed, sometimes 
on purpose, if periods in Poland are rests between spells of working abroad 
(Grabowska 2016).
Given that ‘return’ is indefinite, it is hard to count ‘returnees’. Data 
collected in Poland is only a snapshot; a complete record of return to Poland 
would need to include surveying Poles abroad as to whether they had ever 
been temporary return migrants. According to survey data, 12 per cent of 
Poles currently resident in Poland have worked abroad for an unspecified 
period in the last ten years, including 27 per cent of 25–34-year-olds (Cybul-
ska 2016, 1);14 another survey, in 2017, found that 22 per cent had worked 
abroad at some time (Kubisiak, Ganclerz and Pilichowska 2017, 20).
Like returnees to other countries, Polish migrants return home for 
family reasons and/or because they are homesick and/or have fulfilled 
21tHe ImPACt of mIGrAtIon from And to PolAnd SInCe eu ACCeSSIon
their migration plans (see, e.g. CDS 2010a, 93; Dziekońska 2012, 140; 
Frelak and Reguska 2008, 3; Kostrzewa and Sałtys 2013, 74). Poland’s 
economic growth during the global economic crisis was not enough on 
its own to persuade Poles to return, particularly because, despite the crisis, 
Polish wages and welfare benefits still compared unfavourably with equiv-
alents in most destination countries (Kaczmarczyk, Anacka and Fihel 
2016, 220). Since migrants return to be at home with their friends and 
family, return is often to smaller places rather than to more thriving cit-
ies. When, as often seems to happen, this is not sustainable economically, 
returnees are tempted to go back to foreign countries, where they already 
know their way round, rather than move to an unfamiliar Polish city, 
where they may not find affordable accommodation. Hence return 
migration from abroad currently has limited capacity to produce a re-
location of the Polish workforce within Poland.15
How long returnees spend abroad affects what influence they can 
have in Poland. The longer migrants are away, the more knowledge they 
acquire of the receiving country, and the more they may improve their 
skills. On the other hand, their networks at home may weaken, although 
this is a very individual matter. Different researchers come to different 
conclusions about Polish return migrants’ average length of stay abroad, 
ranging from under six months (Dziekońska 2012, 98; Frelak and Roguska 
2008) to two years (CDS 2010a, 27; Grabowska-Lusińska 2012).
5. The impact of migration on Poland
5.1 Pre-2004 impact
This book is not about the influence of migration on Poland historically. 
However, it is worth highlighting some continuities. In the early twentieth 
century, Thomas and Znaniecki (1918–20, 1984) studied the corre-
spondence and therefore the transnational practices of migrants and 
stayers – how stayers’ lives in Poland intertwined with those of migrants 
in Chicago. This has arguably always constituted the main type of migra-
tion impact, even if today transnational communication takes different 
forms, and migrants can keep in touch with much wider networks of stay-
ers. During the communist period, particularly after Stalin’s death, con-
tacts were often quite close between Poles in Poland and their relatives 
abroad (Sword 1996). Western material goods – comparatively rare in 
Poland but more available there than in other CEE countries thanks to 
migration and visits abroad – constituted ‘a recognised barometer of social 
status, personal style and taste’ (Burrell 2011b, 145).
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON POLAND22
When international migration became a common livelihood strat-
egy in some Polish regions in the 1990s, the money migrants earned, as 
in other societies, was mostly used for consumption. While it made a dif-
ference to individual households, it had little or no traceable impact on 
the economy, even on a local level, except perhaps in Opole Silesia, where 
migration was most intense (Jończy and Rokita-Poskart 2012; Kacz-
marczyk and Nestorowicz 2016, 144). A sense of loss and missing family 
and friends pervaded life in some locations with high volumes of migra-
tion, especially when family members worked undocumented abroad and 
therefore could not easily return for visits.
I’ve never set eyes on my mother-in-law. She went to the States 
before I met my husband [c.1993]. . . .  She married off her two 
sons, but she wasn’t at either wedding. It’s so sad. But that’s life. 
Thanks to her being in the States her children had their weddings. 
Otherwise they couldn’t have afforded them. (Eliza, Grajewo, 2008, 
knows her mother-in-law only from telephone conversations)
One impact of migration was to breed more migration, as adult children 
with migrating parents often followed in their footsteps (Kaczmarczyk 
2008). ‘Migration cultures’ emerged in local communities, both in the 
sense that migration was an expected and acceptable livelihood strategy, 
and also as ways of understanding and doing migration. One aspect of 
local migration cultures, for example, was a heavy reliance on networks 
of friends and relatives to facilitate migration (Osipowicz 2002). This was 
to become less essential after EU accession.
5.2 migration influences after 2004
Dzięglewski’s survey of Polish weeklies’16 coverage of EU mobility from 
2004 to 2012 reveals an upbeat framing of new mobility opportunities 
around 2004, followed by increasing concern about social problems linked 
to migration, and eventual loss of interest in the topic. Clement’s (2017) 
analysis of articles in popular daily tabloids17 during 2013 suggested, how-
ever, that this section of the press had not lost interest in migration, 
which was often framed negatively, with Eurosceptic overtones.
Survey data from January to March 2014, before the 2015 refugee 
crisis and its politicisation, showed that ordinary Poles were more posi-
tive than negative about the impacts of EU-facilitated migration. When 
asked to express in their own words the pros and cons of EU membership, 
only 1 per cent identified labour migration and its consequences as a 
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disadvantage, and only 1 per cent expressed concern about immigration, 
Islamism and Roma (lumped together as a single answer). The most often 
mentioned benefits were open borders and freedom of movement (named 
by 31 per cent of respondents). See table 2.3.
Golinowska and Kocot, in their book about regional development 
(2013), see migration as a pernicious influence that removes young and 
educated people from Poland. While acknowledging that circular migra-
tion and brain gain – where migrants acquire new skills and knowledge 
abroad – are potentially positive outcomes of migration, they argue that 
these are not very evident in Poland. In their profiles of individual regions, 
they therefore treat net out-migration as symptomatic of underdevelop-
ment. The best outcome, from their perspective, would be more ade-
quate investment outside the flourishing metropolises – in line with EU 
cohesion policy – which would enable Poles to stay in Poland and make 
better use of the human and natural resources in regions currently seen 
as lagging.
Other analysts, influenced by international discourses of ‘harness-
ing the diaspora’ (see chapter 3) are more optimistic about potential ben-
efits of ties created by migration, and suggest the need both to involve 
Polonia organisations in a greater range of economic – as opposed to 
cultural – links with Poland and to encourage entrepreneurship among 
returnees (Anon. 2015). Since 2003, Polish governments have attempted 
to find ways to support return migration, chiefly by providing information 
for potential returnees. Originally they hoped that Poland could emulate 
Ireland (before its 2008 crisis), and used Poland’s GDP growth as an incen-
tive to attract back migrants (Lesińska 2010). However, of course this 
depended on economic growth occurring not nationally, but also in the 
home locations to which migrants actually wanted to return. It seems that 
Table 2.3 The ‘main benefits of EU membership for Poland’  
(answers related to migration benefits only, as percentages)
Open borders, free movement, the Schengen Agreement,   
 visa-free travel
31
Freedom to work within the EU, freedom for business, lower  
 unemployment in Poland
17
Opening up to the world, integration with the world, no cultural  
 barriers, mutual understanding, erosion of stereotypes, feeling  
 of community [with Europe]
3
Freedom to study abroad 2
Benefits, opportunities for young people 2
Source: Roguska 2014, 188–93.
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most regional governments believe that to some extent migration can 
facilitate development. Heffner and Solga (2013, 224) report that only 
three regional governments did not regard migration as offering any 
potential benefit: Lubuskie (on the German border), Wielkopolska 
(centred on Poznań) and Mazowieckie (centred on Warsaw).
Our book complements the edited volume whose title can be trans-
lated A Decade of Polish Membership of the EU: Social Consequences of Post-
2004 Polish Migration (Lesińska et al. 2014), which sums up the state of 
knowledge about migration’s impact on Poland. Decade arose from a 
report aimed at policymakers (Slany and Solga 2014) and presents con-
tributions by leading Polish migration scholars, including Grabowska, 
Kaczmarczyk and Slany. Impressively detailed, it illustrates how impact 
is intertwined with other aspects of migration – migration motives, expe-
riences of life abroad, and the labour market trajectories of individual 
returnees. It recognises that the consequences of migration are region-
ally differentiated. Decade is typical of migration impact scholarship in 
referring quite often to costs and benefits, although it is far from pre-
senting a simple cost-benefit analysis, and in according high priority to 
demographic and economic impacts. It treats a rather narrow range of 
social impacts, focusing mostly on those relating to the economy (labour 
market outcomes and skills), as well as on families (in itself a large and 
multifaceted topic).
A comparison of the content of Decade with the list of Polish social 
trends outlined earlier in this chapter suggests that many trends are not 
covered in migration research. Considering the scale of migration from 
Poland, one might suppose that all kinds of social change are somehow 
influenced. It would be interesting to know what influence migration has, 
for example, on religion, trust or tolerance. Public figures and the media 
are not shy about ascribing migration impact in these areas – for example, 
suggesting that migration contributes to an ongoing corrosion of moral 
values in Polish society by exposing Poles to Western consumerism, by 
focusing their thoughts on material success and by separating family mem-
bers. Such arguments, however simplistic and often not evidence-based 
they might be, are powerful partly because they adopt a holistic, inside-
out approach. Supposedly, Polish society is going in the wrong direc-
tion, and migration contributes to this by promoting consumerism and 
so forth.
An inside-out approach has the merit of making impact easy to grasp 
within the overall context of Poland’s (imagined) trajectory. There is no 
reason for scholars to avoid this approach as long as they can find evidence 
and convincing arguments. This is why, in our book, we turn inside out 
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the analysis in Decade (chapter 5 by Kaczmarczyk and chapter 6 by Slany) 
and also present a wider array of impacts (chapter 4 by Grabowska, chap-
ter  6 by Slany and chapters  7 and 8 by White). Before presenting our 
findings, however, it is important to discuss how mainstream sociologists 
do or do not themselves factor migration into their explanations for chang-
ing Polish society. If migration scholars are not, in general, writing about 
such matters – apart from mentioning them in passing – one would hope 
that mainstream sociologists could fill the gap.
6. Mainstream sociologists and migration
Migration scholars naturally focus on specific migration influences, 
whereas sociologists often examine a wider set of causes of analysed phe-
nomena. Unfortunately, as in the case of the Irish Devotional Revolution 
mentioned in chapter 1, they tend not to look outside the national bor-
ders of the society they know. Hence migration passes unnoticed in many 
monographs and articles. In addition to methodological nationalism, one 
can speculate that in the Polish case another reason for such neglect may 
be that sociologists, who typically work in cities, are not always conscious 
of the significance of migration for smaller locations. Since migration sta-
tistics based on official deregistration from place of residence seriously 
understate the actual number of migrants, sociologists who rely on these 
have an additional reason to underestimate migration’s role.
Establishing migration influence is complicated by the fact that reg-
ular Polish opinion polls do not ask respondents to state whether they 
have migration experience, alongside their other socio-demographic fea-
tures such as age and sex. For example, Feliksiak (2013), discussing why 
increasing numbers of Poles express accepting attitudes towards LGBT 
people, finds a correlation between personally knowing gays and lesbians 
and being tolerant. Having established that this is not merely a correla-
tion, but a causal connection well known to researchers investigating 
attitudes to homosexuality, he points out that small-town residents are 
particularly tolerant, and speculates that this might be because it is eas-
ier to come out in a small town. Not only does this seem counter-intuitive, 
but it misses the more obvious explanation that because of their high inci-
dence of migration, small towns are full of people who have met gays and 
lesbians while they were working abroad.
Generally, only larger polls, notably Social Diagnosis and the one-
off survey Living Conditions in Polish Society (Zagórski 2008a), identify 
return migrants. However, apart from Kaczmarczyk (2014) (a migration 
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scholar and economist), scholars rarely seem to make use of such return 
migrant data. The POLPAN longitudinal survey offers an opportunity to 
track return migrants. Tomescu-Dubrow (2016) uses this material to find 
out whether migration leads to greater wealth, over the long term, and 
finds that respondents who appeared to have spent at least two months 
living and/or working abroad at some point in their lives, had on average 
higher incomes, and were more likely to become employers (of at least 
four non-family members) than respondents who appeared to have no 
foreign experience.
Scholars writing about entire countries are less likely than those 
with local or regional focus to incorporate migration into their analysis. 
Halamska’s (2012) monograph on changing rural Poland, for example, 
mentions international migration only in passing, while the CBOS study 
The Polish Village (Hipsz 2014b) does not refer to it. By contrast, Komor-
ska (2015, 97), discussing the marginalisation of young people in the Lublin 
region, notes that migration is a significant facilitator of upward social 
mobility. Kubicki (2015, 103) offers examples of Podcarpathian villagers 
who bring back more tolerant attitudes to diversity as a result of living 
abroad. Łukowski, Bojar and Jałowiecki, in their study of Gołdap (2009), 
a Polish-Russian border crossing, note that post-accession migration 
opportunities have reduced dependence on survival strategies such as 
smuggling.
Anthropologists, who live among their research participants, are 
particularly well-placed to notice migration. Marysia Galbraith’s 2014 
monograph, based on research since 1992 in Lesko (Podkarpacie) and 
Kraków, shows how different factors come together to cause her partici-
pants to self-identify as European; she includes a whole chapter on migra-
tion. In Hunters, Gatherers, and Practitioners of Powerlessness, a study of 
early twenty-first-century survival strategies such as bootleg mining in 
three post-industrial and post-state farming locations, Rakowski observes 
that such strategies became redundant after 2004. Rakowski is in no 
doubt that EU accession created a lifeline for very poor people, reduc-
ing ‘the scope of poverty, as the unemployed were finding whatever 
work was available in the European Union, and then leaving at once’ 
(2016, xiv).
Social movements is another research area in which migration influ-
ences could more often be taken into account. The mushrooming of urban 
grassroots movements is a noteworthy development in twenty-first-cen-
tury CEE (Jacobsson 2015). In Poland these movements have included, 
for example, an active tenants’ movement to defend the rights of people in 
low-quality housing. Polańska (2015, 212–3) provides a set of explanations 
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which, unusually, include the influence of people who have already migrated 
from Polish cities:
The specificity of the Polish case, that added fuel to the contentious 
action of tenants, was, among others, the legal disorder that pre-
vailed in the country, affecting housing issues, along with the 
growing number of ‘housing-entrepreneurs’ using the inconsisten-
cies of the legal system, and the large number of young people emi-
grating abroad, after the accession to EU, activating the desire for 
better living conditions among those left behind.
One reason why ‘migration’ might escape notice in the urban con-
text is that it is commonly associated by non-specialists with labour migra-
tion. If one adds in educational migration, internships and various kinds 
of professional work trips abroad, then it becomes clearer that cities are 
indeed full of people with experience of life abroad, who often move back 
and forth within a ‘transnational action space’ (Binnie and Klesse 2013). 
Chromiec (2011, 207) observes that NGOs promoting intercultural dia-
logue in Poland are usually staffed by people who have spent time abroad 
or are themselves migrants. Demonstrations in support of refugee or LGBT 
rights in Poland regularly involve Polish return migrants alongside stay-
ers, while other Polish activists in the same causes take part in parallel 
events abroad. Polish LGBT activists such as Robert Biedroń, Poland’s first 
gay mayor, gained inspiration from periods of living and working in other 
EU countries (Binnie and Klesse 2013). Following O’Dwyer, Binnie and 
Klesse make the further point (2013, 1111) that even if the EU’s direct 
influence in promoting LGBT rights is rather weak, much more important 
is the creation of a transnational mobility space where activists circulate 
between countries.
7. An inside-out analysis of the impact of migration
The impact of migration on Poland occurs mostly through links that migra-
tion creates between individual Poles and foreign countries. A contrasting 
view of Poland as an isolated entity, suffering mostly loss as a result of 
mass emigration, does not reflect the lived reality of Polish people today. 
Large numbers of Poles resident in Poland have at one time lived abroad. 
Their past experiences and continuing social networks abroad help 
shape their lives after return from foreign countries. Moreover, the major-
ity of Polish people, those ‘stayers’ who have never lived abroad, have 
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contacts with Polish migrants. When these migrants are close relatives, 
both the stayers and the migrants find their thoughts constantly straying 
across nation-state borders. Iwona, for example, interviewed by White in 
2016, had close family and friends in Italy. When asked what new habits 
her family in Lublin had adopted thanks to frequent visits to Italy, she 
said, ‘How we remind each other “But in Italy! It was like that! Do 
you remember?” ’ Wanda, a pensioner interviewed after her English- 
language class in Wrocław, described how she and her daughter, living 
near London, swapped packets of flower seeds, a botanical exchange that 
to Wanda symbolised the intertwining of Polish and English culture in 
their two lives. Family members of circular migrants in particular can 
find that they participate vicariously in the ‘half-and-half’ lives of their 
family members. When the latter spend time resting in Poland they seem 
to continue to half-live in the country where they work, frequently talking 
about the foreign country and drawing comparisons.
The story of migration’s impact on Poland should also include Poles 
abroad, even those who feel fairly settled. They often maintain close 
ties to Poland, so should be considered part of Polish society. Many other 
Poles come and go, changing their main country of residence more than 
once. Nowadays, it is impossible to draw a distinct line between Poles in 
Poland and a Polish ‘diaspora’ or ‘community’ abroad (known to Poles as 
‘Polonia’). We prefer the term ‘Polish society abroad’. This concept indi-
cates the existence of strong social relations among Poles, irrespective 
of the country in which they happen to be based. Rather than viewing 
migrants as members of no society at all, as is commonly assumed, it 
makes better sense to see certain migrants as simultaneously members 
of two societies. This is particularly true of mobile EU citizens, who 
have congregated in large numbers and represent a kind of microcosm 
of Poland in other member states  –  for example, Poles in the United 
Kingdom.
Social change in Poland is therefore connected to social change 
abroad. Of course, every migrant has their unique set of ties to Poland and 
feels connected to varying extents in different times and places. Some-
times, the connection is hardly perceptible. In other cases, Poles deliber-
ately try to achieve social change through activism across borders. Change 
probably occurs more often not through activism but as a process of 
mutual cultural influence. Sometimes this is unconscious, sometimes 
deliberate, when migrants and stayers try to persuade one another to 
change their habits, values or beliefs about diverse matters, from eating 
habits to racism. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, these are ‘social remit-
tances’, which travel back and forth between the two societies, Polish 
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society abroad and Polish society in Poland. They often reinforce wider 
(particularly US) cultural influences.
In short, everyone in Poland is touched to some extent by migration 
and lives within the transnational social space. However, migration influ-
ences some stayers more than others. Obviously, close family members 
are the most emotionally affected. However, in other respects the impact 
of migration is greatest in the lives and livelihoods of certain parts of soci-
ety, especially Poles who are poorer financially, or less well-educated, or 
retired or resident in small towns and villages, or a combination of two or 
more of these. Social change in Poland is generally most observable in big 
cities and among more educated and younger Poles, partly because these 
sections of the population have the most exposure to a range of outside 
influences. Migration is not so important for them, since their lives are 
changing already for other reasons. It is more important for people who 
are less exposed to other influences.
Migration influences society by reinforcing or, in some cases, coun-
teracting trends that are already occurring for other reasons. An example 
of counteraction would be its damaging effect on levels of belief that ‘most 
people can be trusted’. In common with other CEE countries, Poland, as 
it becomes more prosperous, is also more trusting than in the 1990s. How-
ever, this is an uneven process, and young people exhibit high levels of 
mistrust. A discourse of hostility among economic migrants about other 
Poles, who supposedly let one another down and ‘act like wolves towards 
one another’, amplifies a mistrust of strangers that is already considera-
ble in poorer parts of Poland that have high volumes of international 
migration.
Migration’s role in bolstering trends is apparent with regard to the 
drops in unemployment and poverty mentioned earlier in this chapter, but 
this is most marked at a subnational level. Registered unemployment in 
Poland declined from around 20 per cent in 2004 to around 6 per cent in 
2008, and has remained low, while employment growth has been almost 
steady. The labour market, formerly characterised by a permanent over-
supply of labour, is now marked by growing competition for workers 
(Roszkowska et al. 2017). Wages, both nominal and real, have risen con-
siderably (see figure 5.1). Chapter 5 discusses the extent to which those 
developments are attributable to migration. On a national level, Kacz-
marczyk concludes that the influence of migration is small but generally 
positive. On a subnational level, however, migration can have more visi-
ble impact. In particular, the impressive level of job creation since 2004, 
which is linked to Poland’s healthy annual GDP growth (averaging 3.6 per 
cent, 2004–16) has not occurred everywhere, particularly in rural regions, 
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which are characterised by small family farms and limited economic devel-
opment. In such places, migration plays a clear role in driving down 
unemployment.
Although different ways of measuring poverty produce different 
figures, and the extent of poverty reduction can be disputed, Eurostat 
data suggest that the percentage of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion more than halved, from 45.3 per cent in 2005 to 21.9 per cent 
in 2016.18 Reasons include falling unemployment, rising wages and – very 
recently – more generous welfare provision. Money sent home by migrants 
as ‘economic remittances’ also plays a part.
According to World Bank data (World Bank 2016), the value of 
remittances increased from around 2.28 billion USD in 2003 to over 10 
billion in 2007 and around 6.8 billion in 2015 (i.e. from less than 1 per 
cent to 1.3 per cent of GDP). Barbone, Pięńtka-Kosińska and Topińska 
(2012, 3) estimate that in 2008 remittances decreased the poverty rate 
by about 2 percentage points overall, although remittances varied con-
siderably from region to region. In 2008, 1 per cent of households in 
Mazowieckie received remittances, compared with highs of 6 per cent, 
4 per cent and 4 per cent in Opole, Pomerania and Podkarpacie respec-
tively. They made a substantial difference to households who received 
them, where they constituted an average of 62 per cent of income. 
 Barbone, Pięńtka-Kosińska and Topińska also note a corresponding slight 
decrease in income disparities in Poland thanks to remittances.
Migrants’ ability to send remittances, and the capacity of remittances 
to reduce poverty, depend, however, on many factors, including the 
migrants’ positions in the receiving country labour markets, their migra-
tion strategies and whether they return to settle in Poland. For instance, 
if they are working in poorly paid jobs abroad, migrants may not be able 
to save enough to remit; on the other hand, migrants with better jobs may 
wish to settle in the destination location and invest in the receiving coun-
try rather than send money back home. As in other countries, studies on 
remittances sent home by Polish migrants document that most remitters 
use the money to cover costs of everyday consumption (around 60 per cent 
of all respondents), to improve their housing conditions (30 per cent, ren-
ovation and purchase combined), to pay debts (15 per cent), to invest in 
children’s education (10 per cent) or simply to increase their savings (20 
per cent). These patterns differ, however, not only between Polish regions 
but also according to the migrants’ countries of residence (Chmielewska 
2015). Even if, in aggregate terms, the scale of remittances to Poland is 
not very high, it is commonly assessed as having significant and positive 
impacts on the Polish economy.
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Qualitative research tends to support this conclusion, as illustrated 
above in the references to the strategies of ex-bootleg miners (Rakowski 
2016) and former smugglers (Łukowski, Bojar and Jałowiecki 2009). 
Heads of leading institutions interviewed across 64 locations in Poland 
in 2007 agreed that ‘the material situation was improving as a conse-
quence of economic growth, income from abroad and agricultural subsi-
dies’ (Gorzelak 2008b, 20). White (2016b) finds that poor, long-term 
unemployed people in Limanowa and Grajewo were migrating abroad, 
but not always very successfully. However, sociologists of poverty do not 
always identify migration as a livelihood strategy for the poorest people, 
and this may be quite place specific. Warszywoda-Kruszyńska and Jankowski, 
writing about enclaves of poverty in the city of Łódź, do not discuss 
migration, but they do argue that poor people are becoming dependent 
on shadow banks and constitute a precariat doomed to perpetual social 
exclusion unless the government intervenes (2013, 109–10).
Travel abroad is increasing among all sections of the Polish popula-
tion; this includes retired people, even if they travel less than younger age 
groups. In 2009 only 7 per cent of Polish pensioners, when asked how they 
spent their free time, said they travelled outside Poland. By 2016 the fig-
ure had risen to 22 per cent (Kolbowska 2009, 11; Omyła-Rudzka 2016a, 
5). To some extent, this testifies to the increased prosperity of a section of 
the Polish population, who can afford to enjoy their leisure time in new 
ways. However, it also links to migration. Survey respondents aged over 
55 are more likely than other age groups to mention visits to family and 
friends as reasons to travel abroad (Boguszewski 2016, 10).
For many older Poles, this is a significant new opportunity. For 
example, in Wrocław, Ewa commented, ‘We can get to see the world, learn 
English at first hand. . . .  Otherwise I never would. Because we’re not from 
such a rich family and aren’t so well-off we could afford to go as tourists.’ 
Of course, this is not just a phenomenon among older people; there are 
Poles of all ages who would not be able to afford a foreign holiday but who 
now visit migrants abroad. For example, Malwina, a housewife, married 
to a manual worker, described in 2009 inviting a string of visitors from 
her small town near Ukraine to Bristol:
My sister and her husband have been twice, our friends have been, 
and now we have Mum. And we invite everybody who wants to 
come, let them come and see! They haven’t been abroad before, they 
didn’t have the opportunity, and now they have the chance to come 
and look. . . .  They come just for a week or two. To see things, to go 
shopping.
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, more Poles have been acquiring 
higher education thanks to its greater availability since 1989. Poles are 
also becoming more educated and skilled in other ways. In particular, 
knowledge of some foreign languages has spread. So too have transfera-
ble ‘soft’ skills – though not to an extent commensurate with the needs of 
Polish employers.
In 1996, only 14 per cent of Polish people aged 17–21 declared they 
could make themselves understood in English (Grabowska and Kalka 
2014, 133, 135). By 2005, 73 per cent of under-25s claimed some knowl-
edge of English (Panek, Czapiński and Kotowska 2005, 41). The introduc-
tion of mandatory English classes at school helps explain why this 
generation so readily migrated to Ireland and the United Kingdom. Since 
2004 there is evidence, however, that not only does language knowledge 
facilitate migration from Poland, but also the reverse: migration is sup-
porting better language knowledge within Poland. From 2009 onwards, 
survey evidence shows that the 25–34-year-old age group knew English 
better than any section of the adult population, even under-25s, whom one 
might expect to be the most confident, since they were currently study-
ing languages. This suggests that many of those 25–34-year-olds had pre-
viously used English at work abroad. Surveys of return migrants show that 
most consider language skills to be a significant gain from migration. 
Return labour migrants to Małopolska in 2010 claimed they had learned 
much more by using their languages abroad than they had in formal edu-
cation in Poland (CDS 2010a, 151–2). In surveys in Lower Silesia and Silesia, 
87 per cent and 90 per cent of return migrants said they had learned or 
improved their language skills abroad (CDS 2010b and CDS 2011).
Polish employers indicate the importance today of competences such 
as independence, entrepreneurship, teamwork and communication skills. 
However, they also complain that such skills are possessed insufficiently 
by workers in Poland (Religa 2014, 23–4, 42). It seems that return migra-
tion helps address this deficit. Analysis of the Human Capital in Poland 
survey (2010–14) shows that the workers with the highest level of social 
skills are disproportionately well-represented among people who had 
engaged at some time in international migration, or had higher or second-
ary education, or had lived in cities, or were aged 19–44, or were employed 
or owned their own businesses.
Although people working in their field of expertise can hone profes-
sional skills abroad, even simple manual jobs provide opportunities for 
learning social skills. Obviously, workplaces vary. If workers interact with 
one another and customers, this provides opportunities for learning soft 
skills less easily acquired in other settings – for example, in a fish-freezing 
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factory, where migrants wear protective clothing and cannot speak to 
one another. Nonetheless, a migrant in any workplace can find points of 
difference with their Polish experience that prompt ‘aha’ moments of sud-
den understanding (Grabowska 2017). The more transferable and uni-
versal the skills and competences, the more they can be applied within a 
Polish workplace after the migrant returns. By contrast, this is not always 
the case for technical qualifications.
One such competence is entrepreneurship, often associated with 
return migration across the world. Poland is already a country of small 
businesses (Tarnawa et al. 2015); migrants help maintain the phenome-
non. According to the Human Capital in Poland survey (2010–14), 13 per 
cent of return migrants, as compared with 11 per cent of stayers, ran their 
own business. Although there are many reasons why return migrants 
become entrepreneurs, it is also the case that returnees everywhere report 
that migration has enhanced their self-confidence. This self-confidence 
induces many to try their hand at setting up a business. As in other coun-
tries, their ideas are often not original: yet another second-hand clothes 
shop or small building firm does not change the commercial landscape. 
Sometimes, however, returnees fill gaps in the market. For example, among 
our interviewees and their relatives, a builder gave up his job abroad to 
pursue his passion for motorcycles, becoming a successful dealer in for-
eign motorcycle parts; a former forester in Germany worked as a guide 
for Germans on hunting trips; and an investment banker from the United 
States opened the first quality restaurant in her small home town. Migrants 
on holidays back in Poland also patronise local shops and services and 
help keep them afloat.
A growth in entrepreneurial attitudes within society connects to 
increasing individualisation, understood as the greater sense of auton-
omy and opportunity to shape one’s own life that has been present in 
post-communist societies since the 1990s. This individualisation contrasts 
with communist-era collectivism, even if collectivism never reached the 
levels in Poland that it did, for example, in the neighbouring German 
Democratic Republic. In the twenty-first century, individualisation is 
linked to the opportunities offered by more wealth in Polish society and 
EU-enhanced mobility.
The European Values Survey measures individualism by asking 
respondents to choose how far they consider themselves ‘autonomous 
individuals’. The data shows a 2.5 percentage point increase among Poles 
between 2005 and 2012.19 This increase must be linked partly to educa-
tion and income, but must also derive from respondents having had con-
fidence-building experiences such as migration. Garapich (2016c, 159) 
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describes an ‘emphasis on self-determination’ among migrants from 
Sokółka, and Leśniak-Moczuk (2015, 155) similarly claims that return 
migrants to south-east Poland have become more independent. Our own 
interviewees mentioned developing a sense of independence through 
migration. For example, Lucyna, a returnee whom economic hardship had 
forced (in her view) to go abroad in the midst of her Polish university studies, 
commented:
Many people who aren’t planted in one place don’t have narrow views 
about society being uniform. That because I was brought up in this 
country I have to do the same as everyone else. Isn’t that true? I’ll fol-
low the same path as the rest. No, the fact that you can simply have 
your own opinion, you should think things out for yourself, and so 
on, that’s how it [working abroad] gave me so much. I really grew up.
Religiosity is an area of Polish life where individualisation seems to 
be proceeding apace. Although the number of Poles believing in God 
dropped by only four percentage points in the first ten years after EU acces-
sion (from 96 per cent in 2005 to 92 per cent in 2014 (Boguszewski 
2015a, 37), attendance at weekly mass has fallen below 50 per cent, and 
many more Poles have begun to consider their faith to be their own affair. 
In 2014, 52 per cent claimed that ‘I am a believer in my own way’, an 
increase of 20 percentage points since 2005. In 2005, the most popular 
response (66 per cent) had been ‘I am a believer and I adhere to the 
Church’s teachings’, but by 2014 only 39 per cent of respondents chose 
this answer (Boguszewski 2015a, 40). Although there are various reasons 
why Poles might be feeling less close to the Catholic Church as an institu-
tion, such as the association of part of the hierarchy with extreme con-
servative views, and the death of John Paul II, migration also seems to play 
a role. There is no evidence that migration is turning Poles into atheists. 
However, it does seem to dent weekly attendance at mass, which is 10 per 
cent or less among Polish parishioners abroad. The falling-off partly seems 
linked to practical impediments, but migration also reinforces the idea 
that religion is a personal choice, as Poles become more familiar with other 
faiths or different variants of Roman Catholicism, and as part of the pro-
cess of questioning and reflection that accompanies migration. Hence it 
is not surprising if return migrants add to the number of Poles who con-
tinue to believe in God, but increasingly ‘in their own way’.
Migration additionally contributes to individual autonomy by facil-
itating changing lifestyles. Material aspirations are rising overall in Poland 
(CBOS 2009, 16), and this connects to the desire to exercise more choice 
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and enjoy more variety in everyday life – for example in fashion or eating 
habits. Poles from all locations, including villages, express curiosity about 
new types of food and a willingness to experiment (Bieńko 2015). Chang-
ing eating habits can be explained by factors such as more disposable 
income for many Poles; the availability of new foods in city shops and 
eating places, especially in cities; advertising; televised cookery pro-
grammes; the Internet; and holidays and migration abroad. However, 
Bieńko (2015) points to the particular importance of having been abroad. 
Main (2016b) illustrates how migrants pick up new habits, describing 
their culinary experiments in Berlin and Barcelona.
Although Domański et al. (2015) show that, in Poland, it is the rich-
est Poles who are more likely to eat exotic dishes, new tastes resulting 
from migration do not have to be extravagant. For example, Andrzej 
(interviewed in Lublin) and his wife, return migrants from France and 
Italy, having acquired a taste for lighter food abroad, fed their children 
more vegetables and less meat and potatoes than their extended family in 
Poland. Return migrants also open restaurants serving foreign food – for 
example, an interviewee who had picked up a taste for Indian food in 
London reported visiting a new Indian takeaway in Łódź, established by 
Poles who had also acquired a liking for Indian food in the United King-
dom. An interviewee from a smaller town in central Poland mentioned the 
success of two new pizza restaurants, both set up by Polish women who 
had worked in Italy, with their Italian husbands.
Individualisation was signalled by rising levels of homeownership 
in the 1990s, a trend partly fed by migration, as some small towns in 
Poland such as Grajewo acquired whole streets built with migrant money. 
Staszyńska (2008, 109) mentions a housing estate in another small town, 
locally nicknamed ‘Hamburg’.20 More recently, the Polish building boom 
reflects the greatly increased availability of mortgages over the last few 
years and the activity of property developers in and around cities. In 
smaller locations, however, many new houses continue to be built and 
maintained with migration money.
The best example of migrant wealth is Słopnice. . . .  Huge numbers 
of people are working abroad. Generally people round here used to 
tell jokes about Słopnice, the village was notorious for being so 
poor. . . .  Now, if you go through Słopnice you see that every single 
house has been renovated, or is totally new. (Jan, Limanowa, 2013)
Ewa, a migrant’s wife from a neighbouring village, commented: ‘If you 
look at the houses round the Limanowa area . . .  they’re lovely. That’s our 
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mentality, everyone invests in their house . . .  To keep it all up, to pay for 
it all, someone simply has to work abroad.’
Elrick (2008, 1514) also comments on the aesthetics of migrant 
houses in Polish villages, with features such as rock gardens and gnomes 
copied from abroad. As Izabela Grabowska argues in chapter 4, the beau-
tification of small-town Poland by individual migrants helps cement a pro-
cess of regeneration that is mostly taking place thanks to local investments 
utilising EU structural funds.
Another respect in which Polish lifestyles are changing thanks to 
new infrastructure is the enhanced opportunities for families to spend lei-
sure time in interesting ways, for example at aqua parks or child-friendly 
museums, and families living abroad patronise such places when they 
return for holidays. Families who have lived abroad sometimes become 
more used to spending leisure time as families. As Krystyna Slany shows 
in chapter 6, the many Poles who now live in Norway benefit especially 
from official measures to promote work–life balance. Often, like Norwe-
gians, they spend time on outdoor pursuits, whatever the weather. 
Grabowska, in chapter 4, illustrates how some Poles who come back from 
abroad try to convince their contacts in Poland of the importance of cre-
ating quality time with children. For example, she describes a pet shop 
owner in the small town of Trzebnica who tried to spread the idea that it 
was more important to devote time to children after work and school 
rather than to cleaning the house.
Although the evidence for increasing gender equality in Poland is 
somewhat uneven and hard to assess, given recent official support for 
tightening the abortion law and outlawing the term ‘gender’, surveys in 
Poland do show that more people think gender equality is an important 
value, compared with the more conservative 1990s. Mirosława Grabowska 
(2013a, 12–26) suggests that approval for an egalitarian division of house-
hold roles in 2013 stood at 46 per cent. The presence of highly educated 
Polish women in many parts of the labour force, and an active women’s 
movement, reinforce the trend towards equality, as did governments 
before 2015, which introduced EU gender equality principles into Polish 
legislation. However, it can be hard for women to realise aspirations for 
greater equality, especially poorer women from small towns. Migration 
can act against the overall trend and obstruct gender equality, especially 
when wives of male migrants become entirely dependent on their earn-
ings, as happens in some villages in southern Poland. However, migration 
also plays the opposite role, promoting greater autonomy for women. 
Migration is a popular livelihood strategy for mothers with adult children 
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from economically depressed locations, and can be particularly liberating 
for women escaping unhappy marriages. Such middle-aged women are 
often circular migrants, so they frequently return to Poland, where they 
sometimes inspire other women, such as their daughters, to follow their 
example and become more independent.
Female migrants the world over tend to entrust their caring responsi-
bilities at home to other women rather than to husbands remaining in the 
origin country. There are, nonetheless, cases where Polish fathers, thanks 
to migration livelihood strategies, become more involved in childcare. 
Jerzy, a builder from near Limanowa, interviewed between spells of work 
abroad, reported, ‘I look after the children. At first it was hard to get used 
to it, small children, now I don’t mind being left with them for longer 
spells, cooking . . .  I’d rather stay at home with my children while I look for 
decent work abroad.’ Survey evidence in Poland shows fathers today being 
more involved than their own fathers had been in helping organise fam-
ily leisure time (Krzaklewska et al. 2016). One factor here, as mentioned 
above, may be links with families abroad in countries such as Norway.
Conservatives in Poland often complain that migration damages 
family values. However, if so, this is not having a perceptible impact on 
survey data. With the exception of some very recent data on the young-
est Polish adults, the survey Youth 2016 (Grabowska and Gwiazda 2017), 
surveys consistently show that Poles put the family first: around 80 per 
cent state that their family constitutes the main purpose of their lives 
(Grabowska 2013b). In fact, the quite extensive research on Polish fami-
lies abroad provides plenty of evidence of family solidarity, often enhanced 
by the trials and tribulations of migration, which draw families together. 
Moreover, families are acutely conscious of the need carefully to maintain 
ties with family members across borders. Nuclear families living in other 
EU countries today have better opportunities than their predecessors to 
nurture connections with extended family members, involving grandpar-
ents as carers, thinking about the latters’ care needs in Poland and, in 
some cases, being actively involved in their care (Krzyżowski 2013). 
Divorce rates have been rising in Poland, but although this might seem at 
first glance likely to be attributable to migration, it seems that migration 
is often an exacerbating factor rather than the main reason for family col-
lapse. Divorce rates are strongly differentiated by region. Among the 
regions with the most migration, divorce rates remain low in the south-
ern and eastern regions, where church attendance is highest, but are 
higher in northern and western regions, where the Church and social pres-
sure not to divorce have become less powerful.
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Openness to new ideas about gender roles can link to other forms 
of openness. It is obviously not the case that migration automatically 
promotes tolerance; nonetheless, it is hard to go abroad and completely 
fail to notice unfamiliar forms of behaviour. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, a 2014 survey showed that 47 per cent of Poles believed toler-
ance of alternative viewpoints had increased since the collapse of com-
munism, with 20 per cent believing the opposite (Boguszewski 2014a, 
93). The proportion of Poles saying they believed homosexuality ‘should 
not be tolerated’ fell from 41 per cent in 2001 to 26 per cent in 2013 
(Feliksiak 2013, 62). Between 2004 and 2017, the number of Poles 
claiming to ‘dislike’ specific other nationalities dropped, including 
declines from 34 to 22 per cent for Germans and from 45 to 26 per cent 
for Jews.
Certain political parties have been stoking fear of refugees since the 
election campaign of 2015, and support for accepting refugees has fallen 
sharply in opinion polls; this is a mediated migration impact, similar to 
impacts in Western countries. This is about the potential impact of migra-
tion. However, acceptance of immigrant workers is growing. The percent-
age of Poles who believe that foreigners should be allowed to ‘undertake 
any work’ in Poland rose from 9 per cent in 1992 to 56 per cent in 2016 
(Feliksiak 2016, 8).
In many societies, there is a link between higher education and 
higher income levels, and more tolerant viewpoints. Gołębiowska argues 
that ‘religiosity, education, and age, in that order, emerge as the consist-
ently most important influences on Polish tolerance’ (2014, 172). Survey 
evidence suggests that cities, particularly the largest centres such as 
Warsaw and Wrocław, contain a disproportionate number of tolerant 
inhabitants; as mentioned earlier in this chapter, their residents are 
also disproportionately well-educated and well off. With regard to migra-
tion as a factor promoting openness, the limited evidence tends to suggest 
that Polish migrants are more likely than not to acquire more open-to- 
difference attitudes abroad. This implies change among working-class 
migrants as well as others. Scholars no longer assume that only hyper- 
mobile professionals are the most likely group to have cosmopolitan 
attitudes enhanced by living abroad. They point also to the phenomenon 
of working-class cosmopolitanism: in fact, ordinary workers often associate 
with a wider range people in the receiving country than do professionals, 
who can live quite narrow lives (Datta 2009; Werbner 1999).
Interview data suggests that migration experience is significant 
in shaping more tolerant attitudes among some less well-educated and 
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older Poles and their visitors from Poland, particularly perhaps in 
some ‘super- diverse’ districts of cities like Madrid or London, where 
there is no dominant ethnic group. This supports Kuhn’s (2012) asser-
tion that when less well-educated people become more open to differ-
ence, it is often as a result of personal experiences. Sometimes they 
reject racism because they themselves encounter it abroad, so can put 
themselves in the shoes of others, as in the case of Iwona, a Grajewo 
resident without a complete secondary education who had worked in 
southern Italy:
That racism was the worst thing. . . .  Why did they treat me like 
that? How am I worse? A person doesn’t feel that they are worse! 
Just because they don’t know the language. If you came here, I 
wouldn’t treat you like that. It should depend on character, what a 
person is like.
Migration therefore serves as an ‘eye-opener’ for individual members of 
social groups who, considered overall as social categories in survey data, 
often appear to be intolerant. Of course, one should not exaggerate trends 
towards openness in Poland, or the role of migration in contributing to 
these. Nowicka and Krzyżowski (2017, 15) argue that Polish migrants 
often engage in ‘aversive racism or homophobia’, avoiding open displays 
of intolerance only because they realise this is considered unacceptable 
in certain situations abroad. Moreover, the reverse can also happen, with 
Polish migrants mimicking racist ideas which they pick up from local res-
idents (Fox and Mogilnicka 2017). In addition, xenophobic social media 
link Poles in Poland and foreign countries. Racist attitudes held by Polish 
migrants towards people living in Western countries become conflated 
with Poles in Poland’s rejection of Muslim refugees and mix together on 
the Internet in a shared nationalist discourse.
It is too early to assess the impact of immigration in Poland, although 
it has suddenly become a mass phenomenon thanks to the arrival of hun-
dreds of thousands of Ukrainian workers and students. As of 2017, the 
main impacts are to fill gaps in the Polish labour market and to add to the 
ethnic diversity of the resident population. However, contact with foreign-
ers in Poland can contribute towards attitudes to difference. As illustrated 
in chapter 10, it allows Poles to reflect on similarities with Poles’ own sta-
tus as migrants in foreign countries and sometimes also to practise for-
eign language skills and other cultural knowledge learned abroad. Hence 
it can help entrench greater openness.
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8. Conclusion: EU mobility and social change
The European Union provides the closest thing to a ‘laboratory’ on open 
borders, allowing us to examine how reducing barriers to mobility 
might play out. . . .  The current knowledge base on the economic and 
social impacts of free movement is slim – in part because the flexible, 
multifarious forms intra-EU mobility take obscures it from official data 
sources.
Benton and Petrović 2013, 1
The impact of introducing the free movement of people has mostly been 
studied in terms of how it leads to new patterns of migration, often termed 
‘mobility’. The nature of the social impact on sending countries might 
also be changed by EU free movement, but this type of change is hardly 
studied. The one follows from the other. First, as often acknowledged, EU 
mobility rights lead to the creation of more intense transnational fields. 
These help determine mobility patterns, but, as we have seen, they also 
shape the lives of stayers. Second, within the EU mobility laboratory one 
can observe very diverse types of mobility. This diversity in turn has impli-
cations for lives and livelihoods in the sending country, creating numer-
ous channels for impact – for instance, from family visits and educational 
exchanges – in addition to the standard economic remittances typically 
studied.
Third, the evolution of EU refugee and asylum policy in 2015 and 
its agreement to apportion Syrian refugees between member states has 
considerably bolstered the power of right-wing populist parties in CEE, 
including Poland. Finally, the fast tempo of change, with its corollaries, 
speedy network building and a rapid transition towards migration for 
settlement, has considerable impact on the countries of origin. As chap-
ter 9 discusses, it has led to the emergence of Polish society abroad. How-
ever, the rapidity and recentness of these changes, and the threat of 
Brexit hanging over citizens from continental EU countries residing in the 
United Kingdom, also raise the question of how secure such hastily con-
structed transnational ties will prove to be. We began our discussion of 
social change in this chapter by stating that we were interested in ‘change 
as an ongoing process’. Our story therefore remains unfinished and, in 
chapter 11, we suggest how further research might be conducted to con-
tinue what we have begun.
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Notes
 1 ‘Bartosz’, interviewed by Anne White in 2016. All interviewees have been given 
pseudonyms to protect their identities.
 2 A 2013 survey, however, found that only 45 per cent of respondents self-identified 
as middle class (Roguska and Boguszewski 2013a, 47).
 3 http:// www . cbos . pl / PL / trendy / trendy . php ? trend _ parametr​=​stosunek _ do 
_ integracji _ UE, last accessed 1 October 2017.
 4 Knowing of pogroms in some localities, Jews elsewhere often felt threatened 
by violence as well as fleeing actual poverty and discrimination (Lederhendler 
2014, 174).
 5 Warsaw was the only city studied by the Warsaw University Centre of Migration 
Research in the 1990s.
 6 In an extreme case, nearly one in four people aged 25–9 from Olsztyn went 
abroad (Anacka and Okólski 2010, 158). See White (2010b) on youth migration 
from small towns.
 7 Exceptionally, Konrad was interviewed in English, at his request.
 8 See Okólski and Salt (2014) for detailed discussion of ‘why so many came’ to the 
United Kingdom.
 9 Nonetheless, 2002 and 2011 census data showed the same regions in the lead. 
In 2011, per 1000 population, 106 inhabitants of Opole Silesia, 91 in Podlasie 
and 84 in Podkarpacie had migrated abroad. In Mazowieckie the number was 28.
 10 GUS estimates are based on a combination of Polish and receiving country data. 
The proportion of labour migrants was also different in different regions.
 11 Exceptions include Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski–Southampton, Mielec–Jersey, Sanok 
and Sokółka–London.
 12 Strzelecki et al. (2015) provide some information on the Social Diagnosis sample.
 13 Grabowska’s and White’s projects are described in chapters 4 and 7.
 14 Martin and Radu (2012, 111), using European Social Survey data for 2006–8, 
estimate that 8 per cent of the active population aged 24–65 had worked abroad 
for at least 6 months in the past 10 years.
 15 For example, CDS (2010a, 100) found that almost every migrant who returned 
to Małopolska originated from the region, and about 90 per cent returned to 
their home town or village. 7.3 per cent of residents of other towns in the region 
moved to Kraków after return.
 16 Newsweek Polska, Polityka, Wprost and Gość Niedzielny.
 17 Fakt and Metro.
 18 ‘People at risk of poverty or social exclusion’. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm 
/ refreshTable Action.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_50&language=en, last 
accessed 8 December 2017.
 19 Respondents are asked whether they agree (on a four-point scale) that ‘I see 
myself as an autonomous individual’. See http:// www . worldvaluessurvey . org 
/ WVSOnline . jsp. 77.1 per cent/79.6 per cent agreed in 2005/2012 and 15.4 per 
cent/15 per cent) disagreed.
 20 Brzozowski (2014, 274–5) calculated that in 2004–8, returnees to Małopolska 
used their foreign earnings to purchase housing equivalent to 10 per cent of 
new housing that became available in the region. However, because they did not 
always buy new houses, the total new housing bought by migrants would have 
been less than 10 per cent.
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Literature review and theory
The impact of migration on sending countries, with 
particular reference to Central and Eastern Europe
Anne White And izAbelA GrAboWskA
1. Chapter scope and aims
This chapter explains how we understand key concepts for our topic and 
explores dimensions of the concepts that are particularly useful for under-
standing the arguments later in the book. Like most other migration 
scholars today, we are convinced of the need to apply a transnational lens. 
However, our book proceeds from the premise that most other analytical 
frameworks used to study migration impact are only partly helpful, both 
in general, and for understanding CEE in particular. Chapter 3 therefore 
explains conceptual shortcomings in mainstream literature. This justifies 
our alternative, inside-out approach, which focuses on mapping social 
change in sending countries before considering how migration con-
tributes to change, often through a process that can be labelled social 
remitting.
The chapter builds on our own recent research and conceptual 
work. Together with colleagues, especially Michał Garapich, we have 
been developing and operationalising Levitt’s (1998) concept of social 
remittances. Standard cost-benefit, often developmentalist approaches 
to impact are not the whole story. Of course migration does bring social 
and economic costs and benefits, and these are relevant to the develop-
ment of countries and subnational regions. However, migration’s influ-
ences are also wider and subtler. These nuances can only be appreciated 
by microscopic analysis of qualitative data. Moreover, since stayers are not 
passive recipients of change (Carling 2008, 1455), it is also important 
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to look beyond migrants, the natural subject matter of migration schol-
arship. By virtue of living within transnational social spaces, stayers too 
create change in the sending society. This is the least researched type 
of impact. In general, stayers are neglected in migration research 
(Grabowska 2016; Hjälm 2014). Our chapter explains how they can 
be better included.
Another function of this chapter is to review scholarly and policy- 
based literature on the impact of migration on other sending countries, 
particularly in CEE. Probably the largest number of publications is about 
Poland, but there is also an emerging Romanian- and English- language 
literature on migration’s impact on Romania.1 Fewer academic English- 
language publications discuss other countries, despite huge flows from 
Albania,2 Lithuania, Latvia and Moldova. By drawing comparisons, we 
set Poland in regional context. We hope that the concepts and methodology 
developed in this book will be applied by other scholars to different 
countries within the region.
Analysis of migration influence should distinguish between differ-
ent layers where impact occurs: societal, household and individual; 
national, regional and local. It should also distinguish between types of 
migrant. Migration impact on sending-country populations depends on 
who migrates, for how long and to where; why they go/return; and what 
they do while they are abroad and after they come back. Receiving coun-
tries also vary, so migration-related influences from one will be different 
from the next. This is illustrated, for example, in Carletto and Kilic’s 2011 
study of the lower occupational mobility in Albania of returnees from 
unskilled labour in Greece, compared with people who had performed 
more highly skilled jobs in Italy and further afield. We argue that only by 
employing the concept of social remittances and conducting qualitative 
research can scholars gain a sufficiently close-up view of these interwo-
ven combinations of variables creating migration influence.
Existing literature tends to address two themes: development and 
return migration. It sits within larger literatures on those topics. Since 
development is a policy goal, literature is normative, considering ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ outcomes. It sometimes blends comfortably into popular and 
media analyses of migration impact, which similarly adopt a cost-benefit 
approach. Return migration research more often explores the motivations 
and experiences of individuals, and local return conditions, rather than 
wider social impact, and it does not always have a policy focus. The top-
ics of development and return migration overlap, particularly in recent 
years, given widespread interest among policymakers in ‘harnessing’ 
return migration.
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In contemporary CEE, these scholarly preoccupations with develop-
ment and return give pause for thought. How can we understand migra-
tion impact in the case of countries that have high United Nations Human 
Development indicators and cannot be labelled ‘developing’? If ‘develop-
ment is about improving the life conditions that are faced by the global 
majority’ (Potter et al. 2012, 3) how can the migration impact literature 
be adapted to suit high-income and higher-middle income countries in 
CEE, countries whose citizens are part of the ‘global minority’? We should 
also ask whether ‘return’, with its conventional implications of permanent 
return, is an appropriate concept for mobile EU citizens.
The chapter is structured as follows. After discussing key concepts, 
particularly ‘diaspora’, ‘transnational ties’ and ‘return’, and reflecting on 
collective and individual impacts, we mention some scholarly findings 
about costs and benefits for CEE sending countries, and briefly discuss 
pros and cons of this approach. We move on to critique the migration- 
development nexus as a specific, policy-oriented framework for understand-
ing costs and benefits. Having demonstrated its insufficiency, we explore 
the more promising avenue of social remittances as an analytical tool, and 
explain how we will be combining it with an ‘inside-out’ approach that 
looks at social trends before factoring in migration influence.
2. Concepts: Diaspora, transnational ties, return
The impact of migration is commonly seen as the creation of gaps in the 
sending country – brain drain, skills shortages, ‘unemployment export’, a 
reduced working-age population supporting an increasingly aged popu-
lation, and so on. However, in recent decades scholars and policymakers 
have become more aware that migration creates ties as well as gaps: ties 
with foreign receiving countries that have impact on sending ones. Kapur 
(2010, 14), writing about India, distinguishes four channels of impact: a 
prospect channel (where hope of future migration shapes stayers’ behav-
iour), an absence channel, a diaspora channel and a return channel. This 
section focuses on understanding these transnational links and, in particu-
lar, diaspora and return channels of impact.
As Brubaker (2005) and Faist (2010) discuss, the term ‘diaspora’ has 
been stretched in recent years. It has been losing connotations of forced 
dispersal, with a longing to return to a lost homeland. Although this 
remains relevant for refugees, ‘diaspora’ is often used for any group of 
migrants originating from the same country. In keeping with its original 
meaning, however, ‘diaspora’ is often used in the singular, as if all 
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co-nationals scattered around different foreign countries shared a single 
group membership.
The ‘diaspora’ construct is one way of imagining migrants collec-
tively. Morawska (2011, 1030) refers to it as an ideal type. Diaspora help 
for sending countries is often considered an attractive alternative to 
migrant return, and a key to positive migration impact. Since UNESCO’s 
1970s programme for encouraging diasporas to diffuse scientific knowl-
edge in countries of origin (Raghuram 2009, 106), policymakers who 
believe migration impact can be shaped have adopted the term, together 
with its built-in assumptions of ethnic solidarity. The impression that a 
diaspora really exists as a single unit is bolstered by specific migrants 
claiming to speak and act on its behalf (Sinatti and Horst 2015, 136). 
Indeed, Brubaker (2005, 1) suggests diaspora should be considered ‘not 
as a bounded entity but as an idiom, stance and claim’. Although our book 
does not refer to a Polish diaspora, on the grounds that the phrase implies 
a misleading degree of unity, we do use ‘diaspora organisations’. These 
denote groups with a strong sense of diaspora identity, which claim to 
speak for fellow nationals abroad. As a result, they often ignore the sepa-
rate interests of less powerful co-nationals such as women and manual 
workers.
Migrants can help increase income and wealth in their origin coun-
tries via ‘social units such as hometown, religious, ethnic, village or alumni 
associations’ (Faist 2016, 334). In many countries, migrants display 
impressive concern for their communities of origin. For example, Xiang 
(2013, 188) writes about villagers living in Beijing who ‘made generous 
financial contributions to traditional ceremonies and public projects such 
as road constructions even though the villages were almost empty most 
of the time due to outmigration’. Hometown associations are often seen 
as the quintessential development tool, and are quite common in many 
countries across the world (Goldring 2004; Orozco and Rouse 2007).
However, as far as we know, the literature provides no examples of 
hometown associations among CEE migrants living in western Europe.3 
Moreh (2014, 1764), writing about Alcalá, near Madrid, argues that 
Romanians abroad do not form hometown associations and suggests that, 
in the one case where a group did support a twinning arrangement, this 
was an exception to their normal preoccupation with members’ affairs in 
Spain. Although CEE policymakers would like to utilise diaspora organi-
sations (Hazans 2016b, 338; Nevinskaitė 2016, 139),4 migrant organisa-
tions are usually concerned about the affairs and cultural identity of 
co-nationals living in the receiving society (see also Thaut 2009, 220, on 
Lithuania). Rare instances of CEE diaspora engagement seem to be based 
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on economic self-interest. An example is the pressure exercised through 
social media by Moldovans living abroad on the Moldovan government 
to lower road fees for cars with foreign licence plates (Cucoş 2015).
In the case of contemporary CEE migration, which is a mass migra-
tion of individuals, claims by an organisation to speak on behalf of a ‘dias-
pora’ should be treated with care. It is more helpful to understand the 
situation as being one where members of a certain society have to some 
extent transferred themselves abroad. ‘Polish society abroad’ is theorised 
in chapter 9. The most significant point to note here is that ‘society abroad’ 
emerges thanks to the creation of dense transnational fields.
Nieswand (2014, 404) writes of a ‘wave of transnationalization of 
the Ghanaian society that was stimulated by mass migration from Ghana 
over the last few decades’. This phenomenon equally characterises other 
sending societies. Empirical research across the world testifies to an inten-
sification of migrants’ links with friends and relatives in the origin country 
through transnational practices and ‘simultaneity, or living lives that incor-
porate daily activities, routines, and institutions located both in a destination 
country and transnationally’ (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 1003). Accord-
ing to Guarnizo, Sanchez and Roach (1999, 369) ‘transnational migrants 
tend to merge into a single social continuum (that is, transnational social 
field), rather than separate their settlement “here” and their communities 
“there”.’ Transnational activities include using social media that allow 
migrants to conduct their lives simultaneously with friends and family 
physically based in the other country, as well as more traditional prac-
tices such as eating ethnic food, following news and popular culture, pay-
ing visits home, and so on. Through such practices, migrants develop some 
sense of ‘double belonging’ (Vertovec 2004, 975), ‘dual membership’ 
(Levitt 2001) or, in a formulation which hints that more than two coun-
tries or locations can be involved, a ‘diversity of reference points’ (Boc-
cagni 2014, 2). However, in different settings abroad, and at different 
moments, one membership is felt more strongly than the other. As Castles 
(2002, 1159) observes, ‘Individuals and groups constantly negotiate 
choices with regard to their participation in host societies, their relation-
ships with their homelands, and their links to co-ethnics.’
Without using a transnational lens, it is hard to understand how 
migrants and stayers function in today’s world, and our thinking remains 
trapped in the ‘container’ of methodological nationalism. The existence 
of transnational social space affects the emotional lives of many millions 
of non-migrants, such as the hero of the Allegro advertisement described 
in chapter 1. In fact, in high-migration countries such as Poland or the 
United Kingdom, it is hard to agree with Carling (2008) that any sending 
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and receiving country residents live lives completely untouched by migra-
tion and therefore outside transnational social fields.
The term ‘transnational families’ captures this idea of families 
living in two or more countries, although it is used differently by differ-
ent scholars. It refers alternatively to nuclear families split between two 
countries, when migrants maintain a ‘shadow household’ (Faist 2004, 8) 
in the sending country, and to nuclear families who live together abroad 
but maintain transnational links with extended family in the country 
of origin. This is a particularly sensitive topic on which, as Slany shows 
in chapter  6, scholarly, evidence-based interpretations can contradict 
assumptions made by politicians and journalists. Caregivers are by nature 
prone to worries about the adequacy of the care they provide, and to feel-
ings of guilt if it might be perceived as falling short of an ideal. Caring for 
relatives at a geographical distance magnifies such concerns, particularly 
when the norm in sending societies such as those in eastern and south-
ern Europe is that female family members should be at home to fulfil car-
ing responsibilities. Mădroane (2016, 239), for example, writing on 
Romanian media anxieties about children ‘left behind’, mentions ‘cultural 
perceptions that proximity is a condition for care’.
The transnational lens permits a close-up view of the actual, many 
and varied types of relationship that are maintained transnationally. Schol-
ars writing about migrants with good opportunities for engaging in trans-
national practices point out that absence of migrants from relatives in the 
sending country has a different quality today from in the past. More intense 
and real-time contact, thanks to technology, ‘softens’ absence and facili-
tates more intense transnational caring than used to be possible. Nedelcu, 
for example, quotes a Romanian engineer in Toronto who reported: ‘This 
evening I have to baby-sit. When my wife is home alone [in Bucharest] and 
she has to go downstairs, for example to prepare dinner, she focuses the 
webcam on the babies. I keep an eye on them and if one of them starts to 
cry, I let her know by SMS.’ She concludes that ‘in the digital age of com-
munication, family ties have not really weakened’ (Nedelcu 2012, 1351). 
Other scholars are less upbeat. While recognising that migrant relatives 
often try their best, they also highlight that they can find it hard to provide 
intensive care at a distance. (See, e.g. Vullnetari and King 2008 on Albania; 
on villagers in Bulgaria and Romania, see Kulcsár and Brădăţan 2014.)
Transnational ties are also economic. Many households practise 
complex livelihood strategies, where one member’s labour abroad facili-
tates livelihoods in the origin country. For example, Nagy (2009, 8–10) 
describes the pluriactivity (pluriactivité) of households in Maramureş: 
migrants send money back to Romania, which families invest in building 
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and improving guest houses for foreign tourists; these relatives then invest 
profits from guest houses to subsidise another family member to go abroad. 
Migrants also send long-distance advice (‘My son phoned me from Spain a 
week ago to say he had already sent the money and how I should do the 
work’) and, back in Romania for the summer, use their know-how to 
act as ‘cultural brokers’ and liaise with foreign guests. Grill and Anghel 
describes the upward social mobility of Slovak and Romanian Roma (Anghel 
2016; Grill 2012, 1273–4) who enhance their status relative to their 
fellow villagers by temporary spells of working abroad.
These are not merely household-level economic activities, but are 
embedded in a social context. The term ‘transnational social space’ indi-
cates that ‘social life is not confined by nation-state boundaries’ (Levitt and 
Glick Schiller 2004, 1007). In some senses, whole countries seem to be 
linked by a dense web of migration-created ties, creating societies that 
spread across borders (see chapter 9), but in other contexts, regions or 
even localities have their own transnational identities. As discussed in 
chapter 2, regional migration cultures, otherwise known as ‘cultures of 
migration’ (Kandel and Massey 2002) are noticeable in Poland, as indeed 
in other CEE countries such as Romania (Horváth 2008) or Estonia (Nugin 
2014). We use the term to denote norms about who should migrate, why, 
how and where; sets of meanings attributed to migration; and the assump-
tion that international migration is a commonplace livelihood strategy 
(White 2016d; 2017).
In such locations, migration networks constantly expand, as migra-
tion breeds migration. This is one of migration’s most important impacts. 
Moreover, one aspect of this culture is often a preference for international 
over internal migration, which Bélorgey et al. (2012, 3) claim typifies the 
whole post-communist region. International and internal migration strat-
egies exist in relation to one another (King and Skeldon 2010); in the 
case of contemporary CEE, it seems that international migration depresses 
internal migration. As Hazans (2016b, 314) writes about Latvia, Lithua-
nia and Estonia, when everyone now has close family members and friends 
abroad, international migration becomes the ‘new normal’.
To sum up, since the launch of the transnational perspective in 
migration studies by Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992), a 
considerable literature has emerged, reflecting the fact that most migra-
tion scholars agree this perspective is central to understanding contem-
porary migration and its impact on sending and receiving societies. Our 
book examines transnational practices, identities, families and livelihoods, 
and considers how individuals, both migrants and – most importantly for 
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our argument  –  stayers, are changed by living in transnational social 
spaces.
Turning to ‘return’, it is a relief to use a word that, unlike ‘diaspora’ 
or ‘transnational’, is used in everyday speech. This is generally an advan-
tage for qualitative researchers conducting interviews, but it can lead to 
ambiguity. As Long and Oxfeld (2004, 3) remark, ‘Return is a category that 
people themselves use, embellish and understand.’ The ambiguity arises 
because different people imply different degrees of finality to the concept. 
For many, ‘return’ implies ‘return for good’, though this is often not spelled 
out. When considering the topic, it is wise to keep in mind the question 
‘return for how long?’
Our discussion starts from the premise that return is not ‘the end of 
the story’ but a process of migration backwards. It therefore shares nearly 
all the same properties and complexities as the original migration move. 
(See discussion in White 2017, 200–1.) Return can best be thought of as 
intertwining with integration experiences and transnational practices, in 
both countries. It often seems to happen that migrants experiment with 
return, but this experience puts them off living in the origin country, and 
they perform a ‘double return’ (White 2014a, 2014b), sometimes to settle 
abroad, definitively removing themselves from the sending country 
population (see, e.g. Hazans 2016a on double returns from Latvia). Some-
times they continue circulating between their origin country and places 
abroad.
Media in both sending and receiving countries have a tendency to 
speculate about ‘return waves’ of migration (see, e.g. King and Mai 2008, 
235, on Albania, or media interest in post-Brexit referendum return from 
the United Kingdom). If such waves took place, they would have profound 
impacts on both sending and receiving countries. The global economic cri-
sis did result in quite a lot of return migration globally (OECD 2017, 246) 
but did not produce a return wave to CEE (Barcevičius et al. 2012; Benton 
and Petrovic 2013; OECD 2013; Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016).5 This 
suggests that the EU mobility area – where it is possible to sit out crises with 
support from the receiving country welfare state, or fairly easily move to a 
different EU destination – may not be conducive to return migration waves.
Return in fact does not usually occur in waves. Why migrants return, 
and how well they succeed, are individual, often emotional matters, 
depending on a range of emic and etic factors (King 2000). It seems that 
‘non-economic factors generally weigh more heavily in the return decision 
than do economic factors, certainly in comparison to their role in the 
original decision to emigrate’ (King 2000, 15). Even if migrants return 
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because their job abroad ends, this is not strictly an economic reason, since 
emotional ties mean that migrants usually return home rather than to a 
new location in the sending country. A study of Hungarian, Latvian, Polish 
and Romanian returnees during the global economic crisis concluded that 
most ‘went back for family reasons or because they had achieved their emi-
gration goals’ (Barcevičius et  al. 2012, 1). The persisting wage gap 
between old and new EU member states reduces the economic incentive 
to return (Kaczmarczyk, Anacka and Fihel 2016, 222).
The fact that many returnees choose, for sentimental reasons, to 
return to locations with few economic prospects calls into question the 
assumption made in policy literature (see below) that return migration 
aids development. It is also important because migrants already have pre-
conceptions about their home locations, for example, scepticism about 
their capacity for change. On the other hand, they have an emotional 
investment in the place, which should prompt them to wish to improve it.
Typologies of return migrant have been constructed to aid under-
standing the complexity of return. Often, typologies relate to migrants’ 
socio-demographic characteristics. For example, it is noted that highly 
educated returnees will have different impacts than manual workers.6 
Other typologies focus on the success/failure and innovatory/conservative 
dimensions of return, building on the insights of Cerase (1974). Cerase 
distinguished between returns of failure, conservatism (where the returnee 
assimilates back into the sending society without attempting to change it), 
retirement and innovation. The return of any migrant changes the com-
position of the origin society, so all returns are significant. However, the 
‘return of innovation’ is the most interesting for analysing how change 
might be diffused more widely. Since returnees act in transnational social 
spaces, transnational approaches are particularly helpful for understand-
ing their potential influence (Cassarino 2004, 262, 265). As discussed in 
chapter 4, many factors contribute to whether migrants become ‘agents 
of change’ (Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 2017).
Reintegration post return is particularly well-researched. Carling, 
Mortensen and Wu (2011, 3) list 257 publications on the topic. As empha-
sised in literature on immigrant integration, integration is a two-way 
process, involving both the migrant and also the wider society and state. 
Successful return can be supported by origin country institutions (see, e.g. 
Kaska 2013, 34–7, on Estonia; Mereuta 2013, 134, on Romania; OECD 
2017, on non-EU countries). Barcevičius et al. (2012, 44–5) suggest that 
in Poland, Romania and Latvia returnees are a priori sceptical about offi-
cial initiatives and not much aware of their existence. Some non-European 
countries, such as Indonesia, accord returning migrants a hero’s welcome 
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(Fardah 2012). However, other societies receive returnees less enthusi-
astically. Latvia (Barcevičius et  al. 2012, 44), Lithuania (Nevinskaitė 
2016),7 Estonia (Anniste, Pukkonen and Paas 2017, 106) and Poland 
(Dzięglewski 2016; Dziekońska 2012, 249) are probably not the only CEE 
countries where emigrants and returnees can feel disliked by some 
employers and neighbours. This is turn can promote pessimism about 
whether returnees can effect change in their country of origin. Particu-
larly delicate is the integration of ‘returnees’ who were born abroad as 
descendants of Cold War émigrés. This helps explain the relatively lim-
ited impact of a specific type of post-communist ‘return’, when second- or 
third-generation co-nationals migrated after 1989 to countries such as the 
Czech Republic and Croatia (Tomić 2016) or Poland (Fihel and Górny 
2013; Górny and Kolankiewicz 2002; Górny and Osipovič 2006, 99–100; 
Klein-Hitpass 2016).
3. Socio-economic costs and benefits of migration  
for Central and Eastern Europe
Scholarly, educational and policy literature tends to view the impact of 
migration in cost-benefit terms; literature on CEE is no exception. With 
regard to individual countries, for example, Thaut (2009, 191), analys-
ing post-2004 migration from Lithuania, concludes:
The free movement of workers has helped to relieve pressure on the 
domestic labour market, drive down unemployment, place upward 
pressure on wages, and increase the remittances rate to Lithuania. 
However, . . .  recent emigration has introduced labour market short-
ages, placed greater demographic pressure on the country, and 
increased the likelihood of brain drain.
Mereuta (2013, 131,133), writing about Romania, provides a similar, eco-
nomically focused list, but also points to some psychological and social 
consequences, with a hint of regional differentiation:
In spite of this initial beneficial effect on the national labour market 
(which is still characterised by a low level of job availability), the 
sheer volume of labour emigration gave rise to several negative 
effects: labour shortages, skill gaps, distorted wage demand; depop-
ulated areas, deepening of regional discrepancies; social prob-
lems with dependants (especially children) left behind; inflationary 
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pressure (due to remittances) [and] lower levels of economic activ-
ity in the remaining population. Money sent back by Romanian 
migrant workers represented, in a way, a second form of “welfare” 
deeply affecting recipients’ willingness to work. [More positively]: 
The last decade of migration in Romania triggered major social 
change. Traditionally immobile populations (mostly rural) suddenly 
benefited from the opportunities offered by labour migration with 
direct positive effects on the living standards of those back home 
(spouses, children, parents) as well as on individual adaptability.
These extracts nicely illustrate many of the points made in textbooks 
about the impact on sending countries globally (e.g. Castles and Miller 
2009).8 The same puzzles occur everywhere. When and why is the over-
all impact on labour markets and local wages negative or positive? Do 
remittances stimulate local and individual household economies and 
lead to more income equality between regions and households? Do they 
create a more skilled and entrepreneurial population, or the reverse? 
Exactly what is the impact on families – who make their own cost-benefit 
calculations as to whether the benefits of migration compensate for the 
suffering caused by absence?
Recent overviews of the region include Bélorgey et al. (2012), OECD 
(2013) and Kahanec and Zimmermann (2016b), all of which compare the 
economic impact of migration across a range of post-communist countries. 
(See chapter 5 of this volume for some cross-country comparisons.) Remit-
tances are particularly important outside the EU: in 2016, in non-EU 
member states of south-east Europe, remittances contributed a proportion 
of GDP ranging from 8.5 per cent in Serbia to 21.7 per cent in Moldova 
(Knomad 2017, 23), but they are much lower in Central Europe (e.g. 
about 2.5 per cent of Polish GDP in 2007, the year of the most migration 
(Kaczmarczyk, Anacka and Fihel 2016, 145)). Zaiceva (2014) cites studies 
suggesting that migration is fuelling increased wages and reduced 
unemployment in a number of countries. Pryymachenko, Fregert and 
Andersson (2013, 2696) calculated that for the CEE countries which 
joined the EU in 2004, unemployment decreased during the period 
2000–7 on average by at least 3.4 per cent for every 10 per cent increase 
in migration. However, Kaczmarczyk, in chapter 5 of this volume, inves-
tigates this connection in more detail, showing that one should not assume 
that migration-related ‘unemployment export’ is the main reason for fall-
ing unemployment figures, at least in Poland.
Scholars of CEE migration before and after 2004 have found evi-
dence that migration enhances knowledge, skills and well-being (‘human 
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capital’) (see, e.g. Radu 2003; Straubhaar and Wolburg 1999). Baláž and 
Williams (2004) and Williams and Baláž (2005) showed the importance 
of tacit and transferable skills in their analysis of skilled return migrants 
to Slovakia. Returnees highlighted language and communication skills 
and emphasised how migration had changed their perspectives, self- 
awareness and self-confidence.
However, the social impact of migration – except insofar as individual 
migrants improve their human capital – is frequently seen as problematic. 
Brain drain is identified, as is ‘brain squandering’ (Bartha, Fedyuk and 
Zentai 2015), when migrants work in simple manual jobs not commen-
surate with their education (see also Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016a, 
421). Extensive migration can also threaten the sustainability of sending 
country welfare systems (see, e.g. Hazans 2016b, 340, on the Baltic 
countries).
There is a tendency in some of the literature to simplify social effects. 
Phrases such as ‘abandoned children’ (for those with one parent working 
abroad), ‘families left behind’ and ‘care drain’ are also stigmatising towards 
families concerned, and can create a mental fog that inhibits careful anal-
ysis of the social impact. The costs and benefits of (e)migration are also 
political, and this contributes to the tendency to oversimplify issues. 
Mădroane (2016, 234) demonstrates how Romanian newspapers with dif-
ferent political viewpoints adopt different interpretations of the costs 
and benefits of international migration. A more nuanced approach is 
advocated by scholars with a closer knowledge of actual families and local 
communities, for example Piperno, writing about Romania (2012) or 
Markova on Albania (2010b). In local communities, sacrifices made by 
migrating parents for the sakes of their families are often regarded as laud-
able, while the same behaviour is condemned as selfish in superficial 
journalistic analysis and nationalist political discourse.
One might question how far it makes sense to consider CEE as a single 
region for purposes of typical cost-benefit comparison, given the very 
different scale of migration from, for example, Slovenia, compared with 
Lithuania or Albania, and its varied nature. For example, more children 
are separated from their parents by migration in countries with more clas-
sic labour migration, such as Romania and Moldova, than by migration 
in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia, where a 
higher proportion of migrants are young and single. The varied levels of 
economic development also impede comparative analysis. Tallinn can 
hardly be compared with an Albanian village. Assuming that enlarge-
ment and social cohesion policy aimed at creating regional convergence 
across the EU is ongoing, it can however be helpful for predicting future 
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trajectories to compare countries that are more behind with those more 
advanced in that process, as indeed to compare regions and locations at 
different stages of development within larger and regionally differentiated 
EU member states like Poland and Romania. Migration effects are often 
more visible in countries, regions and individual locations where other 
sources of income and investment (notably EU structural funds) are less 
available. However, this suggests that the true impact of migration can 
only be understood when the influence of migration is seen in conjunc-
tion with the influence of other factors. It is only partly helpful to weigh 
up migration influences against one another, as in a typical cost-benefit 
analysis.
4. The migration-development nexus
The cost-benefit framework often seems fragmentary. ‘Development’ adds 
cohesion, providing context within which to conceptualise costs and ben-
efits, and imparting a sense that societies are moving in a clear direction. 
It can therefore appear a more satisfactory analytical tool, even though it 
suffers from the same narrowness created by inherent normative assump-
tions, and even though it ignores social trends that have no bearing on 
development. The developmental approach also has the virtue of being 
focused on transnational ties created by migration, whereas more old-fash-
ioned versions of the cost-benefit approach tend to concentrate on losses 
such as brain drain. Moreover, developmental approaches can encompass 
different kinds of transnational mobility, including visits (European Com-
mission 2013, 3). Although development literature sometimes focuses 
only on economic development, development is often understood more 
broadly, to encompass outcomes in health, education, gender equality, 
and so on. In the latter regard, whereas cost-benefit approaches are used 
by conservatives to lament the deleterious effects of migration for family 
life, developmental approaches view women’s empowerment through 
migration as positive (see, e.g. United Nations 2005). Finally, a develop-
mental approach can be sociological and based on qualitative research, 
and can focus on development as a process, in keeping with our own 
approach to social change as process rather than outcome. To Levitt and 
Lamba-Nieves (2013, 15), writing about social remittances, ‘development 
is as much, if not more, about the ideological shifts, behavioral changes, 
institutional learning and capacity building that occur along the journey 
to a “development goal” as about the destination.’
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This chapter is not the place for more detailed discussion of the 
migration-development nexus literature (on which see, e.g. De Haas 2012; 
Glick Schiller 2012; Keijzer, Héraud and Frankenhaeuser 2016; Raghuram 
2009), although some points should be noted. The first is the existence of 
differences of opinion about whether migration promotes development or 
the reverse. De Haas (2010, 227) suggests ‘the debate on migration and 
development has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from develop-
mentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to neo-Marxist pessimism 
over the 1970s and 1980s, towards more optimistic views in the 1990s and 
2000s’. Newland (2013) concurs that benefits for sending countries are 
currently seen to outweigh disadvantages. De Haas (2012, 19) suggests 
his own compromise position: ‘Migration tends to reinforce (pre)existing 
trends . . .  under unfavourable development conditions, migration may 
undermine development; but under favourable conditions, it is likely to 
accelerate such positive trends.’ Writing about Morocco, De Haas (2007) 
also stresses the regionally differentiated nature of migration and devel-
opment, a point that is relevant to CEE, with its often pronounced regional 
inequalities.
A shortcoming with the approach is that migration-development 
optimists tend to assume that migration can be managed. Sinatti and Horst 
(2015, 134) found that migration-development professionals conceived 
of development as ‘the planned activities of Western professional devel-
opment actors’. As Raghuram (2009, 105) observes, ‘almost all theorisa-
tions of this link [between migration and development] assume migration 
to be something that can be contained, regulated or influenced’, despite 
extensive empirical evidence about the failure of immigration control 
except in very authoritarian regimes (e.g. Hampshire 2013; Steiner 2009). 
We discussed above the unrealistic assumptions built into the concept of 
‘diaspora engagement’, which is a main plank of migration-development 
policy.
‘Mobility’, the term favoured by EU institutions, implies that a migra-
tion and development lens is inappropriate, since EU citizens’ mobility is 
not really international migration. EU publications such as the European 
Commission’s Maximising the Development Impact of Migration (2013) do 
not consider member states as sending countries needing development. 
Development within the EU is through funding for poorer regions (a 
completely different budget) and EU-funded research on ‘migration’ and 
development logically tends to ignore member-state sending countries. 
It looks at countries outside the EU, often with a view to preventing 
migration to Europe by promoting development. In general, international 
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organisations tend to exclude CEE from analyses of migration and devel-
opment, as do migration scholars without a specialist interest in the 
region (see, e.g. textbooks by Bartram, Poros and Monfore 2014; Castles, 
de Haas and Miller 2014, 69–80.) Glick Schiller (2012), in her article 
‘Unravelling the Migration and Development Web’, refers only to ‘the 
development of impoverished countries outside of Europe’ (our italics).
A number of scholars of south-east Europe do couch their arguments 
in developmental terms (e.g. on Romania: Careja 2013; Rotilă 2008; on 
Albania: Carletto and Kilic 2011; King, Uruçi and Vullnetari 2011; Miluka 
et al. 2010; on Moldova: Ellerman 2005) as well as, occasionally, other 
parts of CEE (e.g. Thaut 2009 on Lithuania). However, since CEE coun-
tries are newcomers to the migration-development world, their govern-
ments tend not to have elaborate policies for ‘harnessing’ migration 
potential. Some scholars argue a case for harnessing: Careja (2013), for 
example, criticises Romania’s ‘laissez-faire’ approach and Thaut (2009, 
214) suggests that to maximise the development potential of migration, 
‘governments must pursue policy designed to manage and not control 
migration’.
The usefulness of ‘development’ as a goal for most of post-commu-
nist CEE is questionable, except in the sense of economic development in 
poorer regions. If development is defined broadly, for instance as by 
UN Human Development Indicators, CEE countries already score highly 
on levels of education, healthcare, nutrition, and so on. Migration opens 
channels of influence between countries in eastern and western parts of 
Europe, but it may be difficult to class such influence as having an impact 
on development and therefore to apply the usual development literature 
terminology.
An exception, perhaps, is the literature on encouraging highly skilled 
migrants to spread their expertise for the benefit of their country of ori-
gin, although the remarks above about absence of hometown associations 
of people from CEE suggest that migrants from the region have a more 
individualistic approach, and that evidence of ‘brain circulation’ and 
knowledge transfer should be sought only in the biographies of individ-
ual migrants.
Using the term ‘development’ could be positively unhelpful on the 
level of discourse, both because it implies a greater gap between sending 
and receiving countries than actually exists, and because it feeds into an 
unhelpful ‘catch-up’ narrative about post-communist Europe. Even a more 
general modernisation approach to migration-influenced social change 
(see, e.g. Sandu 2010 on Romania) needs to be employed with caution.
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In CEE, the influence of migration is more likely to take place in the 
area of subtle changes in norms, values and behaviour. The ‘development’ 
umbrella is too small to cover the multitude of different influences. More-
over, although development literature has a healthy emphasis on trans-
national ties, its focus on outcomes in the sending country can promote 
unrealistic expectations of migrants’ behaviour at the receiving society end 
of the transnational social space. Migrants are sometimes assumed to 
automatically facilitate positive outcomes for the sending country, whereas 
they may be much more interested in looking after their own interests in 
the receiving country.
5. Social remittances
Rather than focusing on diasporas and their supposed collective impact, 
we need an approach that is not normative, an approach that understands 
how individual migrants change attitudes and behaviour as a result of 
being abroad, and how this affects stayers. Non-developmental return 
migration literature is promising here, particularly, as already mentioned, 
the abundant publications on reintegration. The complex mutual process 
of accommodation between returning or visiting migrant and the receiv-
ing society – in this case, the origin society – is clearly the site for a great 
deal of migration’s social impact. It follows that the social remittances lit-
erature provides a suitable framework for understanding our topic.
Given that ‘social remittances’ is a new concept, but not a new phe-
nomenon, its literature builds on previous explorations of the social impact 
of migration. Developing the concept has helped researchers to home 
in more accurately on how migrants acquire new ideas, values, beliefs, 
practices and social capital (Levitt 2001, 59–63)9 in the foreign society, 
and how they transmit and spread them back to their origin society. 
This section outlines different facets of the social remittances concept, 
explains some problems with using it as an analytical lens and suggests 
some solutions.
Most social remittances research, like most sending country 
research, is not about remitting within Europe. The term was coined by 
Levitt with reference to the Dominican Republic and the United States, 
and her subsequent research has also been conducted outside Europe (e.g. 
Holdaway et al. 2015). Other recent publications on social remittances 
refer, for example, to Norway and Pakistan (Borchgrevink and Erdal 2016) 
and the Netherlands and Thailand (Brown 2016).
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Probably as a by-product of the literature’s non-European, poor 
country to rich country focus, ‘circulation’, in the sense of remittances trav-
elling from sending to receiving countries as well as the reverse, has not 
been much explored. Levitt (2001, 56) had noted that ‘migrants make 
sense of their experiences using the interpretative frames they bring with 
them’, but nonetheless she was criticised for the book’s greater emphasis 
on influences flowing from the United States, rather than vice versa. Levitt 
and Lamba-Nieves emphasise that circulation takes place, in the sense 
that Dominican villagers already have cultural repertoires which they may 
refine and develop while they are in Boston (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 
2011). Vianello (2013, 92) makes a similar point about Ukraine: ‘Social 
remittances should not be viewed as a cultural colonization, because they 
are developed – and not passively learned – by migrants through their 
work experiences, their life events and the interaction with different cul-
tures.’ Gawlewicz (2015b) uses ‘circulation’ to describe how stayers con-
test arguments raised by migrants, though such counter-influences would 
be described by Grabowska, Garapich, et al. (2017) as ‘blocking’ social 
remittances. However, such discussion still leaves unexplored the matter 
of how sending country stayers might be able through migrants to trans-
mit ideas to majority populations in the receiving societies (as touched 
upon by White in her examples of circulation as reciprocal remitting in 
chapters 7 and 8 of our book). Moreover, it needs to be emphasised that 
‘multidirectional flows’, a term used by Grabowska in chapter 4, is often 
better than ‘circulation’, given that many transnational fields link three or 
more countries.
Although Levitt has elaborated on the concept of social remittances 
in more recent writings, her main ideas are set out in The Transnational 
Villagers (2001), presenting her ethnographic fieldwork in Boca Canasta 
and Boston. Her focus is on the community and the shared ‘dual member-
ship’ that consolidates a certain solidarity among its inhabitants. The vil-
lagers are described as community minded, subject to social sanctions if 
they do not act for the common good and reliant on money earned in 
Boston to enact community projects. In her 2011 article with Lamba-Nieves, 
Levitt deepened her analysis of collective10 remittances. Collective remit-
tances are harder to identify in contemporary Poland. By contrast to their 
equivalents in the Americas, Polish sending locations in the post-EU acces-
sion period usually do not pair up with specific destinations abroad. 
Neighbours in a Polish village frequently have geographically disparate 
networks. Moreover, migrants focus on bettering themselves and their 
families, rather than on clubbing together to fund community projects. 
Community projects are often subsidised by the EU.
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Although Levitt’s understanding of social remittances is quite broad, 
embracing ideas, practices and social capital, it is also specific. She asserts 
that, like economic remittances, social remittances are directly trans-
mitted from one person to another. ‘Migrants and nonmigrants can state 
how they learned of a specific idea or practice and why they decided to 
adopt it’ (Levitt 2001, 63). De Haas (2010, 1595), by contrast, equates 
social remittances with the broader phenomenon of ‘migration-driven 
forms of cultural change’, particularly the propensity of migration to 
breed migration (see above). Boccagni and Decimo, introducing their 
Migration Letters special issue on social remittances, stretch the concept, 
referring to the ‘myriad ways in which migrants affect their home socie-
ties’ (2013, 1) and to ‘the “suitcase” of immaterial goods brought back 
by migrants to home societies’ (4). These include indirect consequences 
of economic remittances, such as ‘patterns of social stratification’ (5). In 
fact, as they point out, it is hard analytically to separate economic from 
social remittances, since the act of sending money always has a social 
context. For instance, Vianello (2013, 92), writing about Ukrainians, 
argues that, ‘as many studies have shown, the act of remitting money is 
often represented by migrant women as a symbol of love and faithfulness 
towards their families left behind’. Boccagni and Decimo further point 
out (2013, 4) that direct social remittances also travel from migrant 
milieux as well as from the majority population of the receiving society.
This latter point seems particularly relevant in the case of political 
remittances, a subset of ‘social’ ones. Although the topic of émigré involve-
ment in homeland politics is hardly new, there has been an upsurge of 
interest in links between migration and democratisation (Ahmadov and 
Sasse 2016, 2; Beichelt and Worschech 2017; Vargas-Silva 2013, 2–3). 
Careja and Emmenegger (2012, 875), for example, argue on the basis of 
2002 data that CEE migrants are more likely than stayers to trust EU 
institutions and to try to convince friends in political discussions. Finally, 
most scholars, starting with Levitt herself, seem to agree that it is impos-
sible to disentangle the social and the cultural. For example, Bobova 
(2016, 120), writing about Belarus, uses the term ‘socio-cultural remit-
tances’ to ‘denote all non-material assets imported by migrants to their 
home societies’.
Despite such conceptual widening, social remittances on the ground 
can be hard to research unless defined more narrowly. Sandu (2010), in 
a quantitative study of outcomes in Romania, refers to ‘attitudes and 
resources’. Migrants as Agents of Change, by Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 
(2017), is the most thorough attempt to date to develop and operationalise 
the concept. Grabowska and her co-authors focus on ideas, skills, practices 
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and objects, but – unlike Levitt – do not include social capital per se. (How-
ever, they do consider social networks after return.) As the title suggests, 
the book focuses mostly on individual agency and on actual remitting; in 
particular, the authors examine each stage of the process, through ‘acqui-
sition’ and ‘transfer’ to ‘diffusion’ (adaptation and implementation).
Social remitting is much harder than economic remitting to con-
ceptualise. A migrant, living abroad, acquires money and either spends it 
on the spot, or saves it, or sends/brings it home to the country of origin. 
In the origin country, it is possible to track how economic remittances are 
spent. However, it is too simple to see social remittances as things that can 
be carried home in a suitcase and unpacked at the end of the journey. Any-
one can send money, but social remittances depend on the size and qual-
ity of individuals’ transnational networks (see especially Krzyżowski 
2016), and on a complex interplay of structure and agency. They are 
therefore very individualised.
The process begins when migrants pick up new ideas, attitudes and 
behaviour in the receiving society. This can be captured in (rare) opinion 
surveys among migrants (see, e.g. Goodwin, Polek and Bardi 2012; Mole 
et al. 2017). Acquisition is both the easiest stage of social remitting to doc-
ument and also one that, in broad terms, often seems similar across dif-
ferent migrant groups. Interviewees mention in particular becoming more 
open and confident. In a typical observation, Bobova (2016, 123), writ-
ing about 43 highly skilled Belarusians, notes that ‘many informants 
repeatedly acknowledged that while abroad they became both more 
self-confident and more tolerant’. More specifically, the first shock of expo-
sure to multi-ethnic societies is often mentioned in the literature. For 
example, Nedelcu (2012, 1350) quotes a grandmother visiting from 
Romania: ‘When I took the subway in Toronto for the first time I felt as 
though I was at a United Nations meeting . . .  I really had a shock. I 
couldn’t have imagined what a “multicultural society” meant.’ Another 
area of special interest to scholars is gender roles, and, although there is 
evidence both ways for whether migration brings greater gender equal-
ity, a number of scholars writing about CEE comment on how attitudes to 
gender roles and relations can indeed change abroad. Vlase (2013, 86) 
quotes Mioara, a Romanian mother:
I know from my own experience that when we first went to Italy, my 
husband and I were both old fashioned. Once we arrived there, we 
saw how others lived and tried somewhat to adjust. Before that, my 
husband used to think that he could just make a mess, throwing tow-
els or other things around the house, because it was my duty to clean.
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In many other cases, which Levitt would not classify as social remittances, 
but which Boccagni and Decimo would, gender roles change for practical 
reasons and not necessarily thanks to recognition that it would be fairer 
to share roles. Szczygielska (2013, 185), for example, describes how 
wives’ migration becomes a ‘forced lesson in housekeeping’ for husbands 
left in Poland. Migrants can also fail to change their ways. For instance, 
Litina, Moroconi and Zanaj 2016 (using World Values Survey data) assert 
that migrants living abroad tend not to pick up the environmental culture 
predominant in the receiving society.
There is a vast sociological and psychological literature on migrant 
integration and acculturation, of which such studies could be considered 
a part. Oddly enough, the overlap between the integration and social 
remittances literature is rarely acknowledged in the scholarship. Scholars 
of integration are interested in the migrant’s behaviour vis-à-vis receiving 
society expectations, while scholars of social remittances examine the 
migrant vis-à-vis the origin society. There is no reason why social remit-
tances scholars should keep off integration territory, although some 
might argue that new ideas and behaviour should only be classed as ‘remit-
tances’ once they are actually transferred to sending country contacts. In 
other words, they become remittances not when they are acquired but 
only when remitted. This happens when the migrant picks up the phone 
to tell family and friends about the new idea, or has a conversation on a 
visit back to the origin country, or after s/he returns to live there. Until 
then, the new idea is simply a potential remittance (Karolak 2016, 22).
However, the integration literature can be used if we employ the con-
cept of ‘society abroad’ and accept that social change to, for example, 
Polish or Romanian society starts as soon as a Pole or Romanian abroad 
adopts new ideas and practices. Every Romanian husband in Italy, for 
example, can be viewed as still a member of Romanian society; Mioara’s 
husband’s conversion adds to the sum of Romanian men who believe that 
men should participate in household labour. Hence this is a social remit-
tance, since it changes Romanian society, at least Romanian society 
abroad. We have to forget the suitcase metaphor if we want to understand 
social remittances in this fashion, since no ‘remitting’ has so far been done 
between individuals.
As the receiving country scholarship on how migrants integrate illus-
trates, individuals integrate differently, and this has an impact on how 
much they are able and willing to remit. Levitt (2001, 57) distinguishes 
between ‘recipient observers’, who spend their time abroad mostly with 
co-ethnics, change little themselves, but nonetheless passively imitate 
aspects of the receiving society; ‘instrumental adopters’, who are more 
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integrated, and change their ways for pragmatic reasons; and ‘purpose-
ful innovators’, who ‘want to learn and benefit from the new world around 
them’ and deliberately develop ideas and practices seen abroad. In chap-
ter 4, Grabowska considers in more theoretical and empirical detail than 
Levitt the distinctions between imitation and innovation, which is equally 
relevant to the initial ‘acquisition’ and the following phase, as migrants 
transfer ideas to stayers. A period of reflection is clearly important in the 
process, and Kubal (2015, 76), writing about Ukraine, makes the point 
that such reflection is often triggered only once the migrant returns to the 
country of origin and begins to make comparisons. Grabowska (2016), 
writing about Poland, and Blum (2015), writing about young Kazakhs 
returning from the United States, separately build on the work of Margaret 
Archer to identify why certain returnees, depending on how they reflect 
on their migration experience, are more likely than others to become 
agents of change.
Also significant to both acquisition and transfer are the more influ-
ential nature of face-to-face than mediated contact (Grabowska and Gara-
pich 2016, 2155); the charisma of the remitters; the social positions they 
occupy; and whether they have an audience. Gawlewicz (2015b, 2226–7) 
offers examples of how migrants’ interpretations are trusted by their 
friends and family back in Poland: they appeared to believe that migrants 
were the source of the most accurate or ‘proven’ pieces of information 
about a receiving society simply because they lived there.
The family, as the key site for socialisation, is particularly important 
for social remitting. For example, Vlase (2013, 87) argues that when 
Romanian women return to Romania, having gained confidence abroad, 
they encourage their daughters to train for professional careers, such as 
law and law enforcement, not traditionally adopted by women. Nedelcu 
(2012, 1350) quotes a Romanian interviewee: ‘I finally understood 
[from my son’s communications] that being Canadian means learning 
to live together, to accept the differences, values and inputs of each indi-
vidual. This really changed my perception of things; today I’m no longer 
surprised to see Chinese or Turkish people coming to my country . . .  or 
rather, it doesn’t annoy me anymore (Architect, male, 66).’
Nedelcu’s example, as described, seems to be a rather direct case 
of values transfer, but she also points out that this is not so simple and 
has multiple dimensions. As she observes (2012, 1351), ‘these “social 
remittances” . . .  have complex consequences. They allow non-migrants 
not only to learn about Canada or Canadians, but also to open up to cultural 
difference and absorb a different mode of communication about and with 
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the Other.’ In the case of social remittances, what goes into the suitcase 
probably rarely comes out unchanged. In Nedelcu’s example, it is some-
thing much larger. It can also mutate, since it is applied in a particular 
context in the sending country. For example, Nagy (2009, 10), writing 
that small Romanian rural hotels incorporate comforts that members of 
the family working abroad have seen in the West, suggests that ‘they 
help impose foreign models but often with a double translation, linked 
to diverse local reinterpretations’.
The authors of OECD 2017 (253) further suggest that returnees’ 
influence depends partly on ‘the size of the return migrant community in 
a given locality’, raising the question, addressed in our book, of where spe-
cifically remittances can be transmitted and diffused. Once again, there 
should be overlap with receiving society scholarship, since contact zones 
are usually the object of receiving society research, particularly regarding 
contact theory, cosmopolitanism and conviviality. Opportunity struc-
tures vary in different locations and social spaces. Nevinskaitė (2016, 136, 
138), writing about Lithuania, suggests that ‘social remittances from the 
highly skilled depend on a favourable context for knowledge and skills 
transfer in their home countries, which can be summarised by the term 
“country receptivity” ’. This is defined as ‘the willingness and the ability 
of a country to accept and assimilate knowledge and skills contributions 
from its diaspora’. However, for non-elite social remitters, receptivity at 
the local level is more important. Power relationships are central in social 
remitting (Boccagni and Decimo 2013), and equality of status can be a 
precondition for people becoming more accepting of each other’s cultural 
practices and identities (see Fonseca and McGarrigle 2012, 10, on receiv-
ing locations). Hence receptivity is most likely to exist when sending and 
receiving locations are felt to be equal, both with something to give and 
accept. Grabowska, Garapich, et al. (2017, 211) refer to the ‘rule of reci-
procity’. Kubal (2015, 83) describes how Ukrainians who acquired more 
law-abiding habits while living in countries such as Norway and the Neth-
erlands pragmatically made only small, acceptable adjustments to their 
behaviour on return: they drive more safely or avoid dropping litter, but 
they cannot have an impact on big problems with legal culture such as 
corruption.
In practice, partly because of defensiveness, many attempts at remit-
ting are resisted (Garapich 2016b), and often there is a time lag before 
they can be enacted (Grabowska et al. 2017a, 213–4). Dzięglewski (2016) 
suggests that the fundamental obstacle is a lack of trust in Polish society, 
which makes people reluctant to adopt novel practices. In respect to 
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levels of trust, Poland is similar to other countries in CEE. The recent 
resurgence of social conservatism, with its backlash against ‘gender ide-
ology’ and multiculturalism, in some countries of the region also creates 
an unfavourable climate for some types of social remitting.
The final stage of social remitting is the diffusion of ideas and 
practices from stayers to other stayers and eventually, perhaps, to wider 
society. Levitt and Lamba-Nieves conclude their article by asking the ques-
tion: ‘When does local-level change in something like gender relations, 
for example, scale up to produce broader shifts in reproductive behaviour 
and labour market participation?’ (2011, 19). To some extent it is possi-
ble to track the first stages of this process. By interviewing stayers in 
the local communities they studied, Grabowska, Garapich, et al. found 
examples of ‘spillovers’, showing how ‘even transmitting to a small group 
of people can gradually spread to larger circles’ (2017, 6). White (2017) 
illustrates how stayers pass on new norms about how to migrate, such as 
that it is better for whole families to relocate abroad, rather than one par-
ent migrating while leaving family members in Poland, with associated 
emotional costs. Such new beliefs spread easily in places with high vol-
umes of migration, where other people’s migration experiences are fre-
quent topics of conversation among stayers. It might be possible to 
track transmission quite precisely if the transmitter broadcasts their 
newly acquired convictions to a broad audience, for example via social 
media, and this is relayed further. Overall, however, it is hardly possible 
to track social remittances in the same way as economic remittances. 
In fact, this worry is misplaced, because it is pointless to expect social 
remittances on their own to achieve social change. A necessary precon-
dition for scaling up is receptivity, discussed above. ‘Migration tends to 
reinforce (pre-)existing trends’ (De Haas 2012, 19), and social remit-
tances will travel further if society is already developing in the same 
direction.
6. Conclusion: The rationale for adopting  
an inside-out approach
As already argued, it is more realistic and useful to start one’s analysis of 
migration impact by identifying significant aspects of social change in a 
given country and then investigating how social remittances intertwine 
with other influences to effect this change, among different sections of 
society and in different locations. In most respects there is no ‘average 
Pole’ or ‘typical household’, so a fine-grained analysis is needed, taking 
65l IterAture revIeW And tHeory
into account the different tendencies among different social groups, and 
the different types of migration that characterise different people and 
places.
There are rare hints of such an approach in the migration literature, 
in the sense that migration is understood to be somehow contributing to 
and combining with other causes of social change. For example, Markova 
(2010a, 3) remarks:
An interesting phenomenon has been observed in Albania – a pro-
portion of the female working population has withdrawn from the 
labour market. There are various explanations for this: one factor 
certainly is the return to traditional family values, according to which 
women are responsible for domestic work and men are those earning 
money outside the household. Another explanation relates to the 
increased dependency on money sent home by emigrant husbands.
However, Markova does not develop this thought, and it remains unclear 
how, if at all, these factors interrelate. Blum (2015, 4) provides a more 
sustained analysis; he argues that understanding the ‘social, cultural, and 
institutional context is essential in order to appreciate the issues at stake 
in enacting various nontraditional practices drawn from abroad’. In his 
discussion of a sample of young Kazakh returnees, Blum prefaces his 
analysis of each type of remittance – from ideas about gender equality 
to attitudes towards sitting on the ground – with comments about related 
areas of ongoing social change in Kazakhstan. This makes his book the 
closest in approach to our own, as far as we are aware. However, most of 
the information on trends is not backed up with statistical evidence; 
instead, Blum tends to make assertions based on his extensive first-hand 
knowledge of Kazakh society. More importantly, Blum does not attempt 
to explain precisely how social remittances relate to types of change 
already occurring for other reasons (and uses the vaguer term ‘hybridisa-
tion’ in preference to ‘social remittances’).
A handful of other scholars, mostly writing on a rather abstract level, 
also note the coexistence of change driven by migration and change driven 
by other factors, making the point that they are hard to disentangle. As 
Faist (2016, 331) points out, ‘In general, it is difficult to clearly pinpoint 
the impact of cross-border mobility, given the overall matrix of change 
and transformation produced by globalization.’ Boccagni and Decimo 
(2013, 2) similarly mention that ‘distinguishing migrants’ specific influ-
ence, within the wealth of material and symbolic resources that circulate 
between and within nation-states, may be quite a hazardous task’.
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Levitt and De Haas both suggest the reciprocal nature of migration 
and non-migration influences, though Levitt appears to attribute slightly 
greater weight to migration. Citing the example of CNN’s impact in the 
Dominican Republic, Levitt writes that ‘global cultural flows also heighten[s] 
remittance impact’ (2001, 68) and Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011, 3) 
argue that social remittances ‘are distinct from, but often reinforce and 
are reinforced by, other forms of global cultural circulation’. De Haas 
suggests:
It is important to recognize that migration itself is [a] constituent 
part of a complex set of radical social, cultural and economic trans-
formations that have affected Morocco, as well as an independent 
factor in perpetuating and probably intensifying, magnifying and 
accelerating these processes at the local and regional levels. Migra-
tion is not only a factor explaining change, but also an integral part 
of change itself to the same degree as it may reciprocally enable fur-
ther change. Other processes, such as improved education, increas-
ing exposure to electronic media, improved infrastructure and 
tourism[,] also play a key role in opening people’s eyes to the wider 
world and helping to raise aspirations. (2007, 32)
Looking at the matter ‘inside-out’ helps disentangle such processes 
of change. Collecting as much information as possible about each individ-
ual social trend and its different possible explanations should enable the 
researcher to form an impression of how different factors interrelate. For 
example, Poles today seem somewhat readier than before 2004 to believe 
that ‘most people can be trusted’. A simple social remittances approach 
might suggest that some migrants acquire more trusting attitudes as a 
result of migration to trusting countries such as Denmark and Norway. 
Individuals may then behave in a more trusting way after they return. 
However, this is definitely not the whole picture. Trust is commonly 
associated with levels of prosperity and education, both of which have 
been rising in Poland and can help account for the Polish trend. Since 
migration money is part of that prosperity, this is a (second-order) 
migration influence. Trust is also a cultural matter. Generalised trust is 
still low in smaller towns and villages, from which many Poles migrate, 
suggesting the need to consider how local migration cultures may help to 
suppress the effect of other factors that might promote rising trust. In 
fact, many stories circulate about agencies who cheat would-be migrants 
and about Poles abroad who let down other Poles, so in this case it seems 
the migration influence might be rather strong. Finally, it is important 
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to notice when individual people behave in unexpected ways as a result 
of migration. For example, interviews with return migrants to small 
towns can reveal that trust is important to them and that they do like 
living in more trusting societies. The influence of migration can be seen 
as particularly important when the migration experience itself was nec-
essary to convert the individual to such a viewpoint.
Notes
 1 Migration scholars are active both in Romania and abroad. The Romanian Network 
for Migration Studies (RoMig) was founded in 2016. For English-language 
sources on Poland, see the publication lists at http:// www . ucl . ac . uk / ssees 
/people/anne-white/ssees/ research / polish - migration.
 2 Albania has the most migration in Europe. One third of the population now lives 
abroad, according to King et al. (2014, 30), a much higher proportion than in 
Poland.
 3 Orozco and Rouse (2007), in their otherwise wide-ranging review of HTAs, seem 
to assume that HTAs would not operate in European sending countries. They do 
not comment on Europe at all. Fiń et al. (2013, 81) recommend the creation of 
HTAs in Poland, implying there are none.
 4 Writing about Lithuania, Nevinskaitė (2016) argues that the shift in policy from 
encouraging migrants to return to harnessing diaspora potential occurred after 
the 2008 crisis.
 5 In the case of Romania and Poland, it did accelerate some returns that would 
otherwise have occurred somewhat later (Barcevičius et al. 2012).
 6 The socio-demographic profile of return migrants varies from country to country. 
The authors of OECD (2017, 252) observe: ‘In Armenia and Costa Rica, highly 
educated people are more likely to come back compared to those with a lower 
level of education, while it is the opposite in Burkina Faso, Cambodia, the 
Dominican Republic and the Philippines’. However, they agree that, overall, the 
best qualified people are the least likely to return.
 7 According to Nevinskaitė (2016, 148–9), ‘Almost 40 per cent of Lithuanians abroad 
perceive a negative attitude from Lithuanians in Lithuania towards emigrants . . .  
8 out of 10 employers claimed they would prefer an employee without emigration 
experience over one with such experience.’
 8 Up to and including the fourth, 2009, edition. The 5th (2014) edition is slightly 
different, because de Haas joined the authorial team.
 9 Levitt categorises social remittances slightly differently in different publications.
 10 Goldring (2004, 808) writes that this term became common in the early 1990s. 
‘It describes money raised by a group that is used to benefit a group or community 
with which it is afiliated.’
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Social remittances
Channels of diffusion
izAbelA GrAboWskA
1. Introduction
Although the later chapters in this book present different aspects of change 
in Poland, before analysing how migration contributes to change, this 
chapter has a different role and design. Its main purpose is to explain, in 
more detail than is possible elsewhere, how the actual process of social 
remitting takes place, which kinds of social remittances are particularly 
likely to become diffused in Poland, and why. In particular, it addresses 
the question of why some migrants become ‘agents of change’ (Grabowska, 
Garapich, et al. 2017). Although the book does not, as a whole, attempt 
to answer the quantitative question of how much migration contributes 
to social change, this chapter does also provide a partial answer to that 
question, with regard to the acquisition of transferable skills. It has a 
strong focus on practices – not just looking at what migrants admire when 
they are abroad, but at how they change and what they actually do 
when they return to their country of origin. In particular, I show that 
rather than simply lamenting the fact that many Poles abroad work in 
jobs for which they are overqualified, we need also to be aware that, as 
proved by survey evidence, they acquire important social skills which 
they can use on their return to Poland.
Chapter 3 argued that social remittances were the most helpful con-
ceptual tool for connecting migration and social change, and this chapter 
backs up that claim with empirical evidence based on the Polish case. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the concept of social remittances generally 
refers to non-economic impacts on the sending society: ‘the ideas, behav-
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iors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending 
country communities’ (Levitt 1998, 927) or, as defined by Sandu (2010), 
resources, predominately non-material, and attitudes. Non-material 
resources include also transferable types of human capital (i.e. knowledge, 
skills and competences). Material culture can be defined as a social remit-
tance when artefacts gain social meaning.
This chapter argues that social remittances are a potentially trans-
formative and ‘stabilising’ element in social change. In other words, they 
can help to consolidate change which is already taking place for other rea-
sons. They are facilitated by forces of globalisation, including ease of 
travel and communication, especially in the EU (King and Lulle 2016, 
104). They themselves are also part of global cultural diffusion. Social 
remittances are a useful lens through which to observe processes of 
social change occurring in different societies simultaneously. A migrant 
who is a potential carrier of social remittances ‘leaves a society in motion 
and comes to a society in motion . . .  also increasingly inhabit[ing] trans-
national spaces’ (Haynes and Galasińska 2016, 46).
As discussed in more detail in Grabowska and Engbersen (2016), 
social remittances had been explored in Polish migration scholarship 
before the term was invented. Migration since 2004 may be compared in 
scale with the flow of Poles to the United States from 1880 to 1910, when 
approximately two million migrated (Zaretsky 1984, 2). Then, too, 
migrants attempted to maintain ties with stayers in Poland, as documented 
through the correspondence collected by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918–
20, 1984). Duda-Dziewierz (1938), in her monograph about the village 
of Babica in Małopolska region, demonstrated that new ideas were trans-
ferred back to Poland, contesting old and creating new normative struc-
tures, through letters, newspapers, books and pamphlets sent from the 
United States, as well as through direct contacts with visitors and, even 
more significantly, return migrants. Krzywicki (1891), analysing another 
historically significant strand of Polish labour migration, shows how cir-
cular migration by female migrants to Prussia created efficient channels 
of diffusion which led to change in households in Poland. With the advent 
of electronic communications in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
the ‘forms, intensity, immediacy and frequency of contacts’ between 
migrants and non-migrants have changed and have facilitated the main-
tenance of closer relations and bonds, on a near daily basis (Haynes and 
Galasińska 2016, 51). This also gives rise to new channels of diffusion for 
social remittances.
The main aims of this chapter are (1) to show that social remittances 
can affect various domains of social life such as labour markets, workplaces, 
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON POLAND70
local communities and neighbourhoods, family and peers; and (2) to iden-
tify channels of diffusion, including human transmitters of social remit-
tances to Poland and within Poland.
Social remittances are mainly researched using qualitative methods. 
King and Lulle (2016, 104) refer to them as a ‘qualitative approach to 
development’. As mentioned in chapter 3, they are difficult to measure and 
quantify. Nonetheless, this chapter uses quantitative as well as qualitative 
approaches, and this is one of its key contributions to the social remit-
tances literature.
The rest of this chapter is composed of five parts. Section 2, a con-
ceptual section, outlines the logic of the social remitting process. Section 3, 
a methodological section, introduces data sources and domains of social 
remitting. Section 4 analyses social remittances related to skills and 
workplace relations. Section  5 analyses social remittances related to 
local community and neighbourhood. Finally, in Section 6, I consider why 
some return migrants successfully become agents of change, with pen 
portraits of individuals (new for this book, and different from the studies 
presented in Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 2017).
2. Conceptual overview and framework of analysis
Migration from Poland is to some extent a response to patterns of system 
transformation starting in 1989 that marginalised sections of society. 
These included many residents of small towns and villages, such as those 
studied in the various ethno-surveys of migrant and non-migrant house-
holds conducted by the University of Warsaw Centre of Migration Research 
(CMR; see, e.g. Jaźwińska and Okólski 2001). More recently, my co- 
authored book Migrants as Agents of Change (Grabowska at al. 2017) 
discussed the small towns of Pszczyna in Silesia region, Sokółka in Pod-
lasie region and Trzebnica in Lower Silesia region. In such towns, ongoing, 
post-transformation change occurs at different speeds in different parts 
of the social space, including in local institutions such as schools, sports 
clubs, courts and hospitals, partly in their role as workplaces. Amin (2002) 
refers to such domains as ‘micropublics’. Change also occurs in more pri-
vate spaces, such as within family and peer groups. Social remittances 
contribute to and intersect with these different strands of change. For 
example, a notable feature of many towns is recent improvements in infra-
structure with the aid of EU funding. However, migrants also make 
improvements to their homes and gardens, which change the appearance 
of the town. Overall, if life is becoming more comfortable, better organised 
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and interesting for many Poles, this is for a variety of reasons. Rather 
than separating migration from other social, cultural, political and eco-
nomic factors, it is important to show its complementary function.
The model sketched out in table 4.1 rests on the definition of social 
remittances coined by Levitt (1998) but also includes the wider approach 
that migrants bring back both attitudes and resources (Sandu 2010). In 
Grabowska, Garapich, et al. (2017) we put human agency at the forefront 
of every stage of this process. Like Levitt, we focused often on intentional 
transmission by individual migrants. Agency is, however, intertwined with 
Table 4.1 Conceptual model of chapter 4
SOCIAL REMITTANCES:
Norms, values, practices, 
social capital  
(Levitt 1998)
Attitudes & rescources  
(Sandu 2010)
Ideas & practices  
(Grabowska & Garapich 2016)
Social skills  
(Grabowska 2017)
Multidirectional PROCESS of social 
remitting with human agency at the 
forefront (Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 
2017):
(1) Encountering/acquiring
(2) Transmitting/transferring
(3) Implementing/applying
(4) Spilling-over/diffusing
Every stage of social remitting might also 
involve social RESISTANCE
DOMAINS of social remittances:
(1)  Workplaces and other locations where 
work-related skills (human capital) 
can be acquired
(2)  Local community institutions such as 
health centres, schools, sports centres 
and neighbourhoods
(3) Family and peers
Everyday SPACES of social remitting:
(1)  Public spaces (micropublics): work-
places, schools, colleges, youth 
centres, sports clubs and other spaces 
of association and everyday encounter
(2)  Private spaces: family, peers and other 
friends
Source: Own elaboration.
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the opportunity structures that can both enable and constrain acquisition, 
transfer and implementation of social remittances in Poland.
The stages of social remitting were discussed in chapter 3 and are 
outlined in table 4.1, but it is worth noting some additional details. Acquir-
ing social remittances involves both simple imitation and also innova-
tion, where social remitters modify activities and practices and translate 
them to local conditions. There is often also a process of evaluation and 
reflexivity, when migrants critically assess ideas, decisions, activities, 
practices and actions undertaken both at destination and origin loca-
tions. With regard to the transmission process, Levitt highlights that social 
remittances often travel together in packages, and that ‘if many remit-
tances are transmitted consistently during a short time, their impact is 
greater than when are they are transferred periodically’ (2001, 69).
Particularly important for this chapter is the implementation of 
social remittances: the outcomes of transfer. Levitt (2001, 64–9) enumer-
ates five determinants of impact of social remittances: (1) the nature of 
the remittance itself (easy or complicated to transfer); (2) the nature 
of the transnational system, particularly social networks and commu-
nity practices: ‘remittances flow more efficiently through tightly con-
nected, dense systems’; (3) the characteristics of the messenger (whether 
they are seen as worthy of emulation); (4) the target audience (their gen-
der, class, life stage); and (5) the relative differences between sending 
and receiving countries.
3. Data sources and domains of social remittances
The three main sources for this chapter are set out in table 4.2. The first, 
the Human Capital in Poland data set, is an exceptionally large study, 
which ‘made it possible to keep track of the situation on the Polish labour 
market, monitor supply and demand for competencies as well as the sys-
tem of education and trainings market in Poland in the years 2010–2015’.1 
Because this is a large data set, including both former migrants and stay-
ers, it is suitable for calculating whether migration has any impact on skills 
and competencies as comparing Poles who have never migrated.
The project Occupational Careers of Post-Accession Migrants formed 
the basis for Grabowska-Lusińska (2012) and the revised, expanded ver-
sion in English, Movers and Stayers: Social Mobility, Migration and Skills 
(Grabowska 2016). This project combined quantitative analysis of data 
on labour market sequences for migrants and non-migrants participating 
in ethno-surveys conducted by CMR, with in-depth biographical inter-
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views of 18 return migrants. Finally, Cultural Diffusion through Social Remit-
tances between Poland and UK was a large qualitative project conducted 
by myself with Michał Garapich, Ewa Jaźwińska and Agnieszka Radzi-
winowiczówna. We interviewed residents of three Polish towns, as well 
as their contacts in the United Kingdom, adopting the sociological prac-
tice of adaptive theory formation suggested by Layder (1998), with no 
preconceptions about the nature of social remittances which might be 
discovered. This enabled us to avoid the conventional cost-benefit fram-
ing of migration impacts and to discover the small, otherwise invisible 
changes actually happening in the lives of individual Poles and their direct 
milieux. The findings of this project, whose methodology is described in 
detail in Grabowska and Garapich (2016) and Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 
(2017), constitute the main source for this chapter.
The data derived from the sources presented in table 4.2 provide the 
opportunity to study social remittances in various domains of social life 
(see also table 4.1) and their channels of diffusion. Three general domains 
are distinguished: workplaces, providing social remittances in the form 
Table 4.2 Data sources for chapter 4
Name of the data source Period Methodology
Human Capital in Poland 
[Bilans Kapitału 
 Ludzkiego, BKL]
2010–16 Representative survey for various 
labour market groups and topics;  
n (worked abroad) = 4,040;  
n (not worked abroad) = 67,163.
Occupational careers of 
post-accession migrants 
(grant funded by Ministry 
of Higher Education in 
Poland)
2009–11 Secondary analysis of ethno- 
surveys of Centre of Migration 
Research 1996–2007 (household 
survey in selected local communi-
ties); n (migrants) = 400;  
n (non-migrants) = 1,200.
Biographical study of occupational 
careers of post-accession (return) 
migrants to Poland; n = 18.
Cultural diffusion through 
social remittances between 
Poland and UK (grant 
funded by National 
Science Centre, Harmonia 
Programme)
2012–15 Transnational Multisited  
Qualitative Longitudinal Study: 
three local communities with 
transnational links in the UK; 
n = 124 individuals (121 in-depth 
interviews).
Source: Own elaboration
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of skills and new ideas about working practices and conditions; local 
communities and neighbourhoods; and family, peers and friendship 
groups. In each domain it is possible to identify specific types of social 
remitting, which relate to both attitudes and resources. In each domain, 
some remittances relate specifically to that domain (e.g. specific work or 
parenting practices), but others are simply acquired and transferred 
within that domain (e.g. ideas about race or religion). It is important to 
note that the three domains are not exclusive, but intersect. They have 
been distinguished from one another here to enhance the clarity of 
argument.
The family domain is not addressed in detail in this chapter, since it 
is covered in Krystyna Slany’s chapter in this volume (chapter 6). It is 
worth noting that, for social remitting to happen between family mem-
bers and friends, both stayers and migrants need to be active in this pro-
cess, although these transmissions sometimes favour migrants, as they are 
felt to ‘know better’ with their ‘experience of the world’. In the domain of 
family and peers, social remittances uncovered in the Cultural Diffusion 
project related mostly to the transfers of attitudes towards diversity, prac-
tices of everyday family logistics, practices of raising children, division of 
household labour, and gender roles and those relating to family rituals and 
ceremonies. Everyday logistics overlap with relations with children (teach-
ing children to perform household tasks and developing children’s inde-
pendence), relations with children overlap with gender roles (conscious 
parenting), gender roles overlap with everyday logistics (division of house-
hold labour in a household). As a result, the process of ‘doing family’ is 
revealed to be a multi-layered process of social remitting (Buler, Sar-
nowska and Grabowska 2016). Peer groups are insufficiently researched 
in social remittances scholarship, although they are the focus of my cur-
rent research project (for preliminary results, see Grabowska, Pustułka, 
et al. 2017).2
Migrants’ immediate family and close circle of friends are important 
because they are the initial recipients of the social remittances migrants 
bring from abroad. However, this is a relatively narrow audience. Work-
places in Poland offer much greater opportunity for diffusion, particularly 
if they allow potential diffusers to have contact with a broad range of 
people. Moreover, workplaces are especially important sites for acquiring 
social remittances in the receiving country. Bearing in mind that post- 
accession migrants from Poland went and still go abroad predominately 
for work and spend the majority of their time in workplaces, personal 
contact with other people at work seems to be the most important channel 
for diffusion.
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4. Domain 1: The workplace as a domain for acquiring 
and transferring human capital and work practices
This domain is designated broadly in order to embrace various aspects of 
social remittances in the area of work and employment. This section dis-
cusses: (1) social skills as one of the key aspects of human capital, and the 
impact of migration on their acquisition, validation and transfer, includ-
ing transfer to the non-migrant population in Poland; (2) the entrepre-
neurship of return migrants as both an attitude and a socio-economic 
activity; and (3) workplaces, both at destination and after return, consid-
ered as micropublics where attitudes are (re)formed and social skills 
acquired, validated and transferred. The aspects discussed in this section 
intersect at every stage of the process of social remitting. Although return 
migrants often complain about unchanging workplaces in Poland, the 
point of this section is not, of course, to argue that migration is the only 
factor leading to changes in the Polish workplace.
4.1 Social skills
Social skills, a rather elusive concept, are difficult to grasp in the data. 
They can be operationalised, however, as knowing how to do certain 
things, in specific settings, and can be treated either as attributes of social 
remittances or as social remittances themselves (Grabowska 2017). For 
the purpose of quantitative analysis, social skills are usually divided 
into two groups: sociocultural, context-specific social skills, which are dif-
ficult to transfer between different cultural settings, and transferable skills, 
which are more universal and can be acquired and transferred between 
settings. Transferable skills include cognitive skills, self-management 
and discipline, interpersonal (communication) skills, and work organ-
isation skills, including capacity for teamwork. In qualitative research, 
social skills are analysed in more interpretative terms, to achieve insights 
into the context and how they are acquired, enhanced, validated and trans-
ferred. Even workplaces where low-skilled work takes place are spaces for 
acquiring social skills (Williams and Baláž 2005). People learn in formal 
situations but above all in informal ones, by observing, communicating 
and doing things together (Grabowska 2017).
The qualitative studies by Klagge and Klein-Hitpass (2010) and 
Klein-Hitpass (2016) on Polish society in the early 2000s showed that 
return migrants were endowed with (tacit) skills not present in the Polish 
workforce. This might have changed, however, with the accession of Poland 
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to the EU, with new educational methods, and the inflow of foreign 
direct investments to Poland (Karolak 2016). Some more recent data is 
considered next.
Survey data derived from the Human Capital in Poland study (2010–
14)3 offers a unique opportunity to identify social skills in both migrant 
and non-migrant populations. From the whole range of competencies 
measured in the survey, we took four categories of transferable skills: 
(1) cognitive skills (information searching, analysing and drawing con-
clusions); (2) organisation of one’s own work, taking the initiative and 
being on time; (3) interpersonal (communication) skills; and (4) mana-
gerial abilities and work organisation skills. A model of linear regression 
calculation (table 4.3) shows that, based on the predictor variables, one 
can estimate 29 per cent of variance in social skills in the population of 
Poland. This model is better than a median for predicting the result of a 
dependent variable [F(9.71092)=3248.42; p<0.001]. The highest level of 
social skills was possessed by five categories of people: (1) those who had 
Table 4.3 Linear regression for social skills and relations with work abroad
Model: Social Skills
B SE
Constant 3.259***
Sex (ref = men)
 women −0.008 0.005
Education (ref = low)
 medium 0.504*** 0.006
 high 0.917*** 0.007
Age (ref =​< 44)
 >45 −0.172*** 0.005
Place of residence (ref = city)
 village −0.158*** 0.005
Labour market situation (ref = employed)
 unemployed −0.166*** 0.009
 inactive −0.202*** 0.007
Self-employed (ref = no)
 yes 0.168*** 0.008
Work abroad (ref = no)
 yes 0.090** 0.011
Adjusted R2 0.291
*** p < 0.001, ** p <​0.01
Source: Grabowska and Jastrzębowska (2017)
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engaged at some time in their lives in international migration; (2) those 
with higher or secondary education; (3) those who lived in cities; (4) those 
who were aged 19–44 (the age of greatest mobility); and (5) those who 
were employed or who owned their own businesses  (Grabowska and 
Jastrzębowska, 2017).
Grabowska and Jastrzębowska (2017) also conducted cluster analysis 
that showed that the population (including both return migrants and 
stayers) could be classed within four groups: (1) stayers with low social 
skills; (2) stayers with high social skills; (3) movers with low social skills; 
and (4) movers with high social skills. ‘Movers with high social skills’ 
was the most significant group. Compared with the other groups, they 
had the highest rate of self-employment (more than 20 per cent), the 
highest level of participating in training courses (nearly 28 per cent) and 
the highest level of enthusiasm for lifelong learning. They ‘want to educate 
themselves further’ (nearly 37 per cent), but they have also the lowest 
educational match with ‘the actual work performed’ (nearly 60 per cent). 
The last point can of course be interpreted as a kind of labour market pen-
alty for working abroad below their formal qualifications. However, taking 
into consideration their self-employment and lifelong learning attitudes 
and activities, migration-related social skills can be regarded also as poten-
tial packages of social remittances (Grabowska 2017). This is discussed 
from a qualitative perspective below.
Regionally representative household surveys conducted by the Stra-
tegic Consulting Centre (CDS) in Kraków for three Polish regions with 
intense post-accession migration outflows (Małopolska, Silesia and Lower 
Silesia) also provide information about formal qualifications and social 
skills. Return migrants to Silesia, for example (n = 1000) reported that 
they learned foreign languages or improved language skills (90 per cent), 
became more confident in their own abilities (83 per cent), obtained 
work experience and qualifications (66 per cent) and learned new 
technical/technological know-how (64 per cent) (Gruszka, Majka and 
Szymańska 2012, 34). The study showed slightly higher percentages 
for female migrants, which is in line with the Occupational Careers 
of Post-Accession Migrants qualitative study, indicating that female 
migrants approach migration somewhat differently from men and are 
readier to learn from every new situation (Grabowska-Lusińska and 
Jaźwińska-Motylska 2013).
My qualitative study (Grabowska 2016; 2017) based on 18 bio-
graphical interviews with return migrants, suggests that formation of 
social skills in migratory settings depends on several factors. First, sea-
sonal migration, and work that does not match the formal education and 
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personal capabilities of the individual migrant, is not so likely to provide 
them with new social skills. Second, the degree of difference between ori-
gin and destination workplaces (Jarvis 2007) helps determine whether 
migrants acquire new skills. If workplaces are overwhelmingly different, 
the migrant may despair of learning from the new situation. On the other 
hand, there has to be enough difference for migrants to experience ‘aha 
moments’ of surprise and interest (Grabowska 2017). As discussed in 
Section  4.3, migrants also pick up new skills if they can communicate, 
relate to and do things with others in that setting, and actively use this 
relational structure of opportunities to learn (Donati and Archer 2015). 
The study revealed three categories of social skill: (1) communicating 
cross-culturally; (2) dealing with emotionally challenging work (e.g. 
jobs in the hospitality and care sector); and (3) taking the initiative and 
acting independently. These skills were reported by returnees to various 
localities in Poland (Grabowska 2017).
When migrants return to Poland, they have differing opportunities 
to put into practice skills acquired abroad and to spread knowledge about 
them. Workplace learning outcomes are both ‘hard’ qualifications, certi-
fied thanks to participation in professional training sessions, and ‘soft’ 
social skills acquired by observing, communicating and doing things 
together. The more transferable and universal the skills, the more they are 
applicable after return. For instance, in the case of hard qualifications, 
respondents obtained new construction qualifications relating to plaster-
ing. However, they were not able to use these qualifications in Poland 
because clients were not interested in this technique and did not want to 
pay for it (Grabowska 2016). Sometimes even the most obvious and trans-
ferable competences, such as English language, were difficult to transfer 
to Poland because workplaces are composed only of Poles and usually do 
not contact foreign counterparts on a daily basis. Return migrants were 
required during the recruitment procedure to have these competences, but 
on site they were not able to use them.
4.2 entrepreneurship
Typically, and not only in Poland, return migrants aspire to become entre-
preneurs. The process of self-identification as an entrepreneur and acqui-
sition of entrepreneurial skills is a type of social remittance. It is possible 
to measure rates of entrepreneurship in a population. For example, in 
the Human Capital in Poland study, 13 per cent of movers, compared to 
11 per cent of stayers, ran their own business (confirmed also in Grabowska 
2016). The differences are even higher when we take into account the 
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level of social skills mentioned in the previous section. In the survey on 
return migrants to Silesia (Gruszka, Majka and Szymańska 2012, 34), 23 
per cent of return migrants reported that they brought an idea for their 
own business from abroad, although the 10 per cent gap between those 
wishing to set up a business and those who succeeded indicates, as dis-
cussed in chapter 3, the difficulties return migrants face in realising their 
aspirations. Moreover, ethnographic observation for the Cultural Diffu-
sion project suggested that, even when returnees had set up businesses, 
these were usually small.
Entrepreneurship can be considered an attitude, a state of mind. In 
qualitative studies migrants reported that thanks to migration experience 
they were better able to take life into their own hands, to take risks and to 
act independently, and that they translated such behaviour to their own 
businesses. They found it difficult to follow Polish workplace rules after 
return because they considered that, as working people, they themselves 
had changed as a result of migration. Self-employment is in some cases a 
strategy to deal with the Polish labour market after return, to avoid  Polish 
working conditions, which return migrants reported as finding inferior 
to those experienced abroad. Karolak (2016) points out, however, that 
one needs to distinguish between fictional self-employment of return 
migrants (accepting contracts that suit employers’ desire for flexible 
labour) and genuine entrepreneurship. This latter, according to Karo-
lak, gives more opportunities for transferring work-related social remit-
tances, especially those connected to quality standards and health and 
safety provisions, as discussed in the following subsection.
4.3 Workplaces
Both destination and origin workplaces are important micropublics for 
acquiring and transmitting social remittances. All workplaces are consti-
tuted of both formal and informal components that create social spaces 
for social remittances (Haynes and Galasińska 2016). However, not all 
workplaces are equally suitable for social remitting. This is because social 
remittances are acquired and transferred by communicating and doing 
things with others (Grabowska, Garapich, at al. 2017). ‘Relational work-
places’ are built by people and for people and are apparently more social 
remittance-friendly than isolated workplaces such as, for instance, 
fish-freezing factories, where protective uniforms and the environment 
restrict people from communicating with and relating to each other 
(Grabowska 2017). Isolationist and exploitive workplaces may lead to 
social isolation and anomie, as discussed by Thomas and Znaniecki 
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(1918–20, 1984). These situations are, however, ambiguous because 
reflexive individuals may also learn from such situations.
Interviewees in the Cultural Diffusion project valued workplaces 
abroad where health and safety provisions were not a facade but were 
implemented in practice, where the work-life balance was respected and 
overtime was paid, where salaries were set at an appropriate level and 
where they felt secure, even when working in flexible liberal economies. 
They reported that they had acquired an understanding of the significance 
of such conditions abroad, but that it was difficult to transfer such condi-
tions to established Polish workplaces. In non-relational workplaces, 
migrants are not even able to start talking about and sharing with others 
what they learned abroad. They therefore put social remittances on hold 
and activate them only when opportunities arise. Transfer was often only 
possible when one set up one’s own business, though even then it was 
hard, for example because small employers found it expensive to pay a 
respectable wage on top of high social insurance contributions. With 
regard to work-life balance, return migrants complained that they had the 
feeling all the time that they earned too little money to have a decent work-
life balance, even when they used their migratory savings, so it was not 
possible to transmit this new lifestyle back to Poland.
5. Domain 2: Local community and neighbourhood
The second domain of social remittances relates to local community and 
neighbourhood, and to the links between these places and receiving coun-
tries. In this domain, the outcomes of social remittances intermingle 
with other factors. This section does not aim to measure the outcomes of 
migration as compared with other factors. However, I begin by describ-
ing non-migration-related reasons why communities are changing (chiefly 
thanks to EU-funded investments), before proceeding to the social impacts 
of migration, including social remittances, in the strict sense of deliberate 
transmission by individual agents, but also other types of influence. 
There is considerable resistance to social remittances in local communities, 
resulting from traditionalism, fear and conservatism (Garapich 2016b), 
so that many potential social remittances are acquired but later blocked 
from diffusion. As in the previous section on workplaces, I discuss both 
those features of the domain which make it (un)suitable for social remit-
ting, and detail some types of remittance which are transmitted in this 
context. The section is based on the findings of the Cultural Diffusion 
study, published in book form as Grabowska, Garapich, et al. (2017).
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As mentioned in chapter 1, Poland is not monolithic – there are many 
local Polands, with different migration cultures or even subcultures (White 
2016d), each of which generate, contextualize and have an impact on 
transfers of social remittances. In addition, of course, each locality has its 
specific history and socio-economic profile, which creates certain oppor-
tunity structures. Local communities are understood here as a system of 
interactions supported by institutions and social control that produces a 
consensus on cultural values and might be framed by territorial bounda-
ries (Morawska 1998). The territorial boundaries are important for our 
analysis because they enclose the point of departure and point of return. 
The territories of local communities have extended as a result of migra-
tion to become transnational (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 
1994; Levitt 1998) or even translocal (White 2011), connecting sending 
and receiving localities. The translocal space is the channel of social remit-
tances discussed in this chapter.
Pszczyna (pop. 26,000), Sokółka (pop. 19,000) and Trzebnica (pop. 
13,000), despite their status as county (powiat) seats, are all small towns 
with a palpable sense of social control and cultural consensus – as men-
tioned by Morawska (1998). This appears to be strongest in Sokółka. 
Sokółka, situated in north-east Poland, was formerly within the Russian 
partition. Its population has been settled locally for generations, though 
the town lost nearly half its residents during the Holocaust. Migration per-
meates local life: since the nineteenth century, the town has experienced 
international migration, originally to the United States and Germany, but 
most recently to London. Pszczyna is marketed as the ‘pearl of Silesia’ and, 
unlike Sokółka, celebrates its multicultural past. Wealthier than Sokółka, 
it has much lower unemployment (in 2014 the rate was 6 per cent, 
compared with 16 per cent in Sokółka).4 Apart from emigration of ethnic 
Germans during the period of communist rule, international migration 
was limited before 2004. Migration today is to a range of destinations 
and is an individual matter, not very dependent on migration networks. 
Although Pszczyna interviewees expressed a sense of local, partly Sile-
sian, collective identity and roots, they did not seem to feel the social 
pressure which marked Sokółka. Finally, Trzebnica, in Lower Silesia, 
was repopulated with Poles after the expulsion of the German popula-
tion in 1945, so its population is less well-rooted. Unemployment in 2014 
stood at 12 per cent, and many people work in nearby Wrocław. Trzeb-
nica interviewees were less positive and locally patriotic than Pszczyna 
residents. As in Pszczyna, however, mass international migration began 
only after 2004, is to a range of destinations and is not very dependent 
on migration networks. Since these are all small towns, face-to-face contact 
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is still an important channel for transfer of information. Moreover, as 
small towns they contrast with the major Polish cities, which, as dynamic 
growth hubs, seem to be ‘ahead’ in numerous respects.
5.1 Changing infrastructure, institutions and streets
The landscape of Polish local communities has changed as a result of 
Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. With the support of EU structural 
funds, roads, railways, sports centres and outdoor sports facilities, water 
parks, arts centres and sewage systems are being built or improved. Poten-
tially the new investments have created relational public spaces, such as 
parks and arts centres, where return migrants and stayers can interact and 
share experiences. Migrants returning to local communities for family 
visits, and return migrants who remembered the local infrastructural 
landscape they left some years ago, are struck by improvements locally. 
Nonetheless, Polish small towns often still suffer from high unemployment 
(as in the case of Sokółka and Trzebnica) and underdeveloped public 
transport connections with vibrant urban labour markets. Pszczyna, by 
contrast, was not viewed by its residents as being underdeveloped, even 
by comparison with locations where they had worked abroad.
Change also comes to local institutions as they adapt to the conse-
quences of migration. For instance, in Pszczyna local law courts the clerks 
needed to obtain additional competences, connected to dealing with 
transnational alimony cases and issuing various documents of powers of 
attorney. In Sokółka, an NGO working with a primary school organised 
an Internet corner for children who wanted to communicate with their 
migrating parents. In Trzebnica, because of a growing number of inter-
national marriages, priests with foreign language competences were in 
demand. Because of migration, local people, wanting good Internet con-
nections, installed reliable broadband.
Alongside infrastructural change, the appearance of the towns has 
also changed, partly thanks to the efforts and money of migrants. Local 
inhabitants noticed well-tended gardens, painted fences and tidier areas 
surrounding houses. In some cases facades had been remodelled in accord-
ance with styles brought from foreign countries. Such adaptations had 
already been observed in towns marked by high volumes of migration in 
the 1990s. For instance, in Siemiatycze, where a large number of inhab-
itants worked in Brussels, local houses were altered by special plastering 
on their facades (Jaźwińska and Okólski 2001). Today the architectural 
and construction novelties brought from abroad are more subtle but also 
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locally specific, something which is connected both to the migratory chan-
nels and the local culture.
Local streets are also changed by the presence of small businesses 
set up by return migrants: shop signs display English-sounding names, and 
interiors imitate premises visited abroad – although of course such inno-
vations might be connected with wider globalisation trends. The return 
migrant businesses, as already mentioned, were usually small in scale. 
They included beauty parlours, second-hand clothes shops, tattoo stu-
dios, construction services, pet shops, fast-food bars, pubs and sports 
centres. Non-migrants also commented on how people behaved, dressed 
and talked on the street. They reported that return migrants dressed in a 
more relaxed style, wearing the flat shoes or fashionable Wellington boots, 
the skinny jeans and the branded sunglasses that they apparently wore 
on British streets.
5.2 Social and cultural change
Alongside these more visible changes, migration also influenced the 
behaviour of local stayers. For example, interviewees had noticed an 
increase in digital skills among the older generation (the parents and 
grandparents of migrants), who wanted to be in touch with family mem-
bers abroad but might not otherwise have started using computers. They 
also suggested that content searched on the Internet was educational 
because people wanted to learn about the places to which they or their 
relatives and peers migrated, and their languages and cultures. Some 
people, claiming that service in bars and restaurants had improved, 
suggested that this could be attributed to migration influences.
Migrants brought a great variety of small changes to their commu-
nities, though in many cases these changes were isolated and barely per-
ceptible. Transmission occurred through three main channels: (1) through 
direct, accidental, spontaneous contacts between migrants, return 
migrants and non-migrants, often resembling gossip (‘someone said to 
someone else’); (2) through observations of migrants’ behaviour and prac-
tices upon visits and after return; and (3) through conscious activities by 
migrants directed to achieve the transmission of social remittances. In the 
first two cases, migrants themselves often failed to notice such social 
remittances. However, the project additionally interviewed stayers who 
were members of some return migrants’ social networks and who noticed 
changes unremarked by the migrants themselves. These stayers provided 
‘proof’ of the influence of particularly active and successful remitters, 
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON POLAND84
whom we labelled ‘agents of change’. In addition, the researchers spent 
time on return migrants’ premises, such as beauty parlours, pet shops, 
sports centres and bars, and were able to observe their conversations with 
customers. Thanks to these multiple perspectives, we identified different 
examples of social remittances, as well as gaining insights into how they 
were successfully diffused among those individuals whom we labelled ‘fol-
lowers’ of the agents of change. We built up detailed information on 
eight particular agents of change filtered out from 121 in-depth interviews 
and as a result of this were able to analyse more precisely how ordinary 
migrants act as agents of change on a community level (see figure 4.1).
As illustrated in figure 4.1, agents of change had specific personal-
ity traits, such as helpfulness, openness and readiness to learn. While liv-
ing abroad, they had contacts and experiences that enabled them to 
acquire social remittances (e.g. because they worked in relational work-
6. Network of active
contacts in home
town
1. Personality traits
5. Migration money
and awareness of its
social value
4. Socially useful,
everyday role in the
community
2. Opportunities for
contact and informal
learning abroad
3. Organisational and
institutional settings
for diffusion in home
town
Fig. 4.1 Combined set of features of an agent of change. Source: Based 
on Grabowska, Garapich, et al. (2017).
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places rather than in fish-freezing factories, as discussed above). They typ-
ically also maintained their transnational contacts with the destination 
country after returning to Poland. Their experience of living in local neigh-
bourhoods abroad was also important in shaping their informal learn-
ing, particularly their encounters with ethnic diversity (see chapter 8). 
Having returned to their communities of origin, the agents of change 
worked in organisations, institutions and businesses where they came 
into contact with the public. Successful social remitting was particularly 
likely if there was a close match between the site where they had acquired 
social remittances in the destination country, and the place where they 
tried to diffuse them in Poland. For example, one of the most successful 
agents of change was a nurse who worked in care homes both in the 
United Kingdom and Poland. Agents of change were respected within the 
local community, often because they performed roles regarded as socially 
useful, such as nurses, teachers and athletes. They had brought money to 
invest from abroad, and were aware of its social value. Finally, and in 
addition to their regular customers or clients, they had a network of active 
contacts (co-workers, friends and family) among whom they diffused 
social remittances.
5.3 Pen portraits of some local agents of change
Chapter 7 of Migrants as Agents of Change (Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 
2017) provides details about the eight agents of change identified in the 
book, with detailed pen portraits of four. This chapter describes three of 
the four cases not presented using portraits in Migrants as Agents of 
Change. One case is a married couple.
Pen portrait 1: Ksenia (and her husband)
Ksenia, having worked in Edinburgh for two years to pay off some debts, 
returned to Poland in 2007. She had positive memories of her employment 
in Scotland, where she had risen from kitchen porter to chief chef, as well 
as cleaning well-off people’s houses after hours. She claimed that the most 
important thing she had learned was ‘respect for others, [including] 
respect for employees’. Ksenia did not forget her experiences abroad, and 
kept in touch with her friends by social media even after she returned, vis-
iting them every year. Since she not only paid off her debts but also saved 
money to invest in setting up a business in Poland, Ksenia established a 
pet shop in Trzebnica. Although she was not using the specific skills she 
had practised abroad, becoming an employer gave her the opportunity to 
imitate employment practices that she had liked when working in the 
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kitchen in Edinburgh, including offering lunch breaks, promoting respect-
ful work relations, providing fair pay and not expecting subordinates to 
pretend to work non-stop even when there was no work to be done.
I believe that if everything is done – my boss [in Edinburgh] taught 
me – if everything is done, then you can even read a book, but it has 
to be all done . . .  I don’t demand, [like other bosses] that girls stand 
with a cloth and pretend that they are cleaning for eight hours, even 
though it’s polished so much that they’ll make a hole in it soon . . . 
And my husband has a workshop and the same practice.
Also interesting in this quotation is the fact that Ksenia’s husband, 
who had stayed in Poland while she was in Scotland, had adopted the 
same approach to his own employees (i.e. it was an example of practices 
spreading through the returnee’s network of personal contacts). Further-
more, as part of the package of social remittances she brought from Scot-
land, Ksenia tried to persuade her customers of the importance of cleaning 
up after their dogs in public spaces, as well as non-pet-related, household 
matters such as spending time with one’s children and giving them full 
attention after school, rather than cleaning the house. By virtue of being a 
shop owner she was able to spread ideas among members of the local pub-
lic. As often seemed to happen, Ksenia had developed certain personality 
traits by being abroad, becoming more confident, active and outspoken as 
a result of her migration experience. In Trzebnica she was active in a local 
Catholic organisation and refuge for lone mothers, where she tried to help 
women stop returning to abusive partners. She was openly in favour of 
IVF treatment, trying to convince local priests and potential mothers.
Pen portrait 2: Iwona and Marcin
Iwona and Marcin were parents active in social spaces connected to a school 
in Pszczyna. Although both were quite well-educated, they did manual 
jobs in the United Kingdom in household and construction services. To 
compensate, they enjoyed a rich cultural life, often visiting cultural institu-
tions, mostly in London. One of their children was born in the United King-
dom, the second in Poland. When Iwona had her baby in Poland they made 
loud comparisons with the UK experience, which they portrayed as involv-
ing fathers to a greater extent and being more respectful towards mothers, 
offering more pain relief, and providing better postnatal conditions and 
care. They also had extensive contacts with other parents from a local 
school and shared with them their experiences and practices brought from 
abroad. Iwona and Marcin’s ‘followers’ in Pszczyna reported that ‘when 
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Iwona and Marcin allowed their children to do small things in the house-
hold and gave them small responsibilities, we decided to do the same. They 
were always telling us stories about how they experienced the UK’.
They reported giving small tasks to children, such as performing 
shopping errands and returning from school and walking the dog on their 
own; giving children space and some autonomy; managing family time, 
recognising that both quality and rubbish time with children was impor-
tant; and teaching their children to behave differently in public spaces 
towards other users and teaching them tolerant, non-judgmental, non- 
excluding attitudes towards difference – not just in cases of racial differ-
ence but also when children at school had certain diseases or sensitive 
family situations (Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 2017).
Pen portrait 3: Radek
Radek, a sports coach from Sokółka, was able to re-establish the local 
sports centre, a kind of local training club, thanks to economic remit-
tances. While abroad he had been working on a construction site but still 
was doing sport and outdoor training. One day a man invited him to a Brit-
ish sports club. They exchanged information about practices and training 
methods in boxing. He later transferred these to the local sports club in 
Sokółka. The most important thing he was able to remit was, however, 
not about boxing practices but about organising boxing competitions and 
box sparring as community and family events, where people could come, 
observe, join in, and spend time together. A local informant reported: 
‘Radek brought families in Sokółka together. He showed everyone that 
sport can be also family quality time.’ Clearly the practices Radek intro-
duced to Sokółka had an integrative function for the local community.
6. Conclusions
This chapter was not intended to provide an exhaustive analysis of social 
remitting, but rather to zoom in on three domains of social life in order to 
exemplify and catalogue social remittances and their complementary role 
in contributing to social change in Poland. It is important not to overstate 
or romanticise the effects of social remittances. Nonetheless, our research 
projects enabled us to uncover many examples that otherwise might have 
passed unnoticed and that are rarely if ever mentioned in discussions 
about migration impact.
In the first domain (the workplace), the most important type of 
social remittance turned out to be transferable social skills. These included 
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cognitive skills, self-management and discipline, contacts with others, and 
work organization skills, including team work, as identified in quantitative 
studies. They also encompassed the ability to communicate cross- culturally, 
deal with emotional labour, take the initiative and act independently, as 
identified in a qualitative study. Workplaces are the best micropublics not 
only for acquiring social remittances but also for transferring and imple-
menting them.
In the second domain (local community and neighbourhood), it is 
crucial to remember that there is not one single Poland, but instead many 
local Polands. The diversity of the country has an impact on social remitting. 
The local community is the best space to observe that social remittances 
travel in packages, from small demonstrations of social remittances visible 
in public spaces (e.g. outfits, outdoor sports, names of shops, interior 
decoration), through improving quality of service and consideration for 
others in public spaces, to relations between people in family and 
friendship circles. We showed that a single workplace in the local send-
ing community can act as a site to transfer hard and soft skills and to trans-
mit attitudes to diversity, gender relations and raising children, and also 
as a space for organising small charity actions as imitated from foreign 
countries. The packages of social remittances can contain both fleeting 
and meaningful social remittances.
The local communities highlighted in this chapter share similarities 
and differences. All locales are multireligious local communities (Catho-
lic, Protestant, Orthodox and Jewish), but each locale has a different share 
of each religious group. All locales experienced historical border shifts. 
After EU enlargement in 2004, intense post-accession migratory move-
ments have taken place in all the towns, flows that have brought many 
exchanges of emotions, attitudes, ideas and practices. In all communities 
migration has created a bifocal perspective and a greater appreciation of 
one’s home area in Poland. Local communities have stopped perceiving 
themselves as peripheries, due to opportunities to migrate and travel, and 
to the quality of available services and products in shops and family homes 
(some of them brought by migrants). The towns share labour market chal-
lenges and constraints, such as high rates of unemployment, limited job 
openings and restricted opportunities for occupational mobility. In all the 
towns, inhabitants stressed the impact of EU funds on local infrastructure.
Among differences, we encountered a varying social visibility of 
migration, which is connected to different patterns of migration: net-
worked versus individualistic. Inhabitants also have different orientations 
towards places: stronger in Sokółka and Pszczyna, but weaker in Trzeb-
nica. They also differ in relation to the encounters with the receiving 
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societies, which is connected to the clustering of Sokółka residents in 
London as opposed to the more scattered destinations of migrants from 
Pszczyna and Trzebnica. In all towns, however, migration has some impact 
on both family and peers and also on workplaces and local institutions. 
These in-depth studies showed that local migration-impacted changes are 
complementary to the changes achieved thanks to EU funds.
In this chapter we have shown the significance not only of micro-
publics (e.g. workplaces, sport clubs, health centres) but also of intimate 
spaces (e.g. family and peer groups) for acquiring, transmitting and imple-
menting social remittances. Banal everyday encounters can have a signif-
icant effect (Valentine and Sadgrove 2012) only when human agency is 
involved. The chapter has shown that despite the availability of a wide 
range of channels of diffusion for social remittances, human contact, pref-
erably face-to-face, still remains the most powerful and effective channel 
of diffusion at every stage of social remitting.
We have discovered that local return migrants can be identified as 
ordinary agents of change when they combine a set of personal and social 
features such as: (1) certain personality traits; (2) opportunities for con-
tact and informal learning abroad; (3) organisational and institutional set-
tings for diffusion in the home town; (4) a socially useful, everyday role 
in the community; (5) migration money and awareness of its social value; 
(6) a network of active contacts in the home town.
We are left with the question of how social remittances ‘scale up’ 
from all three domains and how they might become a macro phenome-
non. Social remittances of the sort described in this chapter are not visible 
on the level of macro trends in Poland. However, they all have the poten-
tial, on a micro level, to ‘stabilise’ social change, in Portes’s (2010) sense 
of consolidating wider patterns of change, change that follows both from 
system transformation and from EU enlargement.
Notes
1 https:// bkl . parp . gov . pl / projekt . html.
2 ‘Transitions from Education to Domestic and Foreign Labor Market: The Role of 
Locality, Peer Group and New Media’ (grant funded by National Science Centre, 
Sonata Bis Programme), 2016–20, a multisited qualitative longitudinal study 
focused on three localities (small cities of pop. c.100,000) and on peer groups from 
secondary school originating from the researched local communities. (N [peer 
groups] = 12–15 per locality, max. 45); n [individuals] = 350 in three waves.)
3 The study was conducted by the Polish Agency for Entrepreneurship Development, 
in cooperation with the Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
4 Unemployment figures for each town are from the local job centre (Powiatowy 
Urząd Pracy).
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Post-accession migration 
and the Polish labour market
Expected and unexpected effects
PAWeł kAczmArczyk
1. Introduction
Post-accession migration from Poland, similar to mobility from other ‘new’ 
EU member states, presents an interesting case in the European context. 
As most recent Polish migrants take paid work abroad, it is commonly 
described as labour migration. This feature makes Poland somewhat dif-
ferent from most West European countries, which record a great variety 
of types of outflow, but particularly migration related to education or fam-
ily reunification. Thus the impact of migration on the Polish labour market 
seems to be an important research area.
The aim of this chapter is to present post-accession migration from 
Poland and its labour market impacts in the broader perspective of eco-
nomic and social change in the country. We apply a temporal lens to assess 
the short-term effects of migration (changes in employment, unemploy-
ment or labour market participation); the medium-term impacts (poten-
tial or real wage pressure and structural changes in terms of human capital 
stock, specifically in the context of the brain drain/brain gain debate); and 
consider also the long-term outcomes of mobility. The last perspective 
seems particularly important as it is commonly overlooked in neoclassi-
cal economic studies and is still understudied in the Polish context. An 
attempt will be made to identify and explore a series of unexpected or not 
obvious consequences of recent migration from Poland, including some 
discussion of its relation to development and its potential impact on 
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structural changes on the domestic labour market, including the local and 
regional labour markets.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly 
analyses Polish macroeconomic trends in the post-enlargement period. 
Section 3 discusses labour market impacts of migration, with short-term 
impacts analysed before medium-term ones. Section 4, concluding the 
chapter, speculates about the possible long-term impacts of Polish post-ac-
cession migration.
2. 2004 and beyond: Macroeconomic developments  
and labour mobility
One of the main reasons to be part of the EU enlargement process was 
to speed up the process of economic convergence in CEE transition 
economies. Against this background, the post-2004 period is commonly 
described in terms of a (moderate) economic success (Campos, Coricelli 
and Moretti 2014; Grycuk and Russel 2017; LE Europe 2017; WEF 
2017; Weresa 2016). Analysis of macroeconomic data shows clear pro-
gress in the case of the most important variables, including GDP, GDP 
per capita and levels of investment and consumption. Progress is also 
observable in labour market developments  –  employment, unemploy-
ment, productivity – with (a risk of) growing inequalities (see Brzeziński 
2017; Bukowski and Novokmet 2017) and the outflow of labour as major 
‘costs’ of EU enlargement.
In terms of economic growth, measured by GDP or GDP per capita, 
Poland is one of the winners of EU enlargement. Over the period 2004–
16 average annual GDP growth in Poland amounted to 3.6 per cent and 
was significantly higher than the EU average (1.5 per cent), but also higher 
than the average rate of growth in the pre-accession period (2.85 per cent 
in the period 2000–3). Moreover, Poland was the only EU country that 
managed to avoid massive recession during the period of global financial 
crisis (2008–9). In terms of GDP per capita expressed in PPP (Purchasing 
Power Parity), Poland is gradually closing the gap towards the EU average: 
in 2005 Poland’s PPP GDP per capita amounted to only 50 per cent of the 
average, to reach 69 per cent in 2009. GDP per capita increased in all Polish 
regions. Change was between 10 and 33 per cent from 2004 to 2016, with 
Mazowieckie region, around Warsaw, experiencing the biggest increase. 
As discussed in chapter 2, in some regions, and in smaller towns and 
villages, growth was much less visible than in the ‘metropolises’.
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Other macroeconomic indicators also improved: international trade 
(increasing shares of international trade in GDP); competitiveness (the 
competitiveness index increased from around 4.30 in 2004 to over 4.50 in 
2016, when the EU average was 4.80); investment (according to UNCTAD 
data the annual inflow of FDI to Poland equalled 5.2 billion over the 
period 1994–2003 and 12.4 billion in the period 2004–2016); as well as 
other indicators (Eurostat data; Grycuk and Russel 2017; LE Europe 
2017; WEF).
Grycuk and Russel (2017) emphasise that these developments are 
attributable to a number of factors, in particular to the implementation 
of EU legislation and institutional rules, and the introduction of the Euro-
pean Single Market and EU funds. They also leave some space for migra-
tion as a possible economic trigger. In particular, the impact of the Single 
Market (and Single Labour Market as a part of it) implementation on 
GDP per capita has been unequivocally positive in most of the EU 
member states, with the Polish outcome close to the EU average (LE 
Europe 2017, 35).
As suggested above, the labour market is a major area of change in 
the post-2004 period. Figure 5.1 presents several important variables 
depicting these developments in a synthetic way. Figure 5.1 documents a 
clear tendency for conditions on the Polish labour market to improve since 
EU enlargement, with its two major features being (1) a substantial decline 
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Fig. 5.1 Labour market development in Poland, 2004–17.  
Source: Based on Roszkowska et al. (2017).
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in unemployment and (2) employment growth. The decrease in unem-
ployment is noted since 2004 but was particularly high in the first 
post-accession phase (a decline from around 20 per cent in 2004 to around 
6 per cent in 2008). Employment growth is almost steady, with two reces-
sion episodes in 2010 and 2013. There is also a clear upward trend noted 
in terms of the level of wages, both nominal and real. Similarly to other 
variables, the effect was the strongest in the pre-crisis phase. Figure 5.1 
includes an additional variable that can be used as a synthetic measure 
of labour market ‘fitness’: the labour market tightness index, defined as 
the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and as such shows how the labour 
market reacts throughout the business cycle. The tightness index presents 
a clear upward trend, with a minor interruption during the period of 
global economic crisis. Additionally, its recent values suggest that the very 
nature of the Polish labour market is changing from a state of permanent 
oversupply of the workforce to a situation of growing competition for 
workers (Roszkowska et al. 2017). The main question we ask in this chap-
ter is to what extent those developments are attributable to migration.
A back-of-the-envelope analysis (figure 5.2) shows that increase in 
the scale of (temporary) migration in the post-2004 period was clearly 
associated with positive changes in terms of unemployment (as one of the 
key labour market-related variables). Figure 5.3, however, points to a far 
more complex and nuanced picture. The introduction of a number of 
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abroad) and Polish labour market, 2004–17. Source: Own elaboration 
based on GUS data and Roszkowska et al. (2017).
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON POLAND94
additional variables to the picture presented above may, rather, suggest 
that substantial changes in unemployment are cyclical in nature and 
related to GDP growth and the process of job creation (see detailed dis-
cussion in next section).
3. Labour market effects of migration from Poland: 
Expected and unexpected effects
The basic ‘analysis’ presented above shows that a more nuanced and dis-
ciplined approach is needed to disentangle the ‘migration effect’ from a 
number of other potential sources of labour market changes, including 
those resulting directly from EU enlargement (e.g. the single market, EU 
funds, infrastructural investments, and so forth).
From the perspective of economics, labour migration implies tem-
porary or permanent movement of labour resources, which effects changes 
within the relative supply of production factors (labour in relation to cap-
ital), and, consequently, may lead to further adjustments at the level of 
wages, employment, and unemployment. As a result, in the short run, the 
outflow of migrants from a given country may be regarded as a sort of sup-
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ply shock. Available studies of post-accession migration reveal that the 
issue is more complex. Instead, to assess the effects of migration at the 
level of the labour market of the migrants’ country of origin, it is neces-
sary to refer to a variety of time perspectives and consider all different levels 
of analysis (i.e. local, regional and national) (Borjas 2004; Janicka and 
Kowalska 2010; Kaczmarczyk, Mioduszewska and Żylicz 2009).
In the short term, the main effects are related to a change in the sup-
ply of labour and thus refer particularly to changes in employment and 
unemployment, and eventually in the number of those who are out of the 
labour force. In the medium term, a tendency to adjust to market equilib-
rium might be visible, which may result, among other effects, in pressure 
on wages.
Additionally, structural features of the outflow are of some impor-
tance, particularly the quality of human capital. In the long term, more 
fundamental adjustments are possible, including changes in the structure 
of the economy (capital/labour ratio, demand-side modifications); occu-
pational and social mobility of native workers; and immigration of foreign 
labour. In this section we focus on short- and medium-term effects. We 
elaborate on the long-term developments in Section 4.
Considering both short- and long-term effects of migration, it is 
important to acknowledge that Poland, similar to other transition econo-
mies, struggled after the onset of transition with a severe oversupply of 
labour. As a result, during most of the pre-accession period, unemploy-
ment was very high. In 2002, immediately prior to the accession, it 
amounted to over 20 per cent. In fact it was commonly presented as the 
main trigger of incomplete migration, as discussed in chapter 2 (see also 
Kaczmarczyk 2005). Additionally, the Polish labour market used to be 
described in terms of low participation and employment rates, structural 
mismatches and a large share of long-term unemployment (Kaczmarczyk 
2011). In 2004, the number of unemployed people started gradually to 
decrease. According to Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, the number of 
unemployed people decreased from 3.2 million in early 2004 to 1.2 mil-
lion in late 2008, while the unemployment rate decreased from 19.1 per 
cent to 7.1 per cent.1 (See also figures 5.1–5.3.)
Against this background, the potential effects of post-accession 
migration should be assessed. All available statistical data prove that at 
the same time as the mass outflow of migrants was taking place, the situ-
ation in the domestic labour market was improving. This pertained to both 
the decrease in the number of people remaining out of work and the fall 
of the unemployment rate to a level not registered during the transition 
period. Thus, a basic analysis such as the one presented in the previous 
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section may suggest that the decline in unemployment might be an out-
come of post-accession migration.
Nonetheless, a series of arguments challenge this thesis, which is 
close to the commonly invoked ‘unemployment export’ hypothesis. First, 
the fall in unemployment as observed since 2004 was also strongly corre-
lated with a rise in employment: employment rates increased from 44 per 
cent to 50.1 per cent between the second quarter of 2004 and the second 
quarter of 2008. Second, the general trends in the labour market contin-
ued even once migration rates had stabilised (i.e. in 2007 and 2008), 
which points to the fact that changes in the Polish labour market may have 
resulted primarily from structural and business cycle changes in the 
whole economy. Third, the scale of migration from Poland was not large 
enough to substantially impact on the unemployment level. For example, 
between 2004 and 2008 unemployment fell by two million, which is a 
much higher number than the total outflow, including also persons not 
active on the labour market (Kaczmarczyk 2011; Kaczmarczyk 2014).
These reservations with regard to the export of unemployment argu-
ment are supported by Bukowski, Koloch and Lewandowski (2008), who 
investigated the impact on unemployment in Poland of changes in demo-
graphic structure, economic activity and employment. They found that 
changes in the level of unemployment in the case of people of mobile age 
should be attributed predominantly to a rise (or decline) in the level of 
employment (i.e. the process of job creation) (see also previous section 
and figure 5.3). Effects of both the remaining factors were marginal. How-
ever, they noted an impact of changes in the proportion of people eco-
nomically active, which can be attributed to migration. Similarly, Budnik 
(2007) revealed that, even if post-accession migration from Poland was 
quite substantial, it had only a moderate impact on the estimated shares 
of people employed, unemployed or economically inactive. For the direct 
post-accession period (2004–5), the bias in unemployment rate due to 
migration (the difference between unemployment rates estimated 
for migration and non-migration scenarios) was negligible. Similar results 
are provided by Barrell, Fitzgerald and Riley (2010).
Nonetheless, even if national-level statistics do not provide evidence 
that migration was particularly responsible for reducing unemployment 
in Poland in 2004–8, quantitative and qualitative research at the local level 
tells a different story. As mentioned above, growth was uneven across 
Poland. In some locations with less economic growth and a high level of 
unemployment, or employment in the informal economy, ‘unemployment 
export’ seemed very visible to the casual observer. It is chronicled in 
ethnographic research (e.g. Rakowski 2016; White 2017). Similarly, a 
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quantitative study by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2017) based on regional 
LFS data provided clear evidence that there is a statistically significant 
(and negative) relationship between the scale of outflow and unemploy-
ment at the regional level.
With regard to medium-term effects (i.e. the impacts on wage levels 
nationally), the evidence of migration influence is also inconclusive. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, wages have risen substantially in 
Poland since EU accession. The emigration of part of the labour force 
should drive up wages for workers remaining in the sending country. How-
ever, Budnik (2008) measured the impact of migration on wage levels 
(using a search and matching model) and concluded that the impact on 
the wage rate of an increase in outflow of workers of around 4.5 per cent, 
as observed between 2002 and 2006, was moderate and in 2006 was lower 
than 1 per cent.2 Kowalska (2011) provides similar results. She estimated 
the elasticity of wages in Poland as a consequence of migration from 
Poland, based on LFS data. Her analysis revealed that a 10 per cent labour 
supply shock caused an increase in wages of between 2 and 4 per cent 
(on average, depending on certain assumptions). Interestingly, elasticity 
of wages with respect to international mobility was higher for men than 
for women and for employees under 30 than for older employees. As shown 
by Gumuła et  al. (2011), when post-accession migration reached its 
peak (mid 2007), almost 30 per cent of employers declared migration of 
Poles an important factor responsible for pressure on wages. This share 
declined to 1 per cent in 2008 and 2009, and to 0 per cent in 2010, not-
withstanding still massive emigration (Gumuła et al. 2011; Janicka and 
Kowalska 2010). The fact that migration had more of an impact on 
increasing men’s wages than women’s points to the importance of selec-
tivity issues, as discussed in chapter 2: the fact that some types of people 
migrate more than others. It also reflects different sectoral impacts of 
migration from Poland.
As concluded above, the transition period in Poland saw a dra-
matically difficult situation on the labour market, marked by severe unem-
ployment. Thus vacancy rates were extremely low for most of that period. 
The vacancy rate and, particularly, the share of firms reporting problems 
with finding employees increased rapidly from 2005 until late 2007 (i.e. 
in the period of the most dynamic outflow). The number of companies 
experiencing labour shortages as a barrier to growth varied, from practi-
cally none prior to 2005, to 14.2 per cent in the third quarter of 2007. It 
then fell again, to around 6 per cent, in 2008. The most seriously hit sec-
tors included construction (35 per cent of firms reporting hiring difficul-
ties) and manufacturing (over 15 per cent) (NBP 2008). Importantly, 
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throughout 2007, labour shortages were declared the most important bar-
rier to growth (NBP 2008).
Nonetheless, as the business cycle phase changed in 2008, labour 
shortages ceased to pose a serious problem for most firms. This suggests, 
again, that labour shortages in the post-accession phase were an outcome 
primarily of the favourable economic situation rather than necessarily of 
outward migration. This conclusion becomes even clearer when referring 
to figure 5.3, particularly to the labour market tightness index. This shows 
that although the tendency continues, more recently it has been driven 
increasingly by demographic factors unconnected to migration (i.e. to the 
age structure of the population).
The arguments presented above are to a large extent supported 
by several studies relying on general equilibrium models or simulation 
approaches. Across all the evidenced cases, the effects of migration for the 
Polish labour market were evaluated as negligible but generally positive 
(Barrell, Fitzgerald and Riley 2010; Brücker et al. 2009; Holland et al. 
2011). (See figure 5.4.) Importantly, all the studies quoted argued that 
post-accession migration from Poland and other CEE countries brought 
substantial benefits, but particularly for receiving economies, and for the 
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United Kingdom and Ireland most of all. In turn, the effects of the outflow 
for sending economies are mixed. While in Poland and Slovakia, the effects 
of migration are low but predominantly positive, in those CEE countries 
that noted very limited emigration in this period (the Czech Republic and 
Hungary), the effects are insignificant. In the case of Romania and the Baltic 
states, massive out-migration contributed to a relatively large decline 
in GDP and did not bring any serious improvement in the labour market. 
This would supports the thesis that the effects of migration depend on the 
scale of the outflow but are also strongly conditional on structural condi-
tions at origin and on the general economic performance of the sending 
country. In fact, the already mentioned positive changes in the labour mar-
ket ought, rather, to be credited to changes in the sphere of creating (and 
destroying) job offers. These processes of job creation/destruction, in 
turn, largely depended on a particular phase of the business cycle, and 
were further enhanced by the influx of EU funds.
Nonetheless, one needs to address also the migration effects on 
regional and local labour markets, which can be far more severe. Addi-
tionally, it is important to consider the more long-term effects of migra-
tion, particularly on human capital formation (brain drain/brain gain 
debate), and the possible impacts of return migration.
The selective nature of post-accession migration from Poland man-
ifests itself, above all, in the overrepresentation of highly educated people. 
The mobility of highly educated people potentially generates medium- 
and long-term effects that may impact the human resource capital in the 
migrants’ country of origin, and, therefore, influence its potential for 
growth. ‘Brain drain’, the commonly used term to describe this phe-
nomenon, is derived from an approach, developed in the 1960s and 
1970s, that focused on the negative effects connected to the outflow of 
highly educated people, including the fiscal costs, since taxpayers in the 
sending country were paying for the education of future migrants, or the 
negative impact of migration on the productivity of other factors of pro-
duction (particularly capital) (Bhagwati and Hamada 1974; Grubel and 
Scott 1966).
In the 1990s, however, a new approach was proposed to challenge 
this already well- established view of highly skilled mobility. The so-called 
‘new economics of brain drain’ rests on an assumption that migration may, 
in fact, be seen through probabilistic lenses. In other words, the fact that 
migration may happen in the future is in itself something that may have 
an impact (cf. the ‘prospect channel’ of migration influence mentioned in 
chapter 3). The migration option, if available, may not be utilised in fact. 
We can also assume that in specific circumstances the possibility of going 
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abroad at some stage in the future may induce people to become more 
highly educated or skilled, and to make bigger investments in human cap-
ital, since they expect a higher return from the human capital abroad. In 
such cases, even large-scale migration of highly educated people may 
increase human resource capital in the migrants’ country of origin. Schol-
ars refer to this as ‘brain gain’ or ‘beneficial brain drain’ (Beine, Docquier 
and Rapoport 2001; Mountford 1997; Stark 2005).
Fihel et al. (2009) presented one of the first attempts to quantify the 
skill selection process in the case of post-accession migration. In the case 
of Poland as well as other CEE countries, there was a clear pattern of pos-
itive selection of persons who completed tertiary education (even if 
controlling for age differences between migrants and the sending popula-
tion). If we agree on a purely statistical meaning of the term ‘brain drain’ 
(that migrants are more highly-educated on average than stayers), then 
we can conclude that post-accession migration did result in brain drain. 
This was also indicated by a series of other studies (Clark, Drinkwater 
and Robinson 2014; Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich 2009; Holland 
et al. 2011; Kaczmarczyk and Tyrowicz 2015; Sporton 2013). Hence, 
although the trend in Poland has been for a steady increase in the share 
of university graduates (see chapter 2), a simple reading of the situation 
would be that migration creates a counter-trend and somewhat dimin-
ishes the scale of this phenomenon. However, the situation is perhaps 
more complex, as discussed in the following section.
How the effects of this phenomenon should be assessed is an addi-
tional question. ‘Drain effect’3 implies that the selective outflow of well- 
educated or skilled persons should impact negatively on labour resources 
and thus on the economic performance of a sending country. Available 
statistical evidence shows that it is extremely difficult to ascribe a direct 
impact to post-accession migration on the skill mismatches in specific sec-
tors and regions in Poland.
On the one hand, as noted in the previous section, the immediate 
post-accession period was apparently marked by a growing scale of labour 
shortages. The number of vacancies increased rapidly from 2005 until the 
third quarter of 2007, and this process was accompanied by a rising num-
ber of companies reporting labour shortages as a barrier to growth (see 
also the previous section). On the other hand, labour shortages ceased to 
be perceived as a serious issue in the first phase of recession, despite the 
still extremely high scale of out-migration. Moreover, as already men-
tioned, the shortages of workers were most apparent in construction 
(with 35 per cent of firms affected) and manufacturing (more than 15 per 
cent). They were comprised mainly of qualified workers (in 2007–8 a 
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shortage of qualified workers was reported by almost 40 per cent of Polish 
companies) (Kaczmarczyk, Mioduszewska and Żylicz; NBP 2008).
Statistical data therefore suggest that the labour shortages as 
observed in the post-accession period are comprised mainly of qualified 
workers, but not necessarily those who might be described as highly 
skilled. The main sectors suffering shortage of labour included construc-
tion and manufacturing. Considering the skill structure and work expe-
rience of post-accession migrants, it is hardly possible that these job 
vacancies could be filled by the migrants choosing EU labour markets. The 
point is that post-accession migration comprised large numbers of persons 
with tertiary education and, additionally, persons who were leaving 
abroad directly after completing their formal education and without expe-
rience on the Polish labour market. They were not interested in taking up 
low-skilled jobs in their location of origin, even if they were ready to take 
this kind of job while staying abroad. Thus it is commonly acknowledged 
that due to the general situation on the Polish labour market (an over-
supply of university-educated labour), post-accession migration is to be 
assessed more in terms of ‘brain overflow’ 4 than ‘brain drain’ (Kacz-
marczyk, Mioduszewska and Żylicz 2009; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 
2008; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009).
Importantly, even if the impact of post-accession migration on labour 
markets in the region seems largely exaggerated, and although there is 
no clear evidence of the brain drain on a national level, there is a com-
mon perception that the effects of migration are clearly visible on the sec-
toral level, particularly in health services. There is no reliable data on the 
real scale of migration of medical professionals from Poland, but some 
indication of the scale of potential migration of this occupational group 
is provided by the numbers of certificates confirming qualifications and 
professional experience issued to Polish medical professionals (as required 
by employers in EU15 countries). The data shows that the scale of the out-
flow is not so large as to pose a threat to the Polish healthcare system in 
the short term. Nonetheless, some serious sectoral imbalances are possi-
ble and already visible, as the outflow is most significant in specialisations 
receiving the lowest average incomes within Poland’s medical labour mar-
ket (anesthesiologists, radiologists) and in those for which there is high 
demand within foreign labour markets (e.g. plastic surgeons). A tempo-
rary or permanent imbalance in local and regional labour markets is also 
likely to appear, or has already appeared (Kaczmarczyk 2014; Kacz-
marczyk and Okólski 2005).
As suggested by Beine et al. (2001), the existence of dynamic or ex 
ante effect (see endnote 3) implies an increase in the investment in 
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education driven by migration prospects. In Poland, one might guess that 
this was occurring, and contributing to the already mentioned growing 
popularity of university education. There are over 1.8 million students 
in Poland, and data from the Central Statistical Office (GUS) shows 
that already in the early 2000s, the gross enrollment ratio (the ratio of 
current students within a given age cohort) in the 19–24 age group was 
close to 50 per cent. The question is, however, whether this change is 
attributable to migration.
First, it is important to note that the growing mobility of well- 
educated persons can be a rough outcome of the simple fact that the Pol-
ish population is increasingly well-educated – according to many studies, 
the recent increase in migration among the highly skilled is to a large 
extent attributable to the country’s general improvement in human capi-
tal and is a natural consequence of educational developments in Poland. 
Along these lines, the high propensity among well-educated Poles to 
migrate constitutes brain overflow, as defined above, being partly attrib-
utable to the low absorptive capacities of the Polish labour market. This 
is clearly suggested by very high unemployment rates among persons 
aged 25–29 who completed tertiary education (Kaczmarczyk 2014).
Second, similar patterns in terms of evolution of the enrolment rate 
are observed in most European countries, including both CEE and EU15 
countries (see figure 5.5). A common pattern of investing in human cap-
ital can be noted in long-established EU countries (Germany, Ireland), in 
new EU member states (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia) and in coun-
tries aspiring to be part of the EU (Turkey). Importantly, if we consider 
post-accession countries, this group comprises both countries experienc-
ing high rates of labour migration (Poland, Slovakia) and those with very 
low emigration rates (Czech Republic). Diverse patterns, as noted in the 
case of Hungary or Romania, cannot be interpreted with reference to 
migration factors either. This, indirectly, shows that a rising tendency to 
invest in human capital can be attributed to factors other than migration 
(or the migration option) alone.
Third, even if the concept of brain drain appeals, its analysis in meth-
odological terms remains very challenging. Available econometric evi-
dence points to possible brain effects based on macro (Beine, Docquier and 
Rapoport 2001; Docquier and Rapaport 2009) or micro studies (Com-
mander, Kangasniemi and Winters 2004; Commander et al. 2008; Gibson 
and Mckenzie 2011; Lucas 2004). In Poland and other benchmark 
countries, we would argue that changes in the structure of educational 
attainment are caused by a set of non-migratory factors (e.g. a growing 
interest in obtaining higher education, structural changes within the 
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system) and, so far, it has been impossible to extract any post-accession 
brain effects.
Fourth, a critical factor here is the performance of migrants abroad. 
One of the key assumptions of the model proposed by Beine et al. (2001) 
is that the rate of return to education should be higher abroad than in 
country of origin. This is supposed to induce more people to invest in their 
education in order to engage in gainful international migration. This 
assumption is commonly challenged, however. Egger and Felbermayr 
(2007) argue that returns to human capital abroad are important in the 
context of (potential) investments in human capital. By contrast, Ber-
toli and Brücker (2011) claim that relative returns to human capital 
in the receiving countries are below those of the sending countries, 
although – even so – migration may still create additional incentives for 
human capital investment.
Nonetheless, if we observe substantial ‘brain waste’, all possible ben-
efits attributed to brain effect can be seriously overestimated. Thus stud-
ies looking at the position of Polish migrants abroad and returns to their 
human capital are highly relevant here. Kaczmarczyk and Tyrowicz (2015) 
show that in the British labour market, both EU8 and EU15 migrants are 
on average better educated than the natives (particularly when it comes 
to tertiary education: almost 32 per cent of Poles resident in the United 
Kingdom have completed tertiary education, as compared to 21 per cent of 
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Fig. 5.5 Students enrolled in tertiary education (ISCED 5–6) as 
percentage of the total population aged 20–4. Source: Own elaboration 
based on Eurostat data.
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natives). Notwithstanding, this does not translate into relevant occupa-
tional positions or wages that reflect investments in education: the bulk 
of Polish migrants are employed in basic occupations and thus earn on 
average considerably lower salaries than their British counterparts. More-
over, the rate of return to education in the case of well-educated Polish 
migrants in the United Kingdom was among the lowest on the British 
labour market, and even lower abroad than on the domestic labour mar-
ket. Similarly, based on UK LFS data, Jakubiak (2016) assessed the extent 
of (possible) wage discrimination on the British labour market between 
2004 and 2014. The study indicated striking differences in real wages: 
among post-accession migrants, Poles and citizens of the Baltic states are 
doing particularly badly compared not only to EU15 migrants but also to 
third-country nationals (e.g. Indian or Pakistani migrants). This is due to 
the generally lower level of skills they possess (as compared to natives) 
but also to substantial wage discrimination. These observations are con-
sistent with studies (Clark and Drinkwater 2008; Dustmann, Frattini and 
Halls 2010; Fihel et al. 2015) that suggest Polish migrants abroad tend to 
be employed in positions far below their skill levels (severe overeduca-
tion). This feature of Polish society abroad can be of some importance 
not only in terms of how migrants function abroad but also upon (poten-
tial) return to the country of origin.
Return migration is often perceived as a development-supporting 
phenomenon: returnees are expected to bring not only the new skills and 
competences but also the financial and social capital needed to improve 
social and economic conditions at origin. Even if the relationship between 
return migration and development is in practice far more complex (see 
chapter 3), it is commonly believed that positive outcomes of return migra-
tion can overcome negative (social) effects of mobility. In the case of the 
EU new member states, empirical evidence, though relatively scarce, gen-
erally confirms experiences of other migrant-sending countries. Martin 
and Radu (2012), based on a cross-country analysis of return migrants 
in CEE countries (utilising EU-LFS data), argued that return migrants are 
in a statistically significant way less likely to be active on the labour market 
than non-migrants and additionally are more prone to be self-employed 
upon return. This effect is attributable to opportunity structures rather 
than to conscious choice, as returnees tend also to be more likely to face 
unemployment after return (see also McCormick and Wahba 2001; Piracha 
and Vadean 2010). Interestingly, those outcomes can be to some extent an 
outcome of endogeneity as return migrants are apparently sorted across 
regions where labour market opportunities are scarce. As discussed in 
chapter 3, migrants tend to return to their home locations, which typically 
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have inefficient labour markets. Nonetheless there is still a substantial 
wage premium for those who decided to return, ranging from 10 to 45 per 
cent (11 per cent in Poland). In other words, they can earn higher wages 
than they would have done if they had not migrated.
The impact of the return of migrants on the Polish economy has been 
limited, as return migration to Poland is much lower than expected and 
the brain gains are limited. There is an increasing tendency toward more 
long-term migration and an orientation toward settlement, which reduces 
returns (Janicka and Kaczmarczyk 2017). Most effects are observed on a 
regional scale, for example skill waste and unemployment (Brzozowski 
2011; Coniglio and Brzozowski 2018). In terms of economic behaviour 
upon return, Polish data shows that the share of entrepreneurs among 
return migrants is slightly higher than in the general population, as dis-
cussed by Grabowska in chapter 4 of this volume.
4. Conclusions
Empirical evidence on Poland demonstrates that in a labour market that 
is encumbered by serious structural maladjustments and that is undergo-
ing major demographic change, even short-term relations between the 
outflow of labour, defined as a supply shock and labour market processes, 
do not have to be so very obvious, as predicted by the basic models of the 
labour market. In simple words, in a country with severe oversupply of 
labour, workforce outflow does not have to be detrimental in a purely eco-
nomic sense.
Unlike in some other CEE countries, short- and medium-term eco-
nomic impacts of post-accession migration on Poland have been only 
moderately positive: migration has contributed relatively little to the 
impressive growth in GDP per capita and in the level of wages, or to 
the striking decline in unemployment. However, effects may be much 
more perceptible at local level.
There are no clear signs of brain drain, in the sense of certain pro-
fessions losing large numbers of highly educated workers, although there is 
(statistical) brain drain, in the sense that the average migrant is better- 
educated than the average Polish citizen. Hence migration somewhat 
works against the overall trend towards an increasing share of the popu-
lation holding university degrees. Prospects of a migration-driven brain 
gain effect, where returnees put new professional skills to good use on 
return to Poland, are questionable, mainly due to the unfavourable labour 
market position of Polish migrants abroad. However, as Grabowska argues 
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in chapter 4, soft skills are more likely to be transferred. Last but not least, 
return migrants fare relatively well on the labour market in the sense that 
they can earn higher wages, but still a relatively large number of return-
ees face problems reintegrating into the Polish labour market, so consider 
moving abroad again.
Against this background it is important to consider long-term effects 
of post-accession migration of Poles, going beyond a simple neoclassical 
approach that assumes capital/labour neutrality. Here, potential out-
comes are far more extreme than observed and documented in the short 
run. First, most empirical evidence shows that the demographic impacts 
of recent migration from Poland will be detrimental. Those population 
‘losses’ are to a large extent unavoidable and will be particularly severe 
for selected Polish regions (Opolskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie) (Fihel 
2015).
Second, one needs to address the possible structural impacts of 
migration on the domestic labour market. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 
(2008) proposed a concept of ‘crowding-out migration’ to address poten-
tial long-term outcomes of recent migration from Poland and other CEE 
countries.5 They argued that, in the long run, recent migration from 
Poland may lead to significant structural changes in how labour resources 
are allocated spatially. In this sense, migration carries with it a certain 
modernising potential, whereby modernisation is understood as the trans-
formation of regions characterised by a large share of farmers producing 
for their own consumption, as well as surpluses of labour resources impos-
sible to absorb into areas capable of joining the competitive global econ-
omy. The concept refers both to key reasons of migration as well as to its 
potential impacts. With regard to the first point, as shown above, contem-
porary migration from Poland involves with particular intensity young 
and relatively well-educated people who, additionally, originate from 
peripheral regions marked by a large share of smallholdings, as well 
as poorly developed labour markets. Arguably it is the limited absorp-
tion possibilities of the local and regional labour markets that are respon-
sible for the mass migration following EU accession. Considering previous 
barriers to mobility, Polish accession to the EU and the resulting mass 
mobility have for the first time in Polish history created the basis for, on 
the one hand, the outflow of workforce surpluses (as in the case of set-
tlement migration), and, on the other hand, the reallocation of labour 
resources in the domestic labour market (as in the case of temporary 
migration and return migration, which could result in internal migration 
within Poland, although there is little sign of this at present). The mech-
anism described by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) ought not to be 
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treated as ultimate or categorical. Widespread migration paves the way 
for structural changes, but in itself does not create them. The outflow of 
labour surpluses abroad only gives space for public policies whose aim 
should be to improve the effectiveness of the labour market, primarily at 
the local and regional level. Today, around 14 years after EU enlargement, 
one could argue that this chance, created by massive post-accession 
migration, is already lost.
Notes
1 Interestingly, the situation had started to improve before EU enlargement, as 
the Polish economy grew. Growth was particularly important directly before 
accession, with 3.9 and 5.3 per cent of GDP growth in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
2 Note that this effect is smaller than obtained in general equilibrium studies, discussed 
later. Apart from the different methodology applied, the reason lies in the shorter 
period covered.
3 We follow an approach, proposed by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), 
of distinguishing between static (or ex post) effects of the outflow, which can be 
termed ‘drain’ effect, and dynamic (ex ante) ‘brain’ effects related to a possible 
increase in the investment in education induced by the prospect of migration.
4 A ‘brain overflow’ occurs when there is an intentional or unintentional oversupply of 
educated professionals in the sending country, whose abilities cannot be matched 
to job offers. In such a case, migration of the highly skilled occurs at low or zero 
opportunity costs and can reduce the labour market supply-demand inequality in 
the sending country.
5 This idea goes back to the concept, formulated by Layard et al. (1992), that one of 
the major conditions of accelerating modernisation in southern European countries 
in the aftermath of World War Two was a mass outflow of labour. This outflow led 
to a sort of ‘crowding out’ of the labour markets, which, along with the application 
of various labour market policies, measurably improved their effectiveness.
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Family relations and gender equality 
in the context of migration
krystynA slAny
1. Introduction
Most chapters in this book directly or indirectly discuss the impact of 
migration on families, both family members living in Poland and those res-
ident abroad. The chapters address various themes, such as intertwined 
social remittances about parenting, gender roles and family logistics 
(chapter 4), lifestyles and transnational family ties (chapter 7) and repro-
duction plans and birth rates (chapter 9). Gender is fundamental to any 
sociological analysis, and the family is a basic social unit, so it is appro-
priate to mainstream the topics of gender and family through the book 
rather than confine discussion just to chapter 6.
In this chapter, however, I look more closely at the family, particu-
larly family relations as seen through a gender lens – in other words, how 
relations evolve, or not, towards greater gender equality. A gendered 
perspective, taking into account the different experiences of women and 
men within families, seems essential in face of ongoing changes in post-
modern family life, and in the context of intense geographical mobility. A 
gender lens also exposes wider relations within society (i.e. the economic 
and cultural structures influencing expectations, obligations, cultural 
scripts and stereotypes relating to gender).
The chapter is based on the premise that gender is partly constructed 
through the migration process and therefore how individuals experience, 
practise and survive migration, as well as the (re-)negotiations it involves. 
More than ever, Polish families have connections both with Polish society 
and families abroad, and at the same time with life in Poland itself. 
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Migration is a factor directly modifying relations within the family and 
creating new family types.
The chapter argues that, insofar as families abroad influence families 
in Poland – directly, through social remittances, or more indirectly – their 
impact seems to be to back up existing models rather than to promote more 
democratic ones. Families in migration seem stuck half-way in transition 
from a traditional model (wife = homemaker, husband = breadwinner) to 
a partner-like distribution of gender roles. In our 2015 research, par-
ticipants shared a vision of equality within the family, but equality was 
more talked about than practised. Most Polish families implement a type 
of everyday maternalism, where women manage the family’s affairs 
without much support from their partners, and suppress tensions and 
conflicts arising from unequal distribution of roles, because they are busy 
trying to combine their domestic roles with paid employment. Migration 
also helps the pluralisation of forms of family life and the decline of the 
extended family household.
Families abroad differ in composition and lifestyle, and this affects 
how they are influenced by migration, as well as the nature of change they 
can bring. Some migrant families formed in Poland; others, abroad. Mixed 
marriages (where one spouse is not Polish) are increasingly common. One 
or both parents can be living together with children, be in the process of 
reunification abroad, or be living abroad while children remain in Poland 
(Ryan and Sales 2013; Ślusarczyk and Pustułka 2017; Ślusarczyk and 
Slany 2016; White 2011).
Gender equality has many dimensions (Krzaklewska et al. 2016), 
and in some areas of gender equality Poland has changed quite signifi-
cantly. For example, an active feminist movement has successfully backed 
the introduction of electoral quotas and increased female representation 
in parliament. However, this chapter is concerned only with certain aspects 
of gender equality linked to family models: relations between partners, 
the distribution of roles and responsibilities within households and 
extended families and work-life balance.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some existing 
knowledge about trends regarding gendered aspects of Polish family 
relations, mostly from a gender equality angle. This is followed by concep-
tual discussion of how migration intersects with other sources of change 
in Polish families. After some information about the chapter’s main data 
sources (see table 6.1), the chapter explores the influence of migration in 
Poland, before considering changes within ‘Polish society abroad’. The 
chapter concludes by summarising how social trends are shaped by spe-
cific factors and how migration contributes to those factors.
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2. The background: Family models  
and gender roles in Poland
Following the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, the system trans-
formation wrought deep changes in family life, in the context of wider 
social change. In addition to endogenous change, Polish society is exposed 
to wider, global-scale developments, including migration. These wider 
developments also affect that basic unit of human society, the family. 
Changes directly influence sexuality, how partners are chosen and unions 
established, relations between partners, parenthood and how long unions 
survive. They also promote the creation of various more complex types 
of family unit (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Mazzucato, Schans 
and Caarls 2015; Zinn, Eitzen and Wells 2009).
After the fall of communism, when gender equality was part of 
the official state ideology, a backlash against women’s emancipation 
occurred, leading to the reinforcement of traditional gender roles. 
Despite the pressure put on subsequent governments by the women’s 
movement and feminists, gender equality has not been a focal point in 
policies from the 1990s up to today (Warat 2016). Nonetheless, family 
matters are often at the centre of political and social attention. Polish 
conservative claims that increased contact with the West, including west-
ward migration, has had a destructive effect on family relations are 
built on prejudice and a simplistic framing of migration impact as being 
primarily about loss (see chapter 3). Evidence-based research adopts 
a more adequate conceptual framework, taking into account transna-
tional ties.
Among the most obvious trends in Polish family life are the contin-
uing importance attached to the family (Grabowska 2013a, 2013b) and 
declared high levels of satisfaction with one’s own family relations 
(Czapiński 2015a, 188). They also include much greater acceptance of 
family types other than married couple plus children, and some support 
for a redistribution of roles within the household – reflected to a much 
lesser extent in actual practice.
Around 80 per cent of Poles state that their family constitutes the 
main purpose of their lives and is the most important thing to them 
(Grabowska 2013b). Although the significance and high value placed on 
family life can be explained partly by hostility to the communist state, it 
has its roots in Polish history. During the period 1795–1918, when Poland 
was partitioned between Russia, Prussia/Germany and Austria, the con-
tinuity of the Polish nation depended on the survival of the Polish family, 
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its maintenance of Polish culture and religion and a perpetuation of a 
sense of national identity. The national fate was bound up with the family 
as the miniature ‘private fatherland’.
Many studies show a sea change of greater acceptance for a range 
of family types: pluralisation of family life has become not just socially 
acceptable, but also more widely practised (see, e.g. Grabowska 2013b; 
Kwak 2005; Slany 2007; Szlendak 2010; Warzywoda-Kruszyńska and 
Szukalski 2004). As many as 91 per cent of Poles agree that lone-parent 
families can be considered ‘families’. Acceptance figures for unmarried 
couples are 78 per cent; for childless couples, 71 per cent; and for non- 
heterosexual couples bringing up children, 23 per cent (Grabowska 
2013b). There is a marked liberalisation of views on divorce: according 
to CBOS surveys, only 13 per cent are ‘very opposed’ to it, while the 
World Values Survey (2012) puts this figure at 16 per cent.
As for the actual variety of family types encountered in Poland, the 
2011 census (Szałtys 2014) showed that the most common type of family 
remained a married couple with children (49.7 per cent of all families). 
However, since the 2002 census the share of that type of family had fallen 
by nearly 7 per cent. By contrast, informal partnerships have increased 
dynamically, by over 60 per cent – although their total share among fam-
ilies was small, at 3 per cent. The number of single parents with children 
had risen to over a quarter of the total, to stand at 2,502,900 (including 
328,000 fathers with children). The changes correspond to changes in age 
of marriage, and new types of educational, occupational and migratory 
careers, which in turn lead to a reduction in family size. Only 12.4 per cent 
of families contained three or more children, compared with about 18 per 
cent in 2002.
With regard to attitudes towards gender roles within the family, 
according to many studies (e.g. Duch-Krzystoszek 2007; Grabowska 
2013a; Titkow 2007), men as well as women increasingly declare support 
for the principle of sharing caring and breadwinning roles within a 
‘partner-like’ or egalitarian marriage, while in practice men still do less 
caring and housework than women. In comparison with research in the 
early transformation period (Gwiazda 1993; Anon.1997), support for 
a traditional model has declined. Recent CBOS research (Grabowska 
2013a, 12–26) shows approval for the partner-like model at 46 per cent 
but also indicates that quite a large group (23 per cent) prefers the tra-
ditional model, in which the wife looks after the house and the man is 
the breadwinner, or the so-called mixed model (22 per cent), where both 
partners are in paid employment, but the wife is expected to care for the 
house and children as well as working.
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With regard to how these models are put into practice, as recently 
as the early twenty-first century, according to European Social Survey 
data, almost every third husband in Poland did no housework on week-
days, and every fifth husband stated that they never helped in the house 
at all (Duch-Krzystoszek 2007, 136). Duch-Krzystoszek’s own research 
showed that in over 80 per cent of marriages the wife alone bore the bur-
den of housekeeping (laundry, cleaning and cooking). It emerged that 
young men almost all regarded responding to requests to share housework 
as part of a power struggle within the marriage. Models were practised 
because they were most functional for the family and its phase in the life 
cycle. According to CBOS (Grabowska 2013b), by 2013, partner-like mar-
riages were the most common category (27 per cent), followed by mixed 
marriages (23 per cent) and traditional marriages (20 per cent).
As already discussed in this book, Polish social trends are complex, 
and change is more evident in some parts of society than in others. Overall, 
urban, better-educated, younger families, with higher incomes and no 
children are likely to display more egalitarian behaviour (Grabowska 
2013b). The traditional model is mostly practised by younger women, 
those with lower levels of education, those with lower income, and mothers. 
The mixed model is practised by women aged 35–44, in paid employment, 
with children.
There is a wide divergence between the preferred and actual model, 
with 52 per cent of women failing to achieve their desired model 
(Grabowska 2013a). Women are more likely to indicate such discrepan-
cies if they have higher education but are from small towns, younger or 
with low incomes. In addition, women with higher education and paid 
employment often feel that they spend too little time on their family; work 
and family are competing priorities and, to use Elisabeth Badinter’s (2013) 
expression, this results in ‘overloading the boat’.
3. Migration and changing trends in families  
and gender roles: Reflections on intersecting factors
Since the 1990s, Polish society has undergone deep, complex and multi-
dimensional change, affecting every sphere of life and all social organisa-
tions and institutions, including families. Social change can be understood 
as changing models of behaviour, social relations and social structures and 
institutions (Sztompka 2005, 22). Different strands of change are inter-
connected, since economic restructuring and political reform have also 
had an impact on social and cultural processes. Figure  6.1 shows the 
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intersecting contexts of family change in Poland, to help understand how 
migration links with wider patterns of change. Migration results from 
changes in each sphere, but it also causes change. Figure 6.1 helps demon-
strate how migration is particularly important for causing change in some 
sections of society and prompts reflection about why some families and 
their members are more affected than others by migration-related change. 
For example, if a poor family (Circle 1) from a poor region negatively 
affected by the transition to a market economy (Circle 2) with more con-
ventional and religious views (Circle 3) adopts a more democratic family 
model this is more likely to be the result of migration than in the case of 
well-educated wealthy families from big cities, who have a greater number 
of different, non-migration related reasons to adopt more liberal views.
As suggested in Circle 1, how families function is related most impor-
tantly to their specific characteristics, particularly whether or not they 
include children; the socio-economic status of family members; social 
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Circle 3: Sociocultural factors: 
processes of individualisation 
and privatisation of family life, 
women’s involvement in 
movements for gender 
equality, family as a social 
value, Mother-Pole model, 
influence of the Catholic 
Church.  
Circle 2: Economic and political 
structures: neoliberal economic 
system, peripheral position 
(globally) of the Polish economy, 
(until recently) limited scope of 
social policy, including family 
policy. Influence of the EU. 
Growth in higher education. 
Circle 1: Characteristics of individual 
families: members’ age, sex, 
education, place of residence, 
parental status, personality traits, 
income, social capital. 
Fig. 6.1 Contexts of social changes relating to migration and families 
in Poland today. Source: Own elaboration.
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support networks (including migration networks) within the extended 
family; and the agency and personality traits of family members (e.g. 
resourcefulness, openness, ambition). Family composition helps shape the 
destiny of individual households. However, changing family composition – 
as documented above, often a departure from the conventional model 
of the married couple with children, surrounded by extended family and 
living in Poland  –  is also a consequence of social change in Poland, 
including migration-related change.
With regard to Circle 2, neoliberal reforms since 1989 have included 
the retraction of state services, the transfer of caring responsibilities to 
individuals and families, and the spread of precarious and insecure work, 
all of which make it harder to combine work and family life (Charkiewicz 
2009; Charkiewicz and Zachorowska-Mazurkiewicz 2009; Hryciuk and 
Korolczuk 2015). This latter tendency is enhanced by Poland’s peripheral 
location within the global economy (Urbański 2014). The transition to a 
market economy also created fear of unemployment, and state benefits 
have been modest until very recently. One consequence has been that 
many couples have hesitated to have children (Hardy 2010; Kotowska 
2014; Szelewa 2015). The general democratisation of family life – the 
introduction of a partner-like family model and the diffusion among all 
social classes of the model of engaged fatherhood (Hobson and Fahlen 
2009; Sikorska 2009; Slany, Pustułka and Ślusarczyk 2016; Suwada 
2016) – is inhibited by the demands of the labour market, which often 
require fathers to work very long hours (Boulhol 2014, 6).
These obstacles to gender equality combine with conservative cul-
tural opposition, notably in the context of the so-called ‘gender war’ since 
2011. Circle 3 refers to sociocultural conditions. These include the still 
influential ideal of the self-sacrificing Mother-Pole (Hryciuk and Korol-
czuk 2012; Titkow, Duch and Budrowska 2004). In the words of Hryciuk 
and Korolczuk (2012, 7), this is ‘personal role model, stereotype . . .  and 
fantasy’. It is part of the identity of Polish women and their cultural capi-
tal, but it also has an ‘exclusionary character [for women who cannot live 
up to the ideal], and its reproduction is entangled in the hierarchy of 
social power relations’. As various research has demonstrated, the role of 
Mother-Pole is both contested and reproduced, including by transnational 
families. The Catholic Church actively promotes a traditional family model 
in Poland. According to the Church, women are responsible for the home 
and children. The Church hierarchy frequently speaks out against gender 
equality and influences the attitudes of many believers, as well as politi-
cians responsible for forming state policy (Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017; 
Szelewa 2015, 123).
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For most Poles the family, as mentioned above, remains the most 
important social value. However, since 1989 Poland has become much less 
a society of families, and individuals have acquired more personal free-
dom (see also chapter 8 on the individualisation of religion). Economic 
changes are accompanied by changes in social life, such as an individual-
isation and privatisation of family life, complementing the withdrawal of 
state services and privatising of care (Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2015). Indi-
viduals exercise greater freedom in organising their own personal lives 
and increasingly believe that matters such as contraception, extramarital 
sex and divorce are for individuals to decide for themselves, rather than 
following the prescriptions of the Catholic Church (Grabowska 2013a, 
2013b).
4. Methodology
The main sources for this chapter are the findings of two research projects 
which provide up-to-date evidence about family trends and gender rela-
tions in Poland and abroad (see table 6.1).1 On changing gender equality 
and family practices in Poland, the main source is Gender Equality and Qual-
ity of Life: How Gender Equality Can Contribute to Development in Europe. A 
study of Poland and Norway (GEQ).2 This asks questions about the fami-
lies in which respondents grew up (their ‘families of origin’) as well as 
about the families they created as adults (their ‘families of procreation’). 
The discussion of transnational families is largely based on Doing Family 
in Transnational Context: Demographic Choices, Welfare Adaption, School 
Integration, and Everyday Life of Polish Families Living in Polish-Norwegian 
Transnationality (Transfam).3 Data for demographic trends in Poland is 
from GUS (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Central Statistical Office).
Norway, the receiving country in which the research was conducted, 
is an interesting laboratory in which to study migration impact. Since the 
1970s it has practised a particularly vigorous gender equality policy. 
Despite the 2012 so-called backlash against gender equality polices, it has 
never stopped treating gender equality as a core value and ‘part of Nor-
way’s identity’ (Krzaklewska et al. 2016). All aspects of life are evaluated 
through a gender lens, and a range of public policy incentives and instru-
ments promotes egalitarian relations in the family and connections 
between family and work lives. Policy is intended to bring positive effects 
for the whole of society, as well as to improve life quality for individuals: 
more happiness and satisfaction with family life, more children per family, 
less domestic violence and better mental health (Holter, Svare and Egeland 
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2009). When arrivals from conservative Poland encounter equality 
measures, such as paternity leave and monitoring of domestic violence 
through the Barnevernet child protection agency, this can constitute a cul-
ture shock but also lead to an enforced egalitarianism across a range of 
complex family practices.
5. Gender equality in Poland as reflected  
in the GEQ study
The 2015 GEQ study illustrated the trend towards modified gender 
equality also noted by earlier Polish surveys. A clear majority of respond-
ents, both female and male, consider that equality between the sexes ‘is 
important to me’ (f = 83 per cent, m = 77 per cent) and ‘is an important 
value for a fair society’ (f = 83 per cent, m = 74 per cent). They consider it 
important for families to adhere to principles of gender equality. Women 
and men should divide household tasks equally and should have an 
equal responsibility for the family’s financial stability.
However, when it comes to childcare or weighing the relative impor-
tance of men’s and women’s work, pro-gender equality views are not as 
strongly marked. Acceptance for democratisation within families and for a 
new gender order is therefore only partial. As many as 64 per cent of men 
and 57 per cent of women (a clear majority) agree that ‘women still have 
the main responsibility for the home and family’. Moreover, 37 per cent 
of women and 46 per cent of men consider that ‘it is right that a woman 
should sustain her husband’s career by abandoning hers’. 75 per cent of 
women and 78 per cent of men consider that ‘a woman who has small 
children (below the age of three) should not be working professionally’.
Comparing actual practices in the families where respondents grew 
up with the families they have formed themselves, it seems that ‘mana-
gerial matriarchy’ (Titkow 2007), where women are in charge of organis-
ing family life, is well entrenched and hard to modify. Unpaid work is very 
much the province of women, just as it was in the families of origin. Most 
organising, cleaning and child-rearing is done by women. Family life could 
not and still cannot take place without women’s domestic labour. How-
ever, certain generational changes can also be observed. The respondents 
note small but visible changes in the direction of greater equality. There 
is a gradual shift towards an egalitarian model, where both partners are 
in paid employment, and men become somewhat more involved in care-
giving. The most commonly declared joint activities are taking the child 
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to extracurricular classes (46 per cent), everyday childcare (44 per cent) 
and taking children to school (43 per cent).
Why are some families more egalitarian than others? By studying the 
division of household labour across two generations, the GEQ survey 
revealed the dynamics of gender equality in specific families. It seems that 
when women acquire paid employment this leads to change, thanks to 
their enhanced self-esteem and sense of autonomy and independence. 
Respondents with more egalitarian origin families were more likely to put 
gender equality into practice in their own family. In addition, young 
women learn from the examples of their own mothers, who have often 
been migrants. It is not uncommon for mothers to encourage their daugh-
ters to work abroad and set in motion a ‘gendered intergenerational migra-
tion transfer’ (Krasnodębska 2013).
As mentioned above, in survey responses Poles declare a high level 
of satisfaction with their own marriages and other family relations. The 
GEQ data backs this up, with a twist. It suggests that, though the unequal 
distribution of responsibilities generates many conflicts, tensions and 
stress, these are often suppressed. Such matters are not discussed between 
spouses/partners. According to 63 per cent of women and 66 per cent of 
men, household duties very rarely or never occasion quarrels. Here one 
can see the role of ‘hidden power’, based on traditional gender models 
(Komter 1989).
6. The influence of migration, especially maternal  
migration, on Polish families in Poland
Conservative social forces, which have been waging ‘gender war’ since 
2011, blame migration for the disintegration of the family and the rise in 
divorce rates, as well as the ‘care drain’ that leaves older people without 
family care in Poland. The concept of a ‘Euro-orphan’ is used for older 
people as well as for children, and can similarly lead to a moral panic (Bar-
glowski, Krzyżowski and Świątek 2015; Krzyżowski 2013; Krzyżowski and 
Mucha 2014; Perek-Białas and Slany 2016). However, the conservatives’ 
main concern is about mothering and the situation of migrants’ children. 
This section, in keeping with the approach of our book, emphasises ties 
more than gaps. It considers in turn the quality of ties in transnational fam-
ilies of the type where just the mother works abroad, suggesting that solo 
maternal migration is compatible with continuing strong levels of support 
for the family as an institution; migration’s link to increasing divorce rates 
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in Poland; and how migration may also be contributing to new models of 
caring for older people living in Poland.
Individuals and institutions that legitimise conservative discourse 
about migration in Poland (such as sections of the Catholic Church, con-
servative media and many professionals in the sphere of child welfare) por-
tray maternal migration as a social evil. Maternal migration strengthens 
anti-Western discourse by providing a subject matter for debates about the 
supposed decline of the ideal family. Mothers’ (unlike fathers’) absences 
raise questions about child neglect and abandonment and children’s undis-
ciplined behaviour and mental health. An even more intense moral panic 
arises when both parents migrate, although this happens comparatively 
rarely, and is usually only brief, with good support networks of relatives. 
(Walczak’s research, 2014, 64, shows that in 2014 only about 15 per 
cent of working trips abroad involved both parents at the same time.)
Actual empirical evidence suggests the need for a more balanced 
assessment of parental migration’s emotional impact. Many studies show 
that women migrants of all nationalities find new ways of caring at a dis-
tance, ensuring the continuance of the family in a situation of temporary 
migration, and that their migration is always motivated by the good of 
the family. Migration is always ‘for the sake of someone’ (Małek 2011; 
Urbańska 2015). Families continue to exist and do not lose their identity 
as a result of migration (Krzyżowski 2013; Slany and Strzemecka 2016; 
Slany, Pustułka and Ślusarczyk 2016).
As chapter 3 discussed, scholars are divided as to whether migration 
promotes gender equality by leading to empowerment for women: this 
often seems to depend on the specific circumstances of migration. The 
conservative Polish view is that individual women are disempowered by 
migration. Women’s migration is problematised in some Polish studies, 
which assume that sedentariness is the norm and that women should 
confine themselves to the private sphere. This type of study emphasises 
migrants’ difficulties – for example, deskilling, loss of contact with family 
and local society, loss of self-confidence and identity, culture shock and 
inability to integrate, and even mental illness (e.g. Korczyńska 2003; Waniek 
2007).
Recent research suggests the more differentiated experience of 
women, men and children who experience separation as a result of migra-
tion or migrate as a whole family (Slany and Strzemecka 2016; Slany, 
Pustułka and Ślusarczyk 2016). It seems to be true that Polish women 
are somewhat empowered by migration, and that gender equality is 
facilitated – but only up to a point. This is in keeping with the ambiguous 
quality of women’s emancipation in Poland itself.
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Many studies (e.g. Krasnodębska 2013, Małek 2011, Urbańska 
2015) suggest that women who migrate alone have a considerable degree 
of agency and satisfaction from financial independence and their ability 
to share their material resources with family members. They add to the 
number of self-confident women in Polish society, changing its composi-
tion. They have new capital in the form of money, knowledge and skills. 
Often they are in practice the only breadwinners, breaking the stereotype 
that this is a male role. For example, an adult daughter of a female migrant 
from Podlasie told me in an interview that her mother, working as a 
carer in Italy, had given her father a credit card as a present. His daughter 
observed sarcastically that he did not put himself out to support his four 
children, preferring to use his wife’s earnings. In such households, the 
women decide how to spend money and they place first the needs of chil-
dren and then their husbands and parents. Despite the physical distance, 
they still manage the household in Poland successfully. They proudly show 
researchers newly built or repaired houses, with new equipment and furni-
ture and beautiful bathrooms. They stress that they are more self-confident; 
for example, they feel able to travel alone and to successfully find work and 
accommodation. Some point out that they are better able to look after 
their appearance and feel more attractive (Małek 2011; Urbańska 2015).
Divorce is often seen as a consequence of migration, but research, 
especially qualitative studies (Danilewicz 2010; Urbańska 2015) show 
that family break-up is often the result not of migration as such but of 
conflictual events, tensions and domestic violence that took place before 
migration happened. Migration is a way of escaping unsatisfactory, low 
quality married and family life, and often offers the chance to construct 
life anew. Most families who are separated by migration reconstruct their 
ties, work on relationships within the family and try to build family unity 
(Danilewicz 2010; Małek 2011; Slany, Pustułka and Ślusarczyk 2016; 
Urbańska 2015). Official Polish statistics do show that overall the divorce 
rate has been rising,4 but this does not necessarily imply a direct connec-
tion with migration. Among the reasons for marriages failing, protracted 
absence of a spouse was cited in only 1.9 per cent of cases (GUS 2016, 
245), a figure that has been rising but that is so low that it does not sug-
gest widespread disintegration caused by migration.
Divorce rates reflect not just ‘demand’ for divorce but also its sup-
ply: rates will rise if divorce is more available, for example through being 
socially acceptable. The increased incidence of divorce should be seen 
largely as the result of Polish society becoming more ‘postmodern’ rather 
than as a direct consequence of migration. Poles are increasingly accept-
ing of divorce under certain circumstances (Boguszewski 2013b).
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Regional analysis suggests that to understand the connection 
between migration and divorce one needs to take into account regional 
attitudes, and in particular the considerable variation in religious obser-
vance (as discussed in chapter 8). The highest divorce rates are in Lower 
Silesia, Lubuskie, West Pomerania and Warmińsko-Mazurskie Regions, 
which have both a high volume of migration and a high incidence of 
various nontraditional behaviour patterns, such as children born out of 
wedlock, cohabitation and single-parent families, mostly headed by moth-
ers. Eastern regions – Podkarpacie, Podlasie, Świętokrzyskie, Małopolska, 
Lubelskie – have high volumes of migration but the lowest divorce rates 
in Poland (Krzyżowski et al. 2014). Therefore, even though migration 
does strain many marriages, it is less likely to lead to divorce in regions 
where the Catholic Church has greatest influence.
Nonetheless, some divorces can be linked to women’s sense of 
empowerment following migration. Urbańska (2015) shows, on the basis 
of qualitative research, that as a result of migration women migrants 
sometimes become more conscious of how their home lives had been 
marked by unequal, often violent and oppressive relations (sometimes 
with the extended family). The reshaping of these relationships through 
migration sometimes made them decide on divorce. Undergoing the 
family situation and experiencing it anew as the result of migration 
exemplifies how migration empowers women who are otherwise deeply 
disadvantaged and how it changes how they evaluate the quality of their 
own lives.
The exodus of younger people abroad intensifies the ongoing pro-
cess of the ageing of the Polish population and worsens the already unfa-
vourable ratio of working-age to retired people5 (GUS 2014). The share 
of people aged 75 and over, with enhanced care needs, Poland-wide, is 
currently 7 per cent but by 2050 will increase to nearly 17 per cent. Par-
ticularly large proportions of such people are to be found in some regions 
that also have a high volume of migration, such as Świętokrzyskie, Pod-
laskie and Opolskie. The age dependency ratio in Poland (children and 
retired people per 100 population) in 2015 was 34 but by 2050 is projected 
to be 84, an increase of 2.5. The ‘index of sandwich generation support’ 
showing the potential of people (aged 50–64) to simultaneously support 
children and older parents, indicates that currently in Poland there are 
potentially three people available to support each person aged 75 or over, 
but by 2015 there will be only 1.2 (GUS 2014; own calculations) This indi-
cator is the most telling evidence of the ticking care time bomb that is 
radically modifying the intergenerational care contract. It is a problem not 
caused solely by migration, but it is certainly exacerbated by it.
123fAmIly relAtIonS And Gender equAlIty In tHe Context of mIGrAtIon
Migration definitely represents a challenge for the norm that fami-
lies, especially women, are expected to care for older relatives (Hryciuk 
and Korolczuk 2015). However, relations with relatives are often carefully 
maintained by nuclear families living abroad. This is shown, for example, 
by their invitations to relatives to join them. Family capital is still of key 
importance and can be transferred between families in both receiving 
and sending countries (Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 2017). Although one 
should not downplay the significance of research showing the weakening 
of family relationships, it is important to point out that most migrants and 
non-migrants who belong to transnational family networks try to main-
tain responsibilities for family members outside the nuclear family (includ-
ing for older people), so that closeness and family loyalty continue across 
international borders (see Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Glick 2010; Goul-
bourne et al. 2010; Slany, Pustułka and Ślusarczyk 2016).
The absence of adult children abroad has up to now not had as much 
impact on care practices for older Poles as might have been expected. As 
Krzyżowski (2013) shows in his monograph on the topic, migrants and 
their older parents located in Poland do provide one another with mutual 
support. Although some forms of care for older people obviously require 
constant physical presence, which sometimes means employing a home 
help, other types of care do not (e.g. emotional support and advice, 
making doctors’ appointments, paying bills, Internet shopping in Polish 
cities and purchasing large quantities of non-perishable items on visits 
home). Migrants also bring technology, medicine and food products from 
abroad. Though physically absent much of the time, they therefore help 
organise the everyday life of their parents (Krzyżowski 2013; Krzyżowski 
et al. 2014).
Botterill (2011), in her study of young Poles in the United Kingdom 
and Poland and their family attachments, found that they declared the 
intention of returning to Poland if their parents fell ill. Kordasiewicz, Radz-
iwinowiczówna and Kloc-Nowak (2018) point out that few post-2004 
migrants so far have parents at an age where they need constant care, and 
that discussions within migrant families (including disagreements with 
siblings based in Poland) are more about possible eventualities rather than 
actual situations. One can see, however, that migrants are exposed abroad 
to alternative ethnomoralities of care, which can influence how they feel 
about the best caring arrangements (in future) for their own parents.
Given the limited state support for older people in Poland, migrants 
need to find ways of direct, physical caring for older relatives within the 
context of a reduced family network locally. Private care homes have 
mushroomed in recent years. Migration, together with the improving 
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quality and availability of institutional care, could be one factor helping 
to erode preconceptions that institutional care is inferior. Krzyżowski 
(2013, 176–7), in a survey of five hundred parents of migrants living in 
Poland, found that migrants’ parents were more accepting than other 
Poles based in Poland of the idea that older people could be cared for (in 
a variety of different ways) by people other than immediate family mem-
bers. Hence this is a social remittance. It seems that many care homes 
already house parents of people working abroad (Karwowska and 
Pochrzęst-Motyczyńska 2015) and that Poles will be forced increasingly 
to use institutional care for lone older people.
There are no studies to date of the experiences and practices at the 
final stage, where parents are in advanced old age, dependent and disa-
bled, or in the process of dying and needing constant care. Using inter-
mediaries or only visiting sporadically does not resolve the care problem 
in such situations. This theme is still a kind of taboo.
7. Transnational practices and gender equality  
in families living abroad
A large and increasing proportion of families based in Poland has relatives 
abroad. As discussed in earlier chapters, the period since 2004 has seen a 
greatly increased number of ‘transnational families’, in the sense of nuclear 
families living abroad but with extended family in Poland. Such families 
in most cases can be labelled ‘transnational’ for the extra reason that they 
engage in frequent transnational practices. To some extent this model 
supersedes the 1990s model of ‘transnational family’, where just one par-
ent migrates, with the rest of the household remaining in Poland. The pro-
liferation of transnational families of both kinds is a social change in its 
own right, both because it contributes to the emergence of ‘Polish society 
abroad’ (see chapter 9) and because of its implications for relatives living 
in Poland. It adds to the overall diversification of family types in Poland 
discussed above (see also Slany 2007). The post-2004 exodus has been 
partly caused by the chain migration of family members and the process 
of family reunification. Polish nuclear families are now to be found in 
every corner of Europe. This phenomenon has been accompanied by a Pol-
ish ‘baby boom’ in receiving societies such as the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Norway (see, e.g. Milewski 2007; Pustułka, Krzaklewska and Huang 
2018).
Many research participants – for example, in the Transfam project – 
state that it is better for families to be together, to resolve the problems 
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created by separation (Slany and Struzik 2016). However, decisions that 
a wife and children should leave Poland are not taken lightly and should 
not be seen simply as a decision taken by the migrating male, imposed on 
his family. First, reunification abroad testifies to the fact that the family 
sees itself as a joint endeavour. Second, the process of reunification is a 
test of power relations within families, requiring serious discussion 
between couples, within the extended family and sometimes also with 
older children (Baldassar and Merla 2013; Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; 
Goulbourne et  al. 2010; Slany and Strzemecka 2016). White (2017) 
shows how some women are able to block reunification attempts. Such 
women feel that direct contact with their family members based in 
Poland is more important than reunifying the nuclear family abroad. 
Sometimes, too, women exert their influence in the opposite direction: 
women living abroad persuade friends and relatives living in Poland to 
migrate to join them.
As discussed in earlier chapters, this migration wave, in the context 
of EU mobility rights, has led to the adoption of transnational ways of life, 
as families ‘spread their roots’ across geographical space and family mem-
bers find new ways of communicating, often using electronic media. To 
change the metaphor, this creates a kind of transnational family bridge. 
The ‘transnational turn’ in migration studies, which has been such a 
paradigm change since the 1990s, has helped scholars focus on actual 
transnational families and their social fields/personal networks, rela-
tionships that are modified and reconfigured by migration (Baldassar 
and Merla 2013; Castles and Miller 2009; Levitt and Glick Schiller 
2004). Using a transnational lens helps reduce the previous overempha-
sis on economic and structural explanations for migration, makes visible 
the heterogeneity of migrants’ ties and allows the researcher to under-
stand migrants’ behaviour simultaneously from the viewpoints of send-
ing and receiving countries.
The transnational turn has been most significant in shedding light 
on migrating families, on their complexity and on varying family practices. 
On the one hand, these practices constitute new attitudes and forms of 
behaviour that have a pragmatic base and can be considered adaptation 
strategies to the new life in migration. On the other hand, such practices 
are culturally embedded. They are a balancing act, a compromise between 
models exported from Poland and models prevalent in the receiving 
society. A transnational orientation is observed in various family practices: 
(1) rituals, traditions and religious holidays; (2) everyday contacts with 
family members by Skype and telephone; (3) visits back home (see, e.g. 
Bell 2016; Bell and Erdal 2015; Erdal 2014; Muszel 2013a; Muszel 
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2013b; Ryan 2011; Slany, Krzaklewska and Warat 2016; Ślusarczyk 
and Pustułka 2017; White 2017). Visits to Poland are usually a bustle 
of activity. They are not just for visiting family but also seeing dentists 
and doctors, beauticians, hairdressers and dressmakers, and sorting out 
official paperwork.
As discussed further in chapters 7 and 8, migrants also invite rela-
tives to come and see how they live abroad, which can lead to their views 
changing after their return to Poland – their views about migration, about 
life in the destination country and about the world in general. Transna-
tional life is often organised around children and, despite migration, chil-
dren living abroad often form strong ties with grandparents, especially 
grandmothers (Slany and Strzemecka 2016, 2018).
Empirical evidence suggests that, typically, just as for Poles in Poland, 
family remains a very important value. Transnational families prioritise 
maintaining relationships across borders, and distance does not automat-
ically decrease intimacy, but can even strengthen family feelings (Ślu-
sarczyk and Pustułka 2017). Whether they have decided to settle abroad 
or say they wish to return sometime to Poland, family ties are kept alive 
and testify not only to family affection but also to a sense of continued 
responsibility.
It is impossible to generalise about gender relations within the hun-
dreds of thousands of Polish families who have migrated since 2004. To 
some extent they are a microcosm of Polish families in Poland. However, it 
is safe to say that practices do change to some extent as a result of migra-
tion. According to a 2016 report, based mainly on the Transfam project, 
prepared by Pustułka (Slany, Pustułka and Ślusarczyk 2016) one can 
distinguish several different models of married and family life among 
Poles abroad. These reflect the fact that being abroad, for families of any 
nationality, tends to result in a myriad of different family practices and 
contexts for ‘doing family’ (Finch 2006). Pustułka creates her typology 
by focusing on several criteria: the type of gender relations in the family, 
attitudes to Polish identity, other important values imparted to children, 
socialisation practices and orientations towards return. Referring to these 
criteria, she identifies the following models: traditional, mixed and egali-
tarian. The most commonly chosen model can be defined as mixed; more 
seldom is an egalitarian model selected (Slany, Pustułka and Ślusarczyk 
2016). The more patriarchal families were mostly likely to declare their 
intention to return to Poland, which, if it happened, would alter the bal-
ance still more in favour of Poles abroad adopting semi-egalitarian or 
egalitarian models.
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A watershed for many couples is having a child abroad and the need 
to adopt various strategies for his or her upbringing, with regard to inte-
gration, language teaching, building a sense of ethnic identity and main-
taining transnational ties. In some families there is opposition to the 
egalitarian ideas and practices common in receiving societies such as Nor-
way, with a consequent deliberate focusing on traditional gender roles: 
mothers are carers and homemakers, and fathers are breadwinners 
(see, e.g. Małek 2011; Mazurkiewicz 2013; Muszel 2013a; Muszel 2013b; 
Pustułka and Trąbka 2017). Rather than the father taking on more 
responsibility for childcare, this role is often performed by ‘flying grand-
mothers’ (Bielecka-Prus, Czapka and Kawczyńska-Butrym 2018; Bjørnholt 
and Stefansen 2018). According to children interviewed in the Transfam 
project, in most households women still did most of the housework 
(Slany and Strzemecka 2016).
The extensive practice of traditional or mixed models may also 
reflect the social composition of migration to Norway after 2004, with 
many manual workers speaking little or no Norwegian or English and 
focusing on maintenance of a ‘Polish’ life-style (Guribye 2018). The more 
educated migrants who had found good jobs and had been in Norway for 
longer were more likely to practise an egalitarian model. However, all fam-
ilies were affected by requirements by Norwegian schools that both par-
ents be involved – as it were, forcing partner-like practices. This is definitely 
a novelty for Polish parents used to a Polish context, where school and chil-
dren are usually the wife’s responsibility.
In many other families, Polish fathers do take on more caring roles 
than is likely to have been the case had they remained in Poland (Pustułka, 
Krzaklewska and Huang 2018). The Transfam research (Pustułka, Struzik 
and Ślusarczyk 2015) and the PAR Migration Navigator6 (Żadkowska, 
Kosakowska-Berezecka and Ryndyk 2018), in particular indicate the 
importance of Norwegian institutional support and social expectations 
with regard to being a ‘New [i.e. engaged] Father’. Because of the migra-
tion context, men have to redefine what fathering implies. Living in 
Norway, they cannot avoid finding out about active fatherhood and its 
manifestations – paternity leave, spending free time with children, less paid 
work, more free time for the family, negotiating care arrangements. How-
ever, since families also tend to maintain strong ties with Poland, Polish 
norms continue to exert an influence, especially the expectation that the 
man should be the chief breadwinner and should play a more passive 
role in the family. It seems that New Fathers often do not reflect deeply 
on their behaviour, but that New Fatherhood is a collection of practices 
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deriving from the specific sociocultural context and practical need to 
combine family and work responsibilities. The research shows, however, 
that there is an increase in active fathering, even if in many cases women 
continue to do the majority of the housework.
The structure and legal regulations governing the labour market in 
Norway also promote a work-life balance, which can help improve gen-
der equality relations within the family. Families pay more attention to 
‘quality time’ and pick up Norwegian habits of spending weekends together 
with their children in outdoor activities, whatever the weather (Slany and 
Strzemecka 2016, 270).
9. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed family practices and relations in Poland within 
the complex context of social change following the post-communist trans-
formation. Migration has played a key role this change. In the chapter, 
I have used a gender perspective to understand links between social change, 
migration and the mosaic of family life. I have shown, by identifying trends 
connected to the family sphere and family practices, and by discussing 
their various causes, that it is then possible to show how migration fits into 
this picture.
Research indicates irrefutably that family remains a very important 
value in Polish society and this is practically unchanged over the whole 
period 1990–2015. Various agencies of socialisation in Poland maintain 
its importance. Migrant families seem to be just as active as families in 
Poland in promoting such values. The Mother-Pole model continues to be 
integral to the identity of many Polish women, including migrants, despite 
a certain weakening and criticism of the model. It is demonstrated in 
the phenomenon of ‘managerial matriarchy’. When mothers migrate 
alone, they manage to adhere to the model by rationalising their situation 
in various ways, creating an identity as a long-distance mother and 
organising care for children in Poland. Research also shows how stressful 
it can be to adhere to the model, both for women working in Poland and 
abroad. The model also to some extent penetrates families living abroad, as 
shown in the frequent practice of mixed and traditional gender roles. 
Despite the fact that most migrant women work and despite their important 
role in maintaining their families (the dual-earner income model), men 
are still widely regarded as breadwinners. The Transfam research in Nor-
way, like the GEQ research in Poland, did not show much evidence that 
this gendered division of roles generated tension and conflicts.
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However, there is also an increase in support for gender equality in 
Poland, at least on a declarative level, as well as more evidence of actual 
engaged fatherhood, particularly in cities and among better-educated, 
younger people. This is also noticeable among Poles abroad and, in receiv-
ing countries like Norway, which strongly promote gender equality, family 
life does become more egalitarian, with Polish families to some extent 
compelled to adjust their practices. Women become more positive about 
their position in the family and acquire a stronger sense of agency. 
Research (both in Poland and Norway) also shows a ‘family turn’, with 
increased understanding of the importance of devoting free time to chil-
dren, particularly in active leisure pursuits and sport, and family holidays 
abroad. Although low income from wages abroad can make it difficult for 
migrants to avoid spending even more time at work than they did in 
Poland, it does seem possible for them to improve their work-life balance. 
This offers opportunities for poorer families that they may not have 
enjoyed in Poland.
Strong attachment to one’s family and satisfaction with one’s fam-
ily life, evident in Polish survey data, is manifested in mutual support and 
solidarity both in Poland and among transnational families. In the latter 
case, other sources of support may be limited in scope. Families abroad 
practise and cultivate different types of Polish family-centred activities, 
and parents draw on help from their own parents in Poland, when they 
are healthy and active. Hence the extended family remains significant to 
Polish families, even though the number of extended family households 
is declining in Poland.
A basic Polish trend since the system transformation, shown in 
many studies, is the pluralisation of family types (more single-parent 
and single-person households, more cohabiting and homosexual couples) 
and a greater social acceptance of this phenomenon. Migration undoubt-
edly contributes to this trend of pluralisation by creating various kinds 
of transnational families, at different lifestyle stages. At the same time, 
there is a higher incidence of divorce in Poland. Particularly in the less 
Catholic, western parts of Poland, it is increasingly considered accept-
able under certain conditions, despite the opposition of the Catholic 
Church. Marriages damaged by migration are probably more likely to 
end in divorce in regions where divorce is already more prevalent. On 
the whole, however, there is little evidence that migration on its own 
leads to marital breakdown; instead, it is more likely to exacerbate already 
existing strains.
Migration furthers processes of individualisation that are already 
marked in many spheres of Polish life. It helps women migrants enhance 
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their sense of individual agency and partly free themselves from social 
control and domestic violence at home.
Poland is experiencing a marked and intensifying process of popu-
lation ageing, with implications for intergenerational caring responsibil-
ities. This becomes even more significant as a result of the nuclearisation 
of families, the declining birth rate and, of course, mass migration. With 
increasing life expectancy, even children remaining in Poland will not be 
able to meet all the needs of parents who become seriously ill in later life. 
This prompts concern about who will be able to provide the necessary 
care. Both the Polish state and Poles living abroad, however, seem to 
devote insufficient attention to this matter. Krzyżowski (2013) suggests 
that for the time being migrants do generally manage to organise care suc-
cessfully, although Kordasiewicz, Radziwinowiczówna and Kloc-Nowak 
(2018) also point to tensions between migrants and their siblings remain-
ing in Poland. It is likely that increasing attention will be paid to developing 
state and private institutional care in Poland.
To conclude, migration exacerbates certain phenomena and 
processes and allows us to observe them more closely and see how they 
mutually influence each other and lead to further consequences. As men-
tioned at the beginning of the chapter, gender is constructed partly 
through the migration process. A gender lens is particularly helpful for 
analysing the interconnections examined in this chapter, and could also 
be applied more widely to studies of family life in Poland. Much still 
remains to be explored. It is hoped, however, that the chapter has opened 
the way for further sociological research and analysis.
Notes
1 The projects were funded by the Polish-Norwegian Research Programme, operated 
by the National Centre for Research and Development under the Norwegian Financial 
Mechanism and directed by myself at the Department of Population Studies, Jagiel-
lonian University, Kraków.
2 http:// www . geq . socjologia . uj . edu . pl / en _ GB / start.
3 http:// www . transfam . socjologia . uj . edu . pl / en _ GB / .
4 The divorce rate is, however, still low in Poland compared with many European 
countries (GUS 2016, 474–6). In 1990, per 1,000 contracted marriages there 
were 166.2 divorces, and in 2015 this had risen to 356.4 (i.e., a nearly threefold 
increase). In Poland, a largely Catholic country, separation (a status officially 
recognised in 1998) is not a popular option; for instance, in 2015 there were only 
about 10 separations per year 1,000 contracted marriages.
5 Prognoza ludności na lata 2014–2050, https:// stat . gov . pl / obszary - tematyczne 
/ ludnosc / prognoza - ludnosci / prognoza - ludnosci - na - lata - 2014 - 2050 - opracowana 
- 2014 - r - ,1,5 . html.
6 See www . migrationnavigator . org for more information.
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Lifestyles, livelihoods, networks 
and trust
Anne White
1. Introduction
Chapters 7 and 8 form a pair, exploring different social trends in Poland 
and considering how migration is one of a number of factors contribut-
ing to those trends. I take into account the varied nature of ‘migration’ and 
the different impact of migration on different subgroups of Polish society. 
The chapters consider both social remittances and indirect migration 
influences. The distinction between lifestyles and livelihoods (chapter 7) 
and culture and identity (chapter 8) is a pragmatic structuring device that 
accords with Portes’s (2010, 1542) suggestion, discussed in chapter 2, 
that ‘social structure’ and ‘culture’ are the core ‘elements of social life’ 
influenced by migration.
Changing lifestyles and livelihoods can signal changing social diver-
sification and status hierarchies. They also reflect changing attitudes – 
rising aspirations not only for different forms of consumption but also for 
more individual autonomy and respect from others, including officials. 
Like chapter 6, however, chapter 7 also identifies important continuities, 
especially the still strong reliance by some sections of society on informal 
networks based on mutual trust.
The chapters are based largely on my interviews with stayers, includ-
ing return migrants, as well as Polish sociological research. An important 
source is Arcimowicz, Bieńko and Łaciak (2015), a qualitative study of 
changing habits among 406 people of different social backgrounds in 
different parts of Poland. The authors found that most interviewees 
(three-quarters) praised certain aspects of life abroad, which they would 
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like to transfer to Poland. Travel and work abroad were influential in shap-
ing such attitudes – even more than media influence. In particular, inter-
viewees appreciated what they saw as more diverse food, more optimism 
and less complaining, more tolerance and better organisation (Łaciak 
2015, 56–61). Arcimowicz, Bieńko and Łaciak also point out that Poles 
cannot simply be divided into two sorts, conservatives and advocates of 
change. Typically, each interviewee liked some foreign practices but 
rejected others. They conclude that ‘based on the narration of our respond-
ents, one could place their habits [not them] in various points on the 
continuum’ between nationalism and cosmopolitanism (2015, 381).
This chapter touches on many of the practices identified by Arcimo-
wicz, Bieńko and Łaciak’s interviewees, but it also sails into deeper waters, 
taking into account norms and values. I discuss the following specific trends: 
increased foreign travel; more ‘active ageing’; diversification of eating 
habits (as an example of changing consumption patterns); and increas-
ing ‘civility’ and regard for legality, combined with somewhat increasing 
belief that ‘most people can be trusted’. I also explore counter- trends that 
can damage generalised trust: the continuing importance of informal 
practices and networks; and a rethinking of proximity and distance  – 
where near seems far, and vice versa – which inhibits internal migration 
and contributes to a sense of disconnectedness from Poles elsewhere in 
Poland. These changing phenomena all link, with differing directness, to 
opportunity structures for changing lifestyles and livelihoods.
Migration contributes to all these trends by promoting more auton-
omy and choice for individual Poles. Bafoil (2009, 199) refers to ‘the high 
degree of individualisation consecutive upon the process of modernisa-
tion’ as a major trend in post-1989 CEE. It is hard to quarrel with this asser-
tion when one considers how life has become less collectivised since 
communist party rule, although less clear is the extent to which individ-
ualisation has intensified since 2004. European Values Survey (EVS) data 
shows a 2.5 percentage point increase in Poles considering themselves to 
be ‘autonomous individuals’ between 2005 and 2012.1 Garapich (2016c, 
159) writes about an ‘emphasis on self-determination’ among migrants 
from Sokółka. He sees social networks in this part of rural north-east 
Poland as remaining strong; nonetheless, individuals value the sense of 
autonomy and agency endowed by migration. Leśniak-Moczuk (2015, 
155) asserts that local people who have returned to south-east Poland 
from working in other parts of Poland or abroad, having been exposed to 
different values away from home, become more independent and individ-
ualistic; unlike Garapich, she believes they possess weaker social ties, 
contributing to the processes of individualisation in local villages. Con-
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servative commentators such as Nowacki (2010, 9) tend to emphasise the 
weakening of social bonds as the significant aspect of individualisation; 
more liberal interpretations stress opportunities for individual agency. 
This was the viewpoint of Lucyna, a 36-year-old returnee from Ireland 
whom I interviewed in Wrocław:
Many people who aren’t planted in one place don’t have narrow 
views about society being uniform. That because I was brought up 
in this country I have to do the same as everyone else. Isn’t that true? 
I’ll follow the same path as the rest. No, the fact that you can simply 
have your own opinion, you should think things out for yourself, 
and so on, that’s how it [working abroad] gave me so much. I really 
grew up.
In addition, migration contributes to social mobility not just by rais-
ing incomes for migrants and their families but also by promoting chang-
ing lifestyles. Gdula and Sadura (2012) and Goryszewski (2014) argue 
that, in contemporary Poland, lifestyle is an indicator of social class. 
Changing consumption patterns, therefore, which could also be inter-
preted as aspects of local migration cultures (Romaniszyn 2016, 162), can 
be seen as evidence of individuals rising socially by achieving lifestyles 
that would otherwise have been inaccessible. Material aspirations are rising 
generally in Poland (CBOS 2009, 16). Just a few years after EU acces-
sion, Domański (2006, 107) indicated that migration was feeding into this 
social trend. Choice of livelihoods, too, can be enhanced by migration, 
with rapidly forming migration networks creating opportunities to access 
labour markets across Europe. However, livelihood chances can also be 
damaged by pervasive social mistrust and informal practices, both of 
which, I argue, can be attributed partly to migration influences.
The return of any migrant changes the composition of their society 
of origin but does not necessarily add to the number of ‘agents of change’. 
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, sometimes returnees postpone trying to 
diffuse new ideas and practices because they do not think they will be 
adopted. Garapich (2016c) points out that resistance to social remittances 
is individualised, localised and context dependent. Grabowska, Gara-
pich, et  al. (2017, 135–6) describe this resistance in the following 
terms: ‘Whether this is about transplanting forms of politeness, driving 
culture, acceptance of religious difference or homosexuality – in all these 
cases individuals carefully navigate between what they regard as nor-
matively just and desirable and what they regard as possible to accept 
and implement in the locality of origin.’ Locations in Poland are differently 
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receptive to the diffusion of social remittances, and impact is more visi-
ble in some locations than others. Some impacts, such as improved hous-
ing stock, are more visible in smaller locations. By contrast, the impact of 
some changing practices and ideas may be greater in cities because 
they can ripple out and spread in destinations that are already changing 
more for other reasons. Cities are simply more receptive to social remit-
tances. In the end, deep social change comes with generational change: if, 
as a result of migration, younger people are changing, for example in 
being socialised by their parents to become more independent, then social 
remittances have a real impact.
Finally, while this chapter mostly presents trends as statistics, it uses 
qualitative data to explain those trends. It therefore presents interviewees’ 
constructions of reality rather than ‘hard facts’. Interviewees can express 
opposite reactions to the same or similar phenomena. Are British work-
ers irresponsible and lazy compared to Poles, or healthily assertive vis-à-
vis their employers? Is it good or bad if foreign parents neglect to wrap 
up children warmly when they go outdoors? Does smiling to strangers 
indicate kindness or hypocrisy?
2. Methodology and comments on studying small  
towns and rural areas compared with cities
Chapters 7–10 are based on all my Polish migration research projects; fur-
ther detail about the methodology can be found in the publications refer-
enced in table  7.1 below. In chapters  7–10, dates of interviews are 
mentioned for interviewees from Grajewo, Warsaw, Bath and Bristol 
because interviews in those locations were conducted in various years. For 
other locations, the dates of quoted interviews are as follows: Sanok 
(2008), Limanowa (2013), Wrocław, Łódź and Lublin (2016). My first 
three projects investigated labour markets, livelihood strategies and 
migration patterns in Poland, focusing mostly on small towns and sur-
rounding rural areas, and using in-depth interviews to explore the views 
of stayers, including return migrants. I also commissioned an opinion poll 
that surveyed men and women in towns and villages across the Podkar-
pacie region (omitting the capital, Rzeszów) about their views on chil-
dren’s and parents’ migration. It was while analysing this poll that I 
became curious about social remittance effects, since these seemed a pos-
sible explanation for the more radical, less gender-stereotyped responses 
given by returnees from the United Kingdom (White 2017, 91–2). Addi-
tional types of migration impact were revealed by my in-depth interviews, 
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as well as by other types of ethnographic research – interviews at job cen-
tres, schools, newspaper offices and other local institutions; documentary 
and media analysis; walks around the fieldwork sites; and casual conver-
sations with local residents. For example, it was only through such research 
that I could solve the puzzle, my main research question in 2006–9, of why 
so many Polish parents took their children to live with them abroad after 
2004. In small towns where one-parent migration on a mass scale before 
2004 had profound emotional impact, it was understandable that parents 
took advantage of new opportunities for family reunification abroad or 
migration all together.
I had complemented the interviews in Poland with some in the 
United Kingdom, with migrants from villages, towns and cities all over 
Poland, and with participant observation as a volunteer teacher of Eng-
lish to parents at Polish Saturday schools (continuing at the time of writ-
ing). For my second project, on return migration, I also included some 
interviews in the cities of Warsaw and Poznań. Conversations with Polish 
city dwellers piqued my curiosity about how, and the extent to which, 
migration patterns and impact really differed between cities and small 
towns. Polish scholarship had to date mostly focused on small towns (e.g. 
Cieślińska 1997; Osipowicz 2002; and Warsaw University Centre of Migra-
tion Research ethnosurveys). An exception is Gorzelak (2008a), Polska 
lokalna 2007, a study of Polish social change across a range of towns and 
cities, which frequently mentions migration in passing. My most recent 
research project (2015–6) therefore looked for evidence of migration’s 
impact on social change in Polish cities, to understand how and why they 
might differ from small towns and villages. The project included mapping 
Polish trends through reading sociological literature, so I began the inter-
views with some sense of what to look for, although there were obviously 
far too many potential trends to discuss them all with everyone. Hence 
interviews were hardly structured, to give interviewees space to talk, and 
for me to find out what they considered important. Food and travel emerged 
as topics on which I gathered many comments, while other consumption 
practices such as cars and fashion, which do mark out social status in Poland 
(see, e.g. Goryszewski 2014), were not mentioned as frequently, so do not 
feature in the discussion below.
The overarching trend for households all over Poland to become 
immersed in transnational social fields was amply illustrated even in the 
largest and more prosperous cities such as Wrocław. In some cases, poorer 
city neighbourhoods constitute ‘migration hotspots’  –  places with high 
volumes of migration where transnational social fields are very intense 
(White 2016d). Lucyna, a trainee probation officer, commented, ‘There 
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are parts of the city where every family contains someone who has 
migrated (wyjechał) to England or who migrates (jeździ) to Germany, 
that’s how they manage. . . .  It’s often their only survival strategy.’ Jacek, 
between jobs and aged 28, reminisced, ‘From those poorer families, the 
ones who always hung around in the playground, made trouble and so on, 
most [of my schoolfriends] went abroad. They had problems, debts, and 
from what I hear most of them are in England, in Holland, and they’re 
probably settled there.’
Migration hotspots can also be found among certain social groups, 
irrespective of geographical location. For example, I found that Eng-
lish-language classes for retired people in Wrocław were full of parents 
of adult children abroad. Other hotspots are the Poland-based social net-
works of migrants who participated in the exodus of young Poles around 
2004. Not everyone in cities is aware of these networks, but where net-
works still exist they can form intense transnational fields. Participants are 
no longer poor students, but working people in their thirties able to make 
frequent visits in either direction, keeping the networks alive. I found 
examples in both Poznań and Lublin. For instance:
The links have lasted for nearly 15 years . . .  with the same inten-
sity as when we were students together . . .  I don’t see any evidence 
that the ties are weaker, in any sense. . . .  There is still the same 
intensity of interest in each other, in their relations, as when they 
were students. . . .  It’s kept up by mutual visits and taking part in the 
same events as they always did in Poland. For example, concerts 
together, bands, going to football matches together, going to pubs 
and clubs, and they have the money to do it. It’s only 2–3 hours from 
Lublin to London. (Maryla, 39, Lublin, on her male university 
friends, some of whom emigrated c.2002)
Small transnational fields exist everywhere among family members 
of Polish migrants, even if those family members do not have many friends 
or neighbours living abroad. If the family members are on close terms with 
Polish migrants, these mini-fields can be central in their lives. For instance, 
when I asked Agata (Wrocław), a student whose father had been work-
ing in Germany for 12 years, how he had changed as a result, she said that 
whenever he returned he would continually be mentioning Germany in 
conversation and drawing comparisons. Stayers are inevitably forced to 
think about these comparisons, and those who visit friends and family 
abroad find themselves thinking in the same way. Iwona (Lublin), when 
asked how her everyday life was changed by having friends and family in 
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Italy, said, ‘How we remind each other, “But in Italy! It was like that! Do 
you remember?” ’
3. The trend towards more foreign travel
One impact of migration is increased travel abroad, although naturally this 
has various causes. Poland had more open borders than other Soviet bloc 
countries (Stola 2010), but most Poles did not travel before 1989. In 1993, 
51 per cent of Poles had never been abroad. By 2004, the figure had 
dropped to 39 per cent and by 2015 to 23 per cent. When asked in 2015 
to name two main motives for going abroad, respondents mentioned 
holidays first, then work, then visiting family and friends, together with 
‘rest and medical treatment’ (both at 17 per cent) (Boguszewski 2016). 
Foreign travel, therefore, represents an important new opportunity for 
many Poles since 1989, but especially since 2004.
Although not every Pole can afford to take a foreign holiday and stay 
in hotels, Poles of all social backgrounds visit family and friends. For exam-
ple, in Bristol in 2009, Malwina (unemployed, married to a manual 
worker) described inviting a string of visitors from her small town near 
the Ukrainian border:
My sister and her husband have been twice, our friends have been, 
and now we have Mum. And we invite everybody who wants to 
come, let them come and see! They haven’t been abroad before, they 
didn’t have the opportunity, and now they have the chance to come 
and look. . . .  They come just for a week or two. To see things, to go 
shopping.
In some cases, the holiday abroad functions as an ‘inspection visit’ that 
precedes migration, particularly for wives whose husbands work abroad. 
When they do not like what they see, it remains just a visit (White 
2017). In other cases, family members come briefly to do paid work. In 
Wrocław, Marzena, from a nearby village, described how ‘many people 
from my family worked in England. I gave everyone who wanted the 
opportunity. They’ve all returned to Poland, but each came briefly to 
earn money and patch holes in the budget, as we say – buy a car, because 
my parents couldn’t afford that, mend the roof.’
Like the grandfather in the Allegro advertisement, more Poles have 
begun visiting adult children abroad. People over 55 are especially likely 
to mention visits to family and friends as motives for foreign travel 
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(Boguszewski 2016, 10). In 2009 only 7 per cent of Polish retired people 
said they travelled outside Poland, but by 2016 the figure was 22 per cent 
(Kolbowska 2009, 11; Omyła-Rudzka 2016a, 5). Grandparents I inter-
viewed mentioned what a significant opportunity this had been. For 
example, in Wrocław, Ewa commented, ‘We can get to see the world, learn 
English at first hand. . . .  Otherwise I never would. Because we’re not from 
such a rich family and aren’t so well-off we could afford to go as tourists.’
Consistent with Grabowska, Garapich, et al.’s (2017) findings about 
the importance of reciprocity, my interviews suggested that the stayers 
who most benefit from visits and who are most likely to transmit new ideas 
and practices to Poland are those able also to contribute ideas and prac-
tices to the lives of children abroad.
I go to the USA, try to make Christmas into a Polish holiday, of course, 
all those seasonings, dried mushrooms, I bring with me. . . .  There’s 
a local Christmas tree, but obviously I bring our beautiful Polish 
baubles . . .  We try to slightly exaggerate that Polishness, so they 
don’t forget . . .  about Poland. So they have the contact, so they think 
about it, that’s the first thing. They are just symbols [but] I’m also 
encouraging them to buy some property in Wrocław to tie them 
even more to Poland. (Ewa)
In a similar case, Wanda (aged 63) described how interesting she found 
her visits to the United Kingdom, but also how she and her husband delib-
erately brought objects – including a tree – and ideas (e.g. about patterns 
of present giving to children), which Wanda saw as being more rational 
than those displayed by her British in-laws. They had created a savings 
fund for their grandson (aged one) so he could attend university in Poland. 
Conversely, other grandparents reported unhappy experiences of visiting 
abroad – they felt that their views were not wanted, and they were not 
impressed by what they saw. In one case, for example, a visiting Wrocław 
grandmother, with no English language, sat at home while her family was 
at school or work, in a US city where it was impossible to go anywhere 
without a car. Not only did she have no interactions with local people, but 
also she sensed that her family was not interested in her. When I spoke to 
her she had decided never to visit again. In other words, because social 
remitting was blocked in one direction (she could not bring anything to 
her US relatives), it seemed also to be blocked in the other (the United 
States had no influence on her).
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4. Retired people’s more active lifestyles
Attitudes in Poland are changing in favour of more active ways of spend-
ing retirement. Krzyżowski et al (2014, 158) identify a ‘slow cultural and 
social change, including adoption of models of “active aging” from 
Western societies’. This involves moving away from the more passive 
model, where Poles ‘construct their identities in conformity with their 
new status as pensioners and/or grandparents, channelling their spheres 
of activity into stereotypically defined and restricted areas (family, grand-
children, the problem of loneliness or fear of loneliness, religion, concen-
tration on health problems)’ (2014, 159). Unsurprisingly, the most active 
pensioners are urban, younger, richer and better educated (Krzyżowski 
et al. 2014; Omyła-Rudzka 2016a, 12). This is nothing new. Changes 
since the communist period should not be overstated: Poland was among 
the first countries to set up Universities of the Third Age, in the 1970s 
(Marecka-Drewniak 2015, 240), and other types of adult education and 
leisure activities existed both in interwar Poland and, under official aus-
pices, in the communist period (White 1990).
Recent years, however, have witnessed greater activity among pen-
sioners: 14 per cent of pensioners in 2016 were in adult education, com-
pared with 3 per cent in 2009. More specifically, 9 per cent were studying 
foreign languages, compared with 4 per cent in 2009 (Omyła-Rudzka 
2016a, 5; Kolbowska 2009, 11). Marecka-Drewniak (2015) and Korcze-
wska (2015), writing about University of the Third Age language classes 
in Opole, note how some of the keenest participants were motivated by 
wanting to communicate with grandchildren abroad, including one 
woman who ‘began to study for that reason even though she did not yet 
have grandchildren’ (Marecka-Drewniak 2015, 242).
Celina, interviewed in Warsaw in 2016, said that when she returned 
in 2014 she had been struck by the numbers of older people taking 
exercise:
When I went to England as a young woman [in 2006] I saw many 
people riding bikes, running, older people, a lot of older people run-
ning or out walking. It was completely new because I never saw 
that in Poland. And from that point of view Poland has changed. 
Because there are lots of cyclists here, people jog, visit the gym, 
spend time in the fresh air, people do exercises, including older 
people, which didn’t use to happen . . .  Everything comes from 
abroad I suspect.
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While not ‘everything’ comes from abroad, it is easy to see how retired 
stayers who visit abroad notice such differences. Ewa, already quoted 
above, whose daughter was a doctor in the United States, commented that
There is an 85-year-old lady who works twice a week at the hospi-
tal information desk as a volunteer. Very well-dressed. It’s really 
good. I think that will come to Poland too because being active is 
very important for older people, to be with other people, to do 
something . . .  I notice more consciousness about keeping fit.
Since, as mentioned in the previous section, stayers from all back-
grounds visit migrants abroad, migration can be a ‘leveller’ also in this 
respect. Eliza, interviewed in Grajewo in 2012, from a poor household, 
told the story of her mother who had visited her in Madrid. At first she 
had been too shy to venture outside the flat, but then she had taken part 
in keep-fit classes in a local park and lost weight. Nonetheless, the impact 
of migration on lifestyles is probably more substantial in cities. City pen-
sioners can enact changes in the context of the city, for example by buy-
ing foreign food products for which they develop a taste abroad, or by 
engaging in particular leisure pursuits, or simply by feeling justified in 
spending time enjoying themselves. In contrast, a grandparent who 
returns to a Polish village may have fewer opportunities. For example, 
Marzena (Wrocław) pointed out:
There are such big differences between older people in the UK and 
in our village. Even the pension is so tiny they don’t have money for 
hobbies. And they don’t have any such expectations. They’re just 
absorbed in growing food, having enough money to pay the bills, 
planting their gardens so everything grows in time. They keep ask-
ing me, ‘Have you done your cucumbers and tomatoes?’ . . .  and 
they pickle vegetables for a rainy day.
5. Changing eating habits
Arcimowicz, Bieńko and Łaciak provide examples of Poles from all loca-
tions, including villages, expressing curiosity about new types of food, and 
a willingness to experiment, although they also found that ‘the smaller 
the location, the less people were able to name particular dishes which 
they would like to try’ (2015, 177). There was also a strong attachment 
among all interviewees to dishes they had eaten since childhood, and 
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which were considered ‘Polish’ despite their in some cases communist-era 
origins (e.g. tomato soup). Domański et al. (2015), in their quantitative 
study of eating patterns, accentuate rather that Poles are still quite con-
servative, although they also state that more highly educated Poles are 
more experimental (2015, 184).
Changing eating habits can be explained by many factors: lifestyles, 
especially longer working days; more disposable income for many Poles; 
the availability of new foods in shops and eating places, especially in 
cities; advertising; televised cookery programmes; the Internet; holi-
days abroad. However, migration also plays a role. Main (2016b, 154) 
suggests that experimentation abroad often results from an interest in 
food rather than from curiosity about cultural difference, which seems 
plausible. Hence this topic is discussed in chapter  7 rather than chap-
ter 8, although motivations can overlap.
It is not just richer and better-educated migrants or their stayer vis-
itors who pick up new tastes abroad. The ability to buy unusual foodstuffs 
and eat out in Poland depends on income and place of residence, but new 
tastes resulting from migration do not have to be extravagant. For exam-
ple, Andrzej, a librarian and return migrant from France to Lublin, 
reported that he and his wife, who had worked in Italy, having acquired a 
taste for lighter food, fed their children more vegetables and less meat and 
potatoes than their more typically Polish extended family. Izabela, a shop 
assistant whose husband had been a chef in Ireland, described how he 
made spaghetti carbonara after the family returned to Wrocław. Stayers 
also eat more exotic types of foreign food because they are supplied by 
relatives working abroad. Iwona, a psychologist who had lived and worked 
all her life in Lublin, nonetheless spent much time socialising with her Ital-
ian relatives and friends and reported on her changing eating habits:
Anne: Now you have these Italian ties, do you feel your life has 
changed on a daily basis?
iWonA: [Thinks for a moment] Perhaps a bit. Perhaps even con-
cerning taste in food. We know what genuine, good pizza tastes 
like; in Poland it’s not the same taste, but my sister-in-law brings 
us good seasonings, we’ve learned to eat dried ham, so those tastes 
have been transferred to our everyday lives.
The following two quotations illustrate how stayers with relatives work-
ing abroad acquire tastes for foreign food. In the first instance the inter-
viewed stayer failed in ‘diffusing’ these new tastes to other members of the 
family; in the second, she succeeded.
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[When I visit my Polish godmother on the western border of Ger-
many] I love going to France for cheese . . .  I mean mouldy 
cheese. . . .  Once we were bringing some back in the car and it made 
such a stink – it was all runny – so you couldn’t breathe in the car. . . . 
We travelled for half an hour, but granddad said, ‘Throw it out’, and 
that cheese just went in the bin. (Maja, aged 20, student from X 
[town with population 60,000], interviewed in Wrocław)
My [elder] son always brings prawns [from Portugal to Poland] as 
well as Serrano ham, he brings chorizo sausage, he brings such a lot, 
more or less it’s just me who eats it [not my husband and younger 
son]. Olives. I used to hate olives. . . .  He said I should try . . .  and 
from then on I’ve adored them and even more, since you can add 
different things to salads, for my family, I began, you know, so it 
wasn’t perceptible, cutting up olives in tiny pieces. ‘Mummy, what 
did you add to the salad? It tastes nice.’ Next time I added a bit more. 
And now they eat olives. You have to be cunning (Trzeba tak pokom-
binować). (Beata, Wrocław, retired economist)
Polish return migrants can diffuse social remittances by opening restau-
rants serving non-Polish food:
mAGdA: Somewhere in the city I recently saw a ‘Masala Express: 
Indian Takeaway’. A takeaway in Łódź?? It seems a couple had 
returned after about ten years, and decided to set up an Indian 
takeaway.
Anne: I wonder if people go there because they got a taste for Indian 
food abroad.
mAGdA: That’s exactly why I went [to the restaurant] . . .
[Slightly later in the interview:]
mAGdA: They wanted to show people that doing something differ-
ent can be a good idea. You don’t have to sit at home and eat 
dumplings.
Magda, having lived with an Indian housemate in the United Kingdom, 
had had a thorough exposure to Indian food, so she had already 
‘acquired’ this social remittance, but she was able to put it into practice 
and therefore consolidate it by visits to the restaurant in Poland.
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6. Civility, legal consciousness and trust
If life is becoming easier for many Poles, this is partly related to more pre-
dictability and pleasanter experiences when dealing with officials, and 
better overall customer service (cf. chapter 4). Arcimowicz (2015, 252–8) 
describes a related process of ‘Americanisation’ of office management. 
There is also more respect for legality and less corruption,2 and a gen-
erally stronger feeling of agency among ordinary citizens than under 
communist party rule. Higher expectations of honesty and polite and 
responsible behaviour from strangers can be witnessed, especially com-
pared with the ‘wild capitalism’ of the early 1990s, and this is in accordance 
with the theory that ‘generalised trust flourishes in democracies’ (Uslaner 
1999, 123). Growing wealth in Poland is also important, since poor soci-
eties everywhere are often less trusting; for example, Portugal shows 
similarly low levels of trust to most countries in CEE, compared with richer 
north-western Europe (Sztabiński and Sztabiński 2014). However, there 
are strong countercurrents. Many varieties of informal practice are still 
rife, both among individuals and employers, with an increase in precari-
ous work (Boulhol 2014). Poles remain generally sceptical about improve-
ments in trustworthiness. In 2014, for example, Poles were much more 
likely to think that Poles were less honest than they had been in 1989, with 
47 per cent believing they were more dishonest, and only 14 per cent 
they were more honest (Boguszewski 2014a, 93).
Surveys suggest that in specific respects Poles are overcoming com-
munist legacies of evading the law. Kubal (2012), in her study of ‘socio- 
legal integration’ among Poles in the United Kingdom, concludes that to 
some extent respect for the law is enhanced there, and that Poles return 
to Poland more convinced that law-abiding behaviour makes sense. For 
example, Poles increasingly disapprove of motorists speeding (Boguszewski 
2013b, 6). This could be linked to many factors, such as road safety cam-
paigns, but Kubal (2012, 2015), Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiedzki 
(2009, 60) and Garapich (2016b) all agree that the habit of safer driving 
does constitute a social remittance.3 Garapich reports that,
according to many respondents, this [safer driving] is the main thing 
that Poles ought to bring from Britain. . . .  Migrants very often 
emphasise that it seems things in that domain are changing in Poland 
and that their (migrants’) attitudes may be playing a part in that pro-
cess. This is of course very difficult to determine, but the very fact 
that migrants are so eager to stress the difference and then argue 
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that change in Poland is highly necessary and is slowly happening, 
suggests that they are implicit agents in that process, albeit met with 
strong resistance.
He quotes an interviewee who had returned from London and constantly 
argues with his friend in Sokółka over the latter’s refusal to wear a seat 
belt (2016b, 163–4).
Improved health and safety in work settings, implying more sense 
of responsibility towards the public, is also a sphere in which progress 
stems largely from enactment and enforcement of regulations, but also 
depends for success on cultural change. Such change can sometimes result 
from migration experience. For example, Leszek, a 33-year-old return 
migrant interviewed in Wrocław, observed:
In Poland a builder is normally expected to do everything. He has 
to do the wiring, put in the pipes, deal with the plumbing. Gener-
ally the whole lot . . .  I liked it better in London because you didn’t 
feel pressurised to do different things. I came and painted the walls, 
that was my job. I had to plaster and paint, and then the plumber 
and electrician would come and do their bit. . . .  Although slowly 
things are changing in Poland . . .  I think it’s because there’s more 
emphasis on health and safety.
Eugeniusz, a Grajewan forester, who had also been a construction worker, 
remarked that:
When I was in Germany I got to know the technology, how work was 
organised. I brought those things back to Poland. . . .  A few friends 
had [also] been able to work in German forests back then. And when 
they returned to Poland they worked for me. So I had enough 
experienced and useful people. . . .  People who knew what they 
were doing. They knew how to be careful. Working in Poland, it was 
the same. None of us, I or any of my employees, ever had an accident.
Eugeniusz backed up his account with a story about working for a Polish 
construction company in Białystok which made balconies not fit to carry 
weight. ‘That’s Polish mentality. You can’t imagine it happening abroad. 
I learned a lot. Taking a more responsible approach to things.’
Many of my interviewees in Poland and the United Kingdom, as well 
as Poles quoted by other scholars (e.g. Burrell 2011a, 1026; Galasińska 
2010b, 315), expressed the wish that in Poland people would behave in a 
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friendlier and often, by extension, more helpful and socially responsible 
way towards strangers and subordinates. This relates partly to customer 
service and more transparency and civility in workplaces, but mostly to 
behaviour on the street – smiling and offering help – which is connected 
to trust in strangers. Iwona (Bristol, 2009, from Warsaw) made a typical 
observation: ‘Have you noticed that if you go somewhere where Poles are 
sitting they don’t smile? When you were in our [Polish] club, the women 
weren’t smiling? Only English women smile! In the UK, when people go 
somewhere where children are playing, they smile.’ Grabowska, Garapich, 
et al. (2017, 122) recount the story of a migrant to London who, on a visit 
home to a local government office in Sokółka, ‘started to count people who 
smiled on entering the place with predictable outcome: one in ten smil-
ing’. In other cases the impression of more goodwill abroad may simply 
reflect moving from a busy city in Poland to a smaller place abroad; the 
comparison is nonetheless framed as between a friendly foreign country 
and unfriendly Poland. For example, Edyta, who had moved from Wrocław 
to Bath and whom I interviewed in 2009, commented, ‘In general, people 
are friendlier. . . .  In Poland they are run off their feet, they are hostile 
[‘look at each other like wolves’] because they never have enough time. But 
here somehow life is more peaceful.’
As illustrated in the following two quotations, some interviewees 
suggest that Poland could not become more relaxed; others assert that 
attitudes are already being transferred:
Everyone [in Germany] was more helpful, more willing and quicker 
to help. I remember there was a situation where I was cycling to the 
[village] shop and my chain fell off and I couldn’t fix it. And a man 
at once asked me what had happened, and I said the chain had fallen 
off, and he helped me. I think that in Poland a couple of people would 
have to come by before maybe one of them – but he was the first per-
son I met. . . .  It’s simply a different culture. Germans are simply 
more open, Poles are more closed. (Oliwia, Lublin)
Later in the interview, I hazarded the idea that ‘life is changing in Poland’, 
but Oliwia retorted that ‘perhaps it’s changing on television’. In contrast, 
Marta, a returnee from Ireland (interviewed in English), commented in 
2011 that she had noticed Warsaw society becoming more trustful and 
helpful as a result of migration:4
The culture is different, people are more friendly in Ireland, they are 
open, they talk to you on the street, the bus stop and everywhere. 
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Here, people are more reserved and not so helpful. . . .  [However,] 
I think that in Warsaw people are more friendly [than in other parts 
of Poland] because there are many young people who are not like 
that who know how it is like to be abroad and they bring some good 
types of behaviour from there.
Marta’s impressions of the contrast between Ireland and Poland are not 
unique. Only 9 per cent of Polish respondents chose answers at the ‘help-
ful’ end of the scale (points 7–10) in reply to the 2004 European Social 
Survey question, ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be 
helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?’ This compared 
with 54 per cent of respondents in Ireland. By 2014, the figure for Poland 
demonstrated a slight increase in expectations of helpfulness, up to 13 per 
cent (Czapiński 2007, 259; Czapiński 2015b, 334).5
Failure to smile is just the tip of the iceberg, according to many inter-
viewees. It signals a wider base of reproving attitudes, distrust and hos-
tility between Poles. On the one hand, it links to a generally less relaxed 
atmosphere said to prevail in Poland. For example, Sławomir, a 60-year-
old pensioner from Warsaw with two children living abroad, suggested in 
2016:
We’re too up-tight (sztywno) in Poland . . .  Maybe a bit less now 
because we have lots of contact with abroad, on television, people 
behave more naturally. In Poland they’re always saying, ‘Don’t!’ 
(Nie wypada!). But now there are lots of things in Poland because of 
those foreign contacts, going abroad people see what it’s like in 
foreign countries and they imitate it.
More seriously, failure to smile is interpreted as mistrust. Poles notice and 
comment upon examples of trustfulness by foreigners, but sometimes only 
to say how unsuitable this behaviour would be in Poland. For example, 
interviewees in my own and other projects (e.g. Grabowska, Garapich, 
et al. 2017, 114; Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiedzki 2009, 118–19) have 
mentioned west European householders’ readiness to trust their house 
keys to Polish cleaners and builders. Both Kubal (2015, 77) and I heard 
surprised comments about Norwegians not locking their cars.
Levels of trust remain low in Poland. To some extent this is a legacy 
from the communist period (Sztompka 1999), but it is also connected to 
lower levels of prosperity and social cohesion in CEE than in the West. 
However, polls in Poland since EU accession mostly show rising levels of 
generalised trust.6 In 1994, 8 per cent of Poles believed that ‘generally 
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speaking, you can trust most people’ (Sztompka 1999, 170). By 2004 the 
number had risen to 17 per cent, and by 2008–10 there had been a sharp 
rise, to 26 per cent, thereafter falling back slightly to 23 per cent in 2016. 
Trust specifically in strangers, however, was fairly constant (with 32–35 
per cent trusting strangers to some extent) throughout the period from 
2004 (Omyła-Rudzka 2016b, 2–3). The rising CBOS figures are similar to 
those in World Values Survey Polish data for 2005 and 2012 (WVS). A one-
off and much larger GUS survey on social cohesion (GUS 2015b) showed 
trust in strangers slightly higher, at 39 per cent.7
Since trust is correlated with prosperity and higher levels of educa-
tion, it is not surprising to find it rising, at least somewhat, after 2004. This 
was a time when incomes were rising fast for many Poles, income inequal-
ity was declining, general life satisfaction was increasing and more Poles 
were acquiring university degrees. However, of course there remain many 
poor and less well-educated people. There is also an almost8 direct corre-
lation between trust and size of place of residence, with villages the least 
trusting and the big cities the most (Omyła-Rudzka 2016b, 6). I inter-
viewed some highly mistrustful stayers in the small towns of Sanok, Gra-
jewo and Limanowa. Usually tales of cheating locally referred to employers 
failing to pay their workers, for example as cleaners or builders, although 
very occasionally a wider generalisation was made about ‘Poles’. In 
Grajewo in 2008, for example, Bogusława explained the poverty of a rel-
ative who was a car repair mechanic as follows (translated literally): ‘Our 
people, the Poles, are conmen (kombinatorzy). They take the car and 
promise to pay tomorrow, but they don’t.’
Trust is important for migrants, especially non-professionals who 
depend heavily on informal networks both to migrate and also to operate 
abroad. However, disentangling how migration affects overall levels of 
trust in Poland is complex, since competing influences are at play. Migrants 
often need to be trusting, if they rely on co-ethnics abroad, so migration 
may strengthen particularised trust, when networks are used successfully. 
On the other hand, migration can promote mistrust. Sometimes this has 
a basis in fact: betrayal by previously trusted personal contacts. However, 
probably more important in forming generalised distrust is the prevalent 
discourse about the need to be careful when accessing the precious 
resource of help from fellow Poles. A discourse of hostility among Poles 
abroad – relating to Poles other than family and close friends – is docu-
mented by numerous scholars writing about Polish networks (e.g. Garapich 
2016c; Gill 2010; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005; Krasnodębska 2012; 
Piętka 2011, 149; Ryan 2010; White and Ryan 2008; White 2017, 185–8). 
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Some migrants base their mistrust on experience of types of work where 
undercutting and sharp practices are prevalent, such as construction and 
seasonal agricultural work, particularly in the shadow economy; con-
versely, some educational and professional migrants may never encoun-
ter the discourse.9 However, judging from the number of times interviewees 
volunteered such opinions (for which I never ‘fished’), mistrust seems 
widespread even among those who have not had bad experiences of 
their own.
Distrust is encapsulated in the saying, ‘Poles behave like wolves 
towards other Poles’ (Polak Polakowi wilkiem), referred to indirectly by 
Edyta above. Garapich (2016c, 243) writes that he lost count of the num-
ber of times Polish journalists asked him to comment on this proverb. He 
refers to the ‘myth of the Polish conman’ (2016c, 241–51), although the 
problem is often framed as being one of envious malevolence, not cheat-
ing. For example, I was told by a Pole in the United Kingdom that it must 
have been his Polish neighbours who slandered him to the tax authorities, 
because only Poles would be envious enough to do this.
Poles who go abroad without having had much contact with Polish 
migrants in advance, for example because they lived in Polish cities, may 
be generally mistrustful before leaving Poland, but nonetheless only 
become aware abroad of the opinion that Poles are dangerous to know. 
Malwina, interviewed in Wrocław, commented on how, after they arrived, 
‘our [Polish London] friends said a Pole would drown another Pole in a 
spoonful of water, to stop him being better’.10 The power of the myth is 
illustrated by the fact that young people from well-off backgrounds who 
go abroad, being apparently quite trusting, can become less so. For exam-
ple, Jacek, aged 28, from Wrocław, expatiated on hostile discourse among 
Poles in Norway, and then described how his Norwegian employer asked 
him to recommend a Polish friend for a job. Jacek decided he would not, 
on the supposition – not backed with evidence – that a Pole might be unre-
liable. He concluded that the myth ‘did play a bit of a role’ in influencing 
his behaviour.
Stayers who live in strong transnational social fields in Poland, and 
feel migration savvy, can imbibe the assumption that Polish migrants are 
wolves merely by living in Poland – even in Warsaw, with its high levels 
of generalised trust. Grzegorz, a student aged 21, had been socialised by 
his older relatives in London:
Lots of people complain it’s best for Poles abroad to avoid other 
Poles. In fact you can see it in Poland too. A Pole always wants to do 
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down other Poles. . . .  I’ve lived here [in Poland] quite a while and 
really, people aren’t nice in Poland. People are envious, they just love 
to make life hard for others.
These discourses especially circulate in locations where many people 
migrate, and can be said to constitute part of the migration culture. Even 
people with limited personal transnational networks believe the myth. For 
instance, Grażyna, a 39-year-old kitchen help from Sanok with no migra-
tion experience, commented, ‘Polish people, sometimes, well, as they say, 
it can be better to be among foreigners. Because a Pole could be out to get 
you because he says “You’re earning more money and I’m getting worse 
money and you only just came.” ’ In an interesting parallel, Krasnodębska 
(2012, 129) illustrates how women from Silesia are upset to find a lack of 
specifically Silesian co-ethnic solidarity. One of her interviewees lamented: 
‘Most of all I was pained by the lack of solidarity among Silesians . . .  If 
I hadn’t seen for myself how people change abroad, I’d never have 
believed it.’
There seems to be circular causation: migrants bring generalised 
mistrust from Poland; this becomes more specific abroad because of the 
discourse – not necessarily backed up by first-hand experience – of wolf-
ish Poles; and, through their negative reports back to stayers, migrants 
reinforce mistrust of Polish strangers in Poland. However, it is also impor-
tant to note that, judging from my own interviews, small towns are already 
full of stories of cheating foreign employers and recruiting agents. These 
feed into overall mistrust of strangers, of whatever nationality.
7. Informal networks, social capital and transnational 
labour markets
The reverse side of not trusting strangers is placing considerable trust in 
friends and family – typical of the communist era (Sztompka 1999; Wedel 
1986) but still persisting in many CEE countries, including Poland. On the 
one hand, nepotism is condemned; indeed, belief that you can only access 
jobs through contacts is a major cause for migration from Poland by peo-
ple lacking requisite social capital (Strzelecki et al. 2015, 148; White 
2016a). Ruszkowski’s (2012) study suggests how widespread the practice 
remains, although CBOS surveys show decreasing public belief that con-
tacts and patronage are very important for success at work (Głowacki 
2017a, 2).11 Paradoxically, it is quite acceptable, indeed routine, to use 
social capital to migrate, including fixing up jobs abroad. Garapich found 
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that Poles in London predominantly relied on friends and family to access 
work (2016c, 220), and Trevena, McGhee and Heath (2013), as well as 
White (2017), in our studies of various UK localities, found that most 
interviewees had used informal networks to migrate. Employers connive 
at this, by asking CEE migrants to recommend friends as potential employ-
ees (Findlay and McCollum 2013).
Belief in the importance of transnational migration networks is 
strong within the Polish population abroad, where migrants encourage, 
tempt, invite, persuade and eventually ‘pull’ (ściągają) stayers to join 
them. However, they are more likely to behave in this way in certain Pol-
ish locations. Reliance on informal networks typifies small towns with 
strong migration cultures, but seems less prevalent in big cities. Use of 
migration recruitment agencies more than doubled across Poland over the 
years 2004–6, with significant regional variation, being lowest in Podlasie, 
a region with a strong migration tradition (Anon. 2008). Jaźwińska 
(2001, 124) comments, ‘In some regions migration capital has been 
amassed over decades, in others (such as Warsaw) migration capital is 
acquired quickly, thanks to easy access to knowledge and information.’ My 
interviews in Warsaw and Wrocław uncovered cases of young people who 
had gone abroad around 2004 w ciemno, ‘into the dark’, with nothing fixed 
in advance, showing considerable self-confidence – perhaps justified by 
their cultural and economic capital. This would seem foolhardy to many 
inhabitants of small towns, where use of social capital to migrate is more 
or less obligatory. On the other hand, as the trend mentioned above sug-
gests, this culture is changing. This happens as migrants become more 
familiar with using agencies; I found some examples in my 2007–9 
research. Overall, migration culture is the part of Polish culture most sus-
ceptible to migration influences, and it clearly has been changing since 
2004. The impact on trust is a secondary effect of this.
Even stayers who live less intensively within transnational social 
space still access their transnational networks as social capital, to obtain 
certain resources, as in the following case of a 36-year-old lecturer from 
Lublin – a situation which, incidentally, is hard to imagine being men-
tioned by a Western stayer.
Anne: Has your own life has been affected by the fact that so many 
people have been migrating from Poland?
bArtosz: Not negatively. But positively, yes, because, knowing that 
some friends are in Scotland, someone’s in England, someone’s in 
Berlin, and in southern Germany, in Italy, so if I need to buy 
some materials for work, books or something, or my wife wants 
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some make-up or medicines, which we couldn’t get in Poland . . . 
it makes things much easier. Building a network of contacts makes 
things much easier.
As mentioned in chapter 3, Kapur (2010, 14) argues that migration 
impact partly happens through a prospect channel, where the hope of 
future migration shapes stayers’ behaviour. Stayers in locations like 
Limanowa, Grajewo or Sokółka can reasonably expect to find a job in Oslo, 
Madrid or London with help from fellow townspeople based in those loca-
tions abroad. Hence one impact of migration on such towns is that the 
‘local’ labour market is viewed by ordinary people (but not in official doc-
umentation)12 as also existing abroad – in many cases, extending across 
multiple foreign locations.
Anne: How did you find your work in Sweden?
JAn: [teasingly] Overall, in Limanowa [registered unemployment 
18 per cent] it’s not hard to find work.
[dramatic pause]
Anne: Abroad?
JAn: That’s right . . .  If people like you, and you have the right con-
tacts, you just need to ask someone and they’ll set up that work for 
you. I come from X [a nearby village] and that whole area is one 
where people go to Sweden. I just talked to people and somehow 
they fixed me up.
8. Internal migration, proximity and distance
Later in the interview just quoted, Jan observed: ‘We stick in one place in 
Poland, but look for jobs all over the world.’ The corollary of dense inter-
national networks is weak networks within Poland, and this helps explain 
why internal migration is quite limited. Polish young people who grow up 
outside university cities often migrate to study, and sometimes stay in the 
city after graduation, especially Warsaw and Kraków (Herbst 2012, 136–
66), but other types of internal migration are not very common. Statistics 
are unreliable because Poles often fail to register moves from one place of 
residence to another, but survey evidence confirms that internal migra-
tion is indeed rather low. In 2011, for example, according to the census, 
56.5 per cent of Poles lived in their birthplace (Anacka 2016, 213). Only 
about one-fifth had moved more than once during their adult life, not usu-
ally for work (Kowalczuk 2010). The period after EU accession has not 
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been characterised by more internal migration; overall it decreased 
slightly from the 1990s to the following decade (GUS 2016, 398). Although 
there are practical reasons not to move, most importantly the small size 
of the rented accommodation sector (Anacka 2016, 215) and its cost, 
there seems to be some cultural inhibition against migration to Polish cit-
ies (Iglicka 2008, 65; White 2017, 54–6). There are a few signs of change 
very recently, with increased migration to a few flourishing cities and sea-
side towns (GUS 2007, 433; 2016, 415).13 Like other urban hubs in CEE 
(Stanilov and Sýkora 2014), the most successful Polish cities have begun 
to suburbanise rapidly (Kajdanek 2011; Zborowski, Soja and Łobodzińska 
2012), with new housing estates springing up, largely thanks to the much 
greater availability of mortgages (Kisiel 2010), though also sometimes 
thanks to money earned abroad (White 2016d).14
The relationship between internal and international migration is 
complex: sometimes the one seems to feed the other, but in other places, 
at other times, they are mutually exclusive (King and Skeldon 2010). 
Okólski (2012) argues that international migration was favoured after 
2004 because foreign labour markets could absorb surplus labour in pro-
vincial Poland. However, intense international migration over the past 
10 years can in itself be seen as a factor inhibiting internal migration. Stay-
ers living in Polish locations without long migration traditions, who have 
begun to live in transnational social space, reverse their understandings 
of proximity and distance. This had already happened in locations that 
became dominated by out-migration in the 1990s, for example when 
buses started going directly from north-east Poland to Brussels (Łukowski 
1998, 147). Emotional lives based on informal networks straddle the local 
area and places abroad; Staszyńska and Bojar, for example, found that 
migrant households in small towns as early as 2007 were more likely to 
have computers, to keep in touch with relatives abroad (2008, 26). In such 
households, other locations in Poland seem less important. Previously, 
flights and visas had been obtainable only in Warsaw, which was ‘the 
contact point with places abroad’ in the communist period (Jaźwińska, 
Łukowski and Okólski 1997, 24); now even the tiniest village is a contact 
point.
There seems to be a shortage of statistical information about such 
preferences, but one can infer that they are increasing. Table 7.2 shows 
the situation in 2007, when a preference for international over internal 
migration was already noticeable for Poland as a whole, but particularly 
in regions with the highest international migration. Exceptions to this rule 
are places within easy distance of dynamic cities. My interviewees in Lublin 
often mentioned that migration was to Warsaw and abroad. This is 
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reflected in table 7.2, which shows that inhabitants of Łódź and Lublin 
regions, with relatively good connections to Warsaw, were untypically, and 
marginally, more likely to prefer moving within Poland.
One can guess that 10 years later, when international migration is 
commonplace from all regions, international migration networks have 
expanded and there has been such marked family reunification for settle-
ment abroad, the gap will have widened in favour of moving abroad.
My own interviewees frequently listed numerous obstacles to inter-
nal migration. For example, in Grajewo in 2012, Iwona commented: ‘I 
don’t have any possibility of moving somewhere else [in Poland], with-
out work, without contacts. There’s no possibility even if you wanted to. 
Where would you go? Even Warsaw. The prices are extraordinary.’ Rosalia 
explained:
My husband and I were thinking about moving somewhere else, but 
we came to the conclusion that either we would stay in Sanok or, if 
we moved, it would be to somewhere abroad. Because if you move 
somewhere else in Poland, all the same, everything will be foreign/
strange [obce]. Strange people, strange places.
Going abroad seems more natural than moving within Poland: some inter-
viewees appeared not even to consider the latter alternative. For example, 
Dorota reported, ‘I looked for work for three months . . .  in Lublin. 
I didn’t think of going outside Lublin. Somehow. I was born and brought 
up in Lublin. And my [woman]friend had gone to England as soon as she 
graduated. And she simply got me to join her.’ In 2012 I had the following 
Table 7.2 Percentage of Poles from different regions claiming that ‘in 
order to obtain a job or change their job for a better-paid one’, they would be 
inclined to move in Poland or abroad
Region of current residence
Would move to 
another place 
in Poland
Would move 
abroad
Łódź region 24.9 24.2
Lublin region 29.3 29.2
Małopolska region 19.2 31.0
Opole region 25.8 32.1
Podkarpacie region 23.4 33.3
Polish national average 25.5 28.3
Source: Feliksiak 2008b,123.
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conversation with Ryszard, aged 56, unemployed in Grajewo, whose 
sister lived in Warsaw:
Anne: But don’t you want to go to Warsaw?
ryszArd: Me? No, I don’t like cities. . . .  Why should I seek my for-
tune in other towns? If my sister would come back here and live 
[to mind my flat] I would feel comfortable about going to Holland.
Kubicki (2015, 85–88), basing his assertion on a local study, suggests that 
Poles identify with their locality – a personal home area (ojczyzna pry-
watna) consisting of local environs, the commune (gmina) or at most the 
county (powiat), rather than with the region (województwo) or the Polish 
state, which is seen as ‘foreign and dysfunctional’. In post-Solidarity 
Poland, the issue of how and why Poland is divided – often framed as 
whether Poland is ‘one’ or ‘many’ – has been a frequent preoccupation of 
sociologists (e.g. Kojder 2007; Rychard, Domański and Śpiewak 2006; 
Zarycki 2014) as well as politicians. Poland today is often claimed to be 
particularly polarised. According to survey evidence, only 14 per cent of 
Poles claim that Poles are more united than divided (Badora 2013, 11).15 
Geographical disconnectedness within Poland, a sense of proximity to 
points abroad and a refusal to contemplate internal migration might be 
feeding into this perception, though of course polarisation has many com-
plex causes.
9. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed some changing practices and beliefs in contem-
porary Poland, summarised in table 7.3. Such changes linked to deeper 
social phenomena such as formalisation and individualisation, trust 
and social capital, and changing aspirations and conceptualisations of 
proximity and distance in a globalising world. I discussed different types 
of endogenous reasons why these trends might be occurring; for example, 
worries about high rents discourage migration to Polish cities, more 
diverse public eating places in towns and cities change eating habits, and 
more prosperity leads to greater trust. I also showed how migration both 
contributes to these factors – for example, more money from migration 
means more prosperity and supports increasing levels of generalised 
trust – but also constitutes an alternative and, in some cases, complemen-
tary and perhaps more important explanation. For instance, people are 
discouraged from migrating to Polish cities because they believe they are 
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‘too expensive’, but this is not so much an objective ‘fact’ (after all, Poles 
do migrate successfully internally) because they compare them with 
places they know to be relatively cheap abroad.
Migration is a ‘leveller’ in the sense that migration supplies some 
Poles with opportunities that other Poles would derive from other sources. 
These include, for example, pensioners who otherwise could not afford to 
travel abroad, or small-town residents with few labour market opportu-
nities locally. However, some people also suffer disproportionately from 
migration effects (e.g. from the discourse of hostility about Polish migrants 
that corrodes trust in high-migration locations). Opportunity structures 
for changing lifestyles vary considerably depending on income and loca-
tion: Indian takeaways do not open in villages, although Italian pizza 
restaurants do open in smallish towns. Overall, one is drawn to the not 
unexpected conclusion that migration makes most difference to the lives 
of people with relatively few resources, but that people with more money 
and cultural capital living in already-changing cities are better placed to 
consolidate and diffuse beliefs and practices acquired abroad. However, 
this remains a deeply individual matter, depending on the exact nature 
of their transnational fields, and in some cases on opportunities for reci-
procity and the circulation of influences between Poland and foreign coun-
tries. This becomes even more evident in the sensitive area of cultural 
and identity change, discussed in chapter 8.
Notes
1 Respondents are asked whether they agree (on a four-point scale) that ‘I see myself 
as an autonomous individual’. See http:// www . worldvaluessurvey . org / WVSOnline 
. jsp. 77.1 per cent/79.6 per cent agreed in 2005/2012, and 15.4 per cent/15 per cent 
disagreed.
2 The percentage of Poles believing that corruption was a big problem in Poland fell 
from 95 per cent in 2004 to 76 per cent in 2017, although this is still a high figure 
(Boguszewski 2017c, 1). 10 per cent in 2017 claimed to know someone who took 
bribes, compared with  
23 per cent in 2004 and 29 per cent in 2000 (Boguszewski 2017b, 2).
3 Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiedzki (2009, 60) tell the story of a migrant from 
Leuven who, when he went back to Poland, was laughed at for observing all the 
rules of the road and stopping to let pedestrians cross the road even from a distance. 
They note that Poles often remarked on the safe driving of Leuven drivers. This was 
10 years ago.
4 EVS data on trust for 2012 suggest the implied distinction between Warsaw and 
Lublin might have some basis in fact, but the sample size is small.
5 Meanwhile the Irish figure had dropped by 10 points to 44 per cent, no doubt 
reflecting the impact of the economic crisis. Figures for Germany were 23 per cent 
(2004) and 29 per cent (2014); from the United Kingdom, 38 per cent (2004) and 
39 per cent (2012).
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 6 See, e.g. Czapiński and Panek (2015); Omyła-Rudzka (2016b). For detailed 
discussion in English, see Gołębiowska (2014).
 7 See Karpiński (2016) for discussion of how question framing influences results 
for surveys on trust.
 8 The exception is that residents of towns of under 20,000 are more trusting than 
those of towns of 20,000–100,000 – but less trusting than residents of cities over 
100,000.
 9 This assertion is based on my experience of teaching Polish students in London. 
Mroczek’s Internet survey of 74 Poles aged under 40 living in the United Kingdom 
found that 77 per cent ‘were positively disposed towards their fellow nationals’ 
(Mroczek 2010, 142). However, the question is rather vague, and the methodol-
ogy is not clearly explained, so this is not strong evidence of positivity.
 10 Another version of the saying is that a Pole would drown someone for 1 euro.
 11 In surveys where respondents were asked to choose the two most important 
influences on professional success, 28 per cent named contacts and patronage in 
2013, compared with 18 per cent in 2017 (Głowacki 2017a).
 12 Official documentation on the labour market, produced by the job centres (PUP) 
rarely even hint at this reality of local life.
 13 Cities that acquired net internal migration between 2007 and 2016 were Gdańsk, 
Gdynia, Koszalin, Opole, Rzeszów and Szczecin. Cities that increased their net 
internal migration in the same years were Chorzów, Kraków, Olsztyn, Warsaw, 
Wrocław and Zielona Góra (GUS 2016).
 14 See http:// biqdata . wyborcza . pl / polish - ways - where - the - residents - of - large - cities 
- come - from for interactive maps showing the birthplaces of residents in 16 Polish 
cities (published 2 June 2017). Last accessed 10 December 2017.
 15 41 per cent thought Poland was united and divided in equal measure, and 40 
per cent that it was more divided than united. The most frequently mentioned 
uniting factor was ‘disasters and defeats’.
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Culture and identity
Anne White
1. Introduction
This chapter explores ways in which ideas about culture and identity may 
be changing in Poland. In particular, I discuss how cultural diversity is 
becoming more accepted. As already mentioned, each migrant who returns 
adds a piece to the mosaic of Polish society, changing its composition. They 
can therefore add to or subtract from the number of people open to differ-
ence. Social change also occurs when migrants directly transmit ideas, 
practices, beliefs, norms and even values to stayers. Though scholars often 
see values as deep-rooted and hard to change, Goodwin and fellow 
cross-cultural psychologists argue that Polish migrants can acquire more 
‘open to difference’ values. Their findings support the common-sense 
expectation that ‘migration is likely to challenge existing world views of the 
person, including values and beliefs’ (Goodwin, Polek and Bardi 2012, 
362). As mentioned in chapter 2, Portes, too, asserts that migration effects 
may ‘go deep into the culture, transforming the value system’ (2010, 1544).
Trends in Poland, insofar as survey evidence can be taken at face 
value, are towards more openness. However, there are also counter-trends. 
Family socialisation, formal education, the media, Internet, politicians, 
and so forth all influence stayers and help make some Poles increas-
ingly open, or the reverse. The impact of exposure to foreigners in Poland 
is discussed in chapter 10. Migration and visits abroad, as discussed in 
this chapter, are significant additional influences. Although people of 
all classes and ages can become more open and tolerant as a result of 
migration, the ‘value added’ may be highest for the least educated. For 
them, migration can be a truly eye-opening experience.
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Gołębiowska (2014) writes about the ‘many faces of tolerance’. 
People are often more tolerant in one dimension than in others. Typically, 
Poles are more accepting of foreign nationals than of LGBT people, and 
more accepting of some nationalities than others. Furthermore, there 
are shallower or deeper forms of ‘cosmopolitanism’. Exponents of the 
first acknowledge the right to exist of different cultures, and are even 
curious. However, they rarely notice interconnections or shared iden-
tities between themselves and others, which would characterise deeper 
cosmopolitanism. Blindness to interconnections may coexist with a feel-
ing that one’s own identity is best and/or a tendency to perform cosmo-
politanism because it is felt to be expected, or just part of everyday life as 
practised abroad, without really being very convinced of the value of 
diversity.
Cultural fear, the most important cause of xeno- and homopho-
bia, can be overcome by contact between people that promotes posi-
tive views of one another. Opportunities for contact and especially 
conviviality (enjoyable socialising) allow both migrants and stayers to 
acquire and diffuse ideas about tolerance. To acquire such social remit-
tances, language competence is particularly important, and the chap-
ter includes a section on language knowledge among Poles. As argued 
earlier in this book, remitting at all stages is most likely to be success-
ful where there is an equal relationship between transmitter and recip-
ient, and particularly when both parties are able to exchange these 
roles. (Return) migrants should also have good networks in both the 
receiving and the sending societies in order to acquire and diffuse social 
remittances.
Of course, the national context is also important, particularly the 
role of right-wing media and political parties. In Poland these warn against 
contact with Western receiving societies, which can supposedly corrode 
national culture and values, particularly ‘family values’ and religiosity 
(Leszczyńska 2017; Smolenski 2016). In fact, according to CBOS surveys, 
Poles seem decreasingly to feel that being Catholic is a particularly impor-
tant attribute of Polish identity. Asked in 2015 to name the two most 
important of seven possible attributes, most respondents chose ‘feeling 
Polish’ and ‘being a Polish citizen’; 7 per cent chose ‘being a Catholic’ (com-
pared with 14 per cent in 2005) (Omyła-Rudzka 2015, 6). However, sur-
veys about religiosity show continuing high levels of belief in God. The 
most significant change seems to be that religion is increasingly consid-
ered a personal affair, with some drop in regular church attendance, and 
this individualisation or ‘privatisation’ of religion in Poland must to some 
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extent be reinforced by the same, but stronger trend among Poles abroad, 
as discussed in chapter 9.
Since culture and identity are complex and largely subjective phe-
nomena, the topic of this chapter poses particular methodological chal-
lenges. Trends are hard to chart with survey evidence, which by its nature 
is superficial and ambiguous. Qualitative data is useful for putting agents 
of social change under the microscope and for understanding how and 
why individual people modify their views, but of course not for establish-
ing ‘facts’ about trends; indeed, interviewees’ assertions about what is 
changing around them can betray wishful thinking rather than hard evi-
dence. Binnie and Klesse (2013, 1119) criticise the optimism of a Polish 
LGBT activist, Łukasz Palucki, who asserted that ‘Polish mentality is 
changing because of them, because of [Polish] immigrants who are going 
back [to small-town and rural Poland], like a bomb, like a bomb in the 
gasoline station.’ However, though no bomb has exploded yet, Palucki’s 
faith that heterosexual return migrants are revolutionising Polish attitudes 
towards homosexuality is important as a motivating factor. Activists in 
social movements need to be optimistic that social change will occur – if 
not a bomb, at least some seedlings of change.
Positionality can be a problem in this area. Binnie and Klesse (2013, 
1119–20) distance themselves from Palucki’s assertion partly because 
they are wary of being assumed to condone orientalism, the supposition 
that West is best. However, one should also avoid falling into the oppo-
site trap (adopted by liberal pessimists) of refusing to believe evidence of 
change towards greater openness in Poland.
I argue that analysis of survey data and individual migrants’ thought 
processes through in-depth interviews suggests that change is indeed 
occurring, and that migration is an ‘eye-opener’ and ‘leveller’ that helps 
change happen, among people from all social backgrounds. Between 
this introductory section and the concluding section, this chapter is 
structured in four sections. After considering survey evidence of trends 
towards acceptance of diversity in Section 2, I discuss in Section 3 why 
migration may help this happen. Since Catholicism has historically 
been central to Polish Gentile identity, and because it is still so impor-
tant in Polish society, Section 4 surveys (more briefly) evidence about 
religiosity; in Section 5, I consider how this may be affected by migra-
tion. This section particularly emphasises the geographical diversity of 
Poland.
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2. Polish trends regarding attitudes towards foreigners 
and national, ethnic and sexual minorities
Survey evidence, at least up to 2015, suggests that Poland is becoming 
more open in many respects. Of course, to some extent people answer sur-
veys based on what they think are socially acceptable answers, taking 
their cues from public discourse. Gołębiowska (2014, 20) suggested that 
openly displaying prejudice against some outgroups circa 2013 was more 
acceptable than others. Anti-Semitism and xenophobia were the most pro-
scribed, misogyny more acceptable, and homophobia most acceptable. 
Before the refugee crisis and accompanying rise in xenophobic political 
rhetoric, a CBOS survey conducted 25 years after the collapse of the com-
munist regime indicated that 47 per cent of Poles believed tolerance of 
alternative viewpoints had increased since then, while 20 per cent believed 
the opposite (Boguszewski 2014a, 93). More specifically, for example, the 
proportion of Poles saying they believed that homosexuality ‘should not 
be tolerated’ fell from 41 per cent in 2001 to 26 per cent in 2013 (Felik-
siak 2013, 62).
Acceptance of ethnic diversity also seems to have grown. Poland’s 
population was 96 per cent ethnically Polish, according to the 2011 cen-
sus (GUS 2012, 105), so ethnic uniformity is the normal state of affairs 
for most Poles. When asked in 2015 whether ‘it’s good if a country is eth-
nically uniform’, 42 per cent of CBOS respondents disagreed1 and 52 per 
cent agreed. In 2005 only 36 per cent thought ethnic uniformity was bad, 
compared with 56 per cent who considered it good (Omyła-Rudzka 2015, 
10–11). In the same 2015 study, 74 per cent of interviewees believed that 
it was possible to have two home countries (ojczyzny), a three percentage 
point increase since 2005 (Omyła-Rudzka 2015, 7). Acceptance of immi-
grant workers is also growing. The percentage of Poles who believe that 
foreigners should be allowed to ‘undertake any work’ in Poland has risen 
from 9 per cent in 1992 to 56 per cent in 2016 (Feliksiak 2016, 8).
Polls also show a drop in hostility towards other national groups, 
including neighbours in CEE; nationals of Western countries to which 
Poles migrate; nationalities commonly found as immigrants in Poland; 
and the most stigmatised groups, Roma and Jews. See table 8.1 for atti-
tudes towards a selection of nationalities from a wider CBOS survey. This 
survey evidence of declining xenophobia among the population at large 
puts into perspective the recent rise in hate crimes (Klaver et al. 2016, 
32–3) perpetrated by nationalist extremists, who do not represent ordi-
nary Poles, as well as the sharp decrease in preparedness to welcome 
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refugees, from 72 per cent of CBOS respondents in May 2015 to 44 per 
cent in December 2016 (Głowacki 2017c, 2).2 The alarmist and Islamo-
phobic presentation of the European refugee crisis by politicians and the 
media, including social media, has influenced answers to survey ques-
tions specifically about refugees. Considering the results shown in 
table 8.1, it seems that fears about refugees should not be equated with 
blanket dislike of all foreigners. On the other hand, backing up the impres-
sion of a hardening of attitudes towards outgroups, fewer respondents in 
June 2015 than in 2005 said it was ‘good to have neighbours whose cul-
ture and traditions differ from the Polish ones’ (a drop from 53 per cent to 
50 per cent) (Omyła-Rudzka 2015, 12).
The surveys mentioned above predictably tend to find that people 
who know members of a minority group or another nationality are more 
favourably disposed towards them (e.g. Feliksiak 2013, 62; Feliksiak 
2016, 11). The surveys do not reveal how these Poles know openly gay 
people, and so on, but it would be reasonable to assume that in many cases 
they have met them abroad. For example, Feliksiak (2013, 61), pointing 
out that the number of Poles who know LGBT people rose between 2005 
and 2013 from 16 per cent to 25 per cent, writes that ‘among those more 
likely to know a gay or lesbian were young respondents and . . .  inhabitants 
of small towns’, both of which represent categories particularly likely to 
have lived abroad. Up to 20 per cent of Poles know Muslims personally, 
but since only about 0.1 per cent of the Polish population is Muslim 
(Pędziwiatr 2015), it must be the case that many met Muslims abroad.
Table 8.1 Percentage of Poles claiming to feel dislike (niechęć)  
of selected nationalities
2004 2017
‘Arabs’ 59 59
Roma 56 50
Russians 53 38
Jews 45 26
Vietnamese 38 23
Chinese people 37 21
Germans 34 22
British (literally ‘English’) 17 16
Czechs 14 10
Italians 11 10
Sources: Strzeszewski 2005, 2; Omyła-Rudzka 2017, 3.
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3. Migration vis-à-vis other factors promoting 
cosmopolitan attitudes
‘Cosmopolitanism’ has acquired many meanings since Kant. More complex 
definitions, taking into account specific attitudes towards politics and the 
economy, and/or morality, or particular cosmopolitan practices, are 
needed for quantitative studies, where different variables require meas-
urement. In this chapter, cosmopolitanism is understood in a more inclu-
sive way, as ‘openness to cultural difference’. I also take into account 
Delanty’s suggestion (2012, 340) that a cosmopolitan disposition is ‘an 
orientation towards tolerance of diversity, recognition of interconnected-
ness and a general disposition of openness to others’. However, I argue 
that ‘recognition of interconnectedness’ cannot be assumed to go naturally 
with ‘tolerance of diversity’; rather, it is a deeper cosmopolitanism.
As Skey (2013, 236) observes, ‘people shift between subject posi-
tions as they encounter different forms of “otherness” in their everyday 
lives’. For example, migrants can have different attitudes towards major-
ity and minority populations. Wiesław, a returnee to Wrocław, stated, 
‘I  liked everything in the UK . . .  people [sic] were very friendly . . . 
which you can’t say for example of all those newcomers, I don’t know, 
from India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka’. As Fox, Morosany and Szilassy 
(2012; 2015) illustrate with reference to Hungarians and Romanians in 
the United Kingdom, and Garapich (2016c, 251–67) and Nowicka (2018, 
830) to Poles, this can accord with a perceived racial hierarchy, where 
white EU migrants position themselves alongside white majority popu-
lations in western European countries but ‘above’ black people.
The term ‘cosmopolitan’ is normally used with reference to receiv-
ing societies, reflecting the receiving country bias and the dominance 
of Western scholarship. Cosmopolitanism tends to be associated with 
globalisation and, as such, its spread can be seen as part of a process 
accompanying increased mobility since the 1990s, although an interest 
in how people become more open to cultural difference as a result of 
migration predates the 1990s popularity of the term.
Keating (2016, 340) suggests that ‘one of the key questions that the 
latest empirical research has sought to address is which individuals or 
groups are more likely to exhibit these dispositions and why’. Helbling and 
Teney, in their review of the literature, suggest (2015, 447) two types of 
explanation. Different scholars have been interested in how cosmopolitan-
ism relates to (1) socio-demographic factors and (2) what they label 
‘transnational’ activities, including simple travelling.3 The next section 
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON POLAND166
looks at both in turn, considering in particular how they intertwine, as 
well as at foreign language learning as a cause and consequence of 
migration.
With regard to socio-demographic characteristics, Gołębiowska, 
who defines tolerance as ‘acceptance and equal treatment of an outgroup 
or members of an outgroup’ (2014, 169), argues that ‘religiosity, educa-
tion, and age, in that order, emerge as the consistently most important 
influences on Polish tolerance’ (172). Recent CBOS surveys regularly point 
to education, income and residence in one of Poland’s five large cities4 as 
being associated with more liberal views.5 With reference to attitudes 
towards LGBT people, Feliksiak (2013) and Gołębiowska (2014) find that 
younger, less religious, more left-wing, more politically interested and 
more Europhile respondents are more likely to demonstrate tolerance.
The CBOS survey Młodzież 2016 (Youth 2016)6 suggests that 
younger people, whose views are obviously particularly important in 
pointing towards future trends, are polarised, increasingly tolerant, and 
not much different in outlook from older adults (Głowacki 2017b). 39 per 
cent agreed and 51 per cent disagreed in 2016 that ‘homosexuality was 
not a normal thing and must not be tolerated’, compared with 46 per cent 
and 45 per cent respectively three years earlier. Women everywhere tend 
to be more accepting of homosexuality than men, and young Polish women 
and men hold opposite views. Only 22 per cent of women agreed that 
homosexuality was abnormal, compared with 53 per cent of men (66 per 
cent in 2013). By contrast, young people showed declining acceptance of 
immigration. Most disagreed with the statement that ‘foreigners should 
not be allowed to settle permanently in Poland’, but this dropped from 65 
per cent in 2013 to 51 per cent in 2016. 37 per cent agreed, compared to 
26 per cent three years before (Głowacki 2017b, 135–7; Badora 2014, 
79–83).
There is a common view that ‘cosmopolitanism’ is confined to an 
educated elite, reflecting empirical evidence of correlation between edu-
cational level and tolerance in various countries, including Poland.7 To 
some extent this is connected to the content of education received, as 
opposed to other attributes of educated people, such as enhanced reason-
ing skills (Gołębiowska 2014, 18). Kennedy (2009, 22), writing about 
middle-class Polish and other EU migrants in Manchester, suggests that 
their class background ‘endows them not just with educational credentials 
but also social confidence and an individual rather than a collective frame 
of reference’.
However, capacity for reflexivity and empathy is not necessarily 
linked to education. It could, for example, result from parental socialisa-
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tion; some parents, irrespective of social class background, bring up their 
children to be respectful towards members of outgroups whom they 
encounter, for instance disabled people or Roma, even if they have never 
met a black or gay person. In this chapter I give examples of reflexivity 
among people of all educational and class backgrounds. For example, 
social workers in Lublin Region – well placed to observe the households 
of poorer local residents – opined that ‘not only do they become more 
open to foreign cultures (especially food and customs) but also after 
they return both they and people around them become more tolerant 
towards difference’ (Kawczyńska-Butrym, Ogryzko-Wiewiórowska and 
Butrym 2012, 61).
Since ability to communicate with people unlike oneself is a key to 
acquiring empathy and tolerance, it is unsurprising to find foreign lan-
guage knowledge as an indicator of tolerance among Polish migrants 
(Garapich 2016c, 255; Nowicka and Krzyżowski 2017, 9). The growth in 
English-language competence is in itself an important trend in Poland,8 
facilitating migration and mixing with other nationalities abroad. One of 
my interviewees, Dorota, a 34-year-old teacher from Lublin, observed that 
‘the academic year when English became compulsory at school was a 
watershed . . .  All my generation learned English to some extent. That 
really opens doors.’ For many return migrants and stayers who visit 
migrants, competence has been enhanced by language use abroad, so 
improvements in Polish trends must also be partly thanks to migration. 
Rosalia, a 24-year-old student from Wrocław, suggested the existence of 
a virtuous circle: ‘There’s that exchange the whole time, either tourists are 
here or Poles go abroad, and it means we become more open to foreign 
languages and understand more how necessary they are.’
In 1996, only 14 per cent of Polish young people declared they could 
make themselves understood in English (Boguszewski et al. 2014, 133, 
135). By 2005, 73 per cent of under 25s claimed some knowledge of Eng-
lish (Panek, Czapiński and Kotowska 2005, 41). This helps explain why 
this generation so readily migrated to Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
The Youth 2008 survey also found that young people whose parents had 
worked abroad were particularly likely to claim foreign language knowl-
edge (CBOS 2009, 126). By contrast, in 2005 only 43 per cent of Poles in 
the next age group, aged 25–34, knew any English at all (Panek, Czapiński 
and Kotowska 2005, 41).9 From 2009 onwards, however – when figures 
are only available for ‘active’ language knowledge – it was this 25–34-year-
old group which knew English better than any other age group, even stu-
dents, whom one might expect to be the most confident, since they were 
currently studying languages (see figure  8.1). This suggests that the 
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25–34-year-olds used it at work in Poland and/or abroad. In another sur-
vey, 84 per cent of return labour migrants to Małopolska declared a more 
than basic knowledge of foreign languages, and more than half said they 
were fluent or advanced. In general, returnees in this survey emphasised 
how much more they learned by using their languages abroad than they 
did in formal education in Poland (CDS 2010a, 151–2). In parallel sur-
veys in Lower Silesia and Silesia, 87 per cent and 90 per cent of returnees 
respectively said they had learned or improved their language abroad 
(CDS 2010b; CDS 2011).
The remainder of this section considers the effect of migration and 
of living within transnational fields on promoting cosmopolitan attitudes, 
including their differentiated effect on different social groups. A survey 
by Mole et al. (2017, 13) found that among heterosexual respondents 
from 10 new EU member-states, those who had lived longer in London 
were also more accepting of homosexuality. Fitzgerald, Winstone and Pre-
stage (2014) arrived at the same conclusion, using European Social Sur-
vey data (n = 1291) for CEE migrants in western Europe. Ahmadov and 
Sasse, discussing 22 in-depth interviews in Oxfordshire (2016, 17) com-
ment that ‘the perception of a norm of tolerance in the UK and compari-
sons with a less open and still less diverse society in Poland is mentioned 
in almost every interview, leading the interviewees to conclude that the 
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Fig. 8.1 Share of Poles in different age groups possessing a self- 
declared ‘active’ knowledge of English, 2007–15. Source: Based on data 
from Panek et al. (2009, 39; 2015, 34).
169Culture And IdentIty
experience of migration has made them more “open”, “tolerant”, and “less 
critical of others”’.
With regard to return migrants living in Poland, a 2012 survey of 
returnees to Podlasie found that 86 per cent agreed they had become 
‘more open and tolerant’ as a result of migration. This was one of the 
potential benefits of migration on which there was greatest agreement 
(Dziekońska 2012, 137). Lucyna, a 36-year-old nursery schoolteacher and 
student, pointed to the migrant’s reflexivity rather than to norms of tol-
erance in the receiving society as the main reason promoting openness.
I think lots of people have come back from migration. They have 
some influence too. Because they somehow look at foreigners dif-
ferently, and somehow their environment in fact and I think in 
Wrocław and Poland generally every family has someone who 
migrated and thanks to that they have a different viewpoint and 
somehow accept those people more. Because they know that when 
they are abroad they want to be treated well, too.
Obviously, not everyone who migrates becomes open minded. Nowicka 
and Rovisco (2012, 9) suggest that ‘cosmopolitanism is better seen as a 
form of imagination – that one can . . .  develop in certain transnational 
contexts – rather than an essential quality of mobile people’. Nowicka and 
Krzyżowski (2017, 15) suggest that rather than truly becoming more tol-
erant, Polish migrants often shift towards ‘aversive racism or homopho-
bia’, learning to avoid openly manifesting intolerance because they realise 
this is considered socially unacceptable abroad. Similarly, Mole et  al. 
(2017, 217) point out that CEE migrants may simply ‘learn to perform tol-
erance in the United Kingdom rather than become tolerant, a trend that 
has also been identified among indigenous British people in contexts of 
cultural diversity’. Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiedzki (2009, 72), after 
telling the story of a middle-aged woman from Podlasie who claimed to 
have shed her intolerant views after working as a cleaner for an older gay 
couple in Leuven, suggest that Poles working in Belgian households accept 
their hosts’ points of view out of politeness, but only temporarily.
It is also possible to become more racist and homophobic as the 
result of migration, as Nowicka and Krzyżowski (2017, 15) found in their 
study of Poles working in British and German cities, especially Birming-
ham, the least tolerant city studied. There is often a circulation of atti-
tudes between Poland and western Europe. Gawlewicz (2015a; 2015b) 
illustrates how some migrants become more racist and transmit racist 
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attitudes to their relatives based in Poland. Nowicka (2018, 825) argues 
that ‘Polish immigrants in England incorporate, reproduce, and transform 
aspects of racial discourses present in the British public space into their 
cultural repertoire (habitus) that was shaped by education and exposure 
to other [racist] discourses in Poland’.
Garapich (2016c, 261) connects racism with snobbery, arguing that 
racism among aspiring middle-class London Poles may be a distancing 
device, picked up from local white people, to assert their middle-class 
status. Workplaces can be sites for imbibing racist attitudes, for example 
because of ‘ethnic competition’ (Nowicka and Krzyżowski 2017, 8). My 
interviewee Wiesław, quoted above, had a long-running conflict with Sri 
Lankan fellow shop assistants, a conflict that seems to have hardened his 
attitudes towards them.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, cosmopolitan attitudes are often 
positively associated with higher levels of education and hence with 
social class. However, qualitative data shows plenty of examples even of 
well-educated migrants who do not become open as a result of being 
abroad, although they may be careful to apologise for expressing racist 
sentiments. This is illustrated in the following quotations.
I feel better in white Europe, to say something controversial. I felt 
the same in Belgium, in Antwerp I didn’t see a single Belgian. Only 
black people. I don’t have anything against them but, having gone 
to Belgium, I would have liked to meet a typical Frenchman, like in 
books or films. (Grzegorz, aged 21, student in Warsaw, visits rela-
tives in London, 2016)
They [asylum seekers] were often from African countries, that lan-
guage barrier, mentality, work-shy . . .  and huge help from the 
[Dutch] state . . .  It was a huge shock for me, over the top. A Pole, 
for instance, who speaks Dutch, a graduate, knowledgeable, eager 
to work, and how’s he treated? (Robert, aged 34, return migrant and 
civil servant, Lublin)
Given that in countries such as Poland, people of all social back-
grounds migrate, it seems important, when considering what types of 
attitude may be remitted to stayers, to be on the lookout for examples of 
cosmopolitanism even among less educated migrants. As indicated above, 
for example, almost all Polish labour migrants, whatever their previous 
education, feel they improve their foreign languages while abroad. Many 
scholars no longer associate cosmopolitanism exclusively with hyper- 
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mobile elites (see, e.g. discussion in Datta 2009, 353; Moroşanu 2013, 
2163). Indeed, the latter may lead rather socially circumscribed lives (Hel-
bling and Teney 2015), whereas ordinary workers can have more contact 
with a range of people in the destination country. Werbner (1999, 18) 
argues that ‘even working class labour migrants may become cosmopoli-
tans, willing to “engage with the Other” ’. Datta (2009, 357) also argues 
that working-class migrants can also ‘perform varieties of cosmopolitan 
behaviours’, as she illustrates with examples of East European, mostly Pol-
ish, construction workers in London. Some other studies of Poles abroad 
also suggest that increasingly tolerant attitudes are not just to be found 
among the most educated migrants. Mole et al. (2017), for example, found 
that gender, not education, was the most significant variable determin-
ing the acquisition of more accepting attitudes towards homosexuality 
in London and Berlin.
People whose exposure to difference is mostly from migration rather 
than from other channels (especially people without higher education, if 
their school education did not particularly teach respect for diversity)10 
are therefore more likely to acquire their cosmopolitan attitudes from 
migration. Kuhn, writing about acquisition of European identities, argues 
that the ‘impact of transnational practices on European identity is stronger 
among the low educated than among the highly educated’ (2012, 995).
For the low-educated people, interacting across borders can be the 
decisive moment that leads them to adopt a European identity. To a 
certain extent, the exposure to a different culture might have the 
same formative effects as brought forward by education. Moreover, 
while low-skilled Europeans might be the “losers” of integration at 
the outset, their cross-border mobility and interactions might be a 
way to circumvent their marginalized position. (Kuhn 2012, 999)
If true, this supports my argument (advanced in chapter 7) that migra-
tion is a leveller. In other words, it is not only important not to overlook 
how cosmopolitanism evolves among some working-class migrants, but 
particularly important to search out examples of such change, because 
they are the people for whom migration is most likely to change their opin-
ions. For example, Jolanta, interviewed in 2016, was a 53-year-old 
cleaner from a Warsaw satellite town working in Warsaw. She visits her 
adult son in Copenhagen; her second son was living near Berlin.
They have a different level of tolerance there and it’s totally obvi-
ous in public, with [two] men or [two] girls holding hands or 
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embracing, no one is shy about doing this and no one will attack 
them for it . . .  . I changed, and my children changed me [laughs]. 
As I mentioned earlier, I grew up in communist times, when the 
propaganda was that Poland was good and the West was bad, but 
thanks to the fact that first one and now my second child has gone 
abroad my opinion on tolerance and even that I am more open to 
everything . . .  . Now I’m quite different. I look at life differently.
Eliza, aged 26, a cleaner and carer without a complete secondary 
education, had spent seven years in Madrid, where she had often social-
ised with fellow Poles, her ex-neighbours from the same poor housing 
estate in Grajewo. Despite her ‘unfavourable’ socio-demographic features, 
when interviewed in 2012 she displayed a similarly open disposition as 
Jolanta, making no disparaging comments about other nationalities. Her 
mother, who – as mentioned in chapter 7 – had slimmed successfully in 
Spain, had also caught Eliza’s enthusiasm:
I really enjoy speaking Spanish. I’ve got lots of friends who phone 
me on Skype, we speak Spanish. My mother really likes it when I chat 
in Spanish. She says, ‘Translate it for me, translate it!’ [laughs] She 
watches those Mexican-Spanish soaps and says, ‘Translate what they 
are saying!’ . . .  You can make friends with great people, Chinese, 
other people, various. I had lots of friends. And there are lots of 
Poles, including from Grajewo, an awful lot. Even from our estate. 
Almost half our estate is in one city. When we met one another in a 
bar it was like we were in Grajewo . . .  I met lots of Spaniards, really 
nice people, and even made friends with a very nice, what’s the 
word, Brazilian girl, from Brazil, she worked in a bar . . .  . And there 
were lots of Ukrainians, including some who became very good 
friends.
As a migrant cleaner, Eliza constantly encountered non-Spaniards 
in Madrid. Wessendorf (2015), in an article titled ‘All the People Speak 
Bad English’, refers to ‘cornershop cosmopolitanism’ – sometimes known 
as ‘everyday multiculturalism’ – to describe the taken-for-granted and 
pragmatic approach to super-diversity common in parts of London. There 
is no majority population, and everyone is a member of a minority. It is 
this lived quality of cosmopolitanism, and the experiences of sociabil-
ity between different groups, that is the most efficient at entrenching 
it in some people’s mindsets  –  cosmopolitanism through practice. 
Rzepnikowska (2016) also illustrates this for Manchester and Barce-
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lona, through simple examples such as Polish manual workers exchang-
ing plants with non-Polish neighbours, or going out for meals with their 
work team.
Leszek, a Wrocław builder with vocational secondary education, 
illustrated his point that English people were friendlier than Poles abroad 
by describing favourite clients from when he worked as a plumber in 
London:
An English man, well, he was of Jamaican origin but born in Eng-
land, and his wife was black too, but she was German. We worked 
for him, and they were really great people. Every day we’d go to their 
house at eight but before starting work we’d drink coffee, have a 
chat, tell them about ourselves, they were really nice, they smiled a 
lot, and always pleased with our work.
In less cosmopolitan settings abroad, interethnic tensions are often 
greater. However, my interviews suggested that the poorest Polish 
migrants, reflecting upon the injustice of racism they encountered in such 
places, could arrive at the conclusion, not that Poles should be particu-
larly privileged for being white (see above), but that people of all nations 
should be treated equally. One such case was Iwona, aged 39, who had 
lived for 14 years in ethnically diverse but – unlike Madrid or London – not 
super-diverse southern Italy. Like Eliza, she had left Grajewo immediately 
after school, without taking her secondary school leaving exam.
If you live in the south of Italy, there’s racism. There is racism. Even 
though it’s supposed to be such a civilised country, the West, but it’s 
not true. They don’t like us, or Arabs, or Turks, Albanians, Ukraini-
ans, no one! Only themselves! . . .  I had different friends, Italian, 
Albanian, Ukrainian – that was the only way. I lived there a long time 
so knew everyone local . . .  . That racism was the worst thing, in 
offices, if a Polish woman showed up they treated her differently, 
could you wait because this man has come in – but I came first! . . . 
Why did they treat me like that? How am I worse? A person doesn’t 
feel that they are worse! Just because they don’t know the language. 
If you came here, I wouldn’t treat you like that. It should depend on 
character, what a person is like.
This passage shows Iwona’s capacity for reflexivity, but the interview, 
which took place in the presence of her relative, also a former migrant, 
turned into a conversation between the two of them which indicated 
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how, in families with multiple migration experiences (and in high- 
migration locations like Grajewo) returnees compare notes about life 
abroad, which can also develop ideas about equality.
tomAsz: I worked for good farmers, they understood me, there 
wasn’t any of that racism. There was a young farmer, he was 32 
I think, and his 60-year-old father . . .  . He didn’t drive us on, like 
some Germans, schneller, schneller! Everything was relaxed, we’d 
chat over meals . . .  . He did know Polish swear words. He knew 
some common words like ‘ladder’, and ‘come on’, which I’d say to 
my friend, he knew those basic things . . .  . Usually in Germany 
the Germans eat separately from the Poles or other foreigners. In 
our case, no: they’d wait to have dinner until we came and then 
we’d all eat together.
iWonA: In our case we did sit separately.
The above examples are of working-class migrants who were well 
embedded in the destination society and in some cases had gone abroad 
when they were still young. Being abroad temporarily – for example, as 
a construction worker moving from site to site in different countries – 
unsurprisingly leads to more superficial contacts and impressions, no doubt 
often reinforced by a sense of loneliness. Superficial contacts can entrench 
the idea that Poland is best and that foreigners are cold and unfriendly. For 
example, in Limanowa in 2013, Jerzy, an unemployed builder with a uni-
versity degree, commented, ‘People live differently abroad. No one cares 
about anyone else or talks to them. But in Poland family ties are strong’. 
Andrzej, another unemployed builder (without higher education) inter-
viewed in Limanowa, remarked, ‘More people would stay in Norway but 
they’re all afraid about their children, however. Children are the most 
important thing, at least, definitely for Poles’.
Superficial impressions of family and religious celebrations abroad 
can reinforce feelings that Polish is best. For example, Grażyna, a retired 
civil servant and stayer who lived in Wrocław but whose daughter lived in 
Germany, reminisced, ‘Twenty years ago, I was in Germany for Christmas. 
Oh dear. They had no traditions! We were invited to a German family 
[for Christmas dinner] but it was such a modest snack, as if in Poland a 
friend had phoned and said she’d drop by for coffee.’
This perception of western Europe is already being conveyed to Poles 
in Poland by some priests and politicians and, though it would not make 
sense to argue on economic grounds against migration to the West in a 
place like Limanowa, assertions about a cold and alien Western culture 
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sometimes do not fall on deaf ears. Andrzej’s comments about children 
quoted in the previous paragraph relate to the fact that such fears are 
intensified by stories circulating about Polish children being taken into 
care by supposedly overzealous Norwegian authorities (Erdal 2015) – an 
example of a social remittance emanating from a migrant milieu that 
stokes xenophobia in Poland.
However, people who do not have much exposure to natives in the 
destination country can also pick up ‘cosmopolitan’ attitudes, as was the 
case of Lech, a Grajewo builder with a basic vocational education, in his 
fifties. Forced by poverty to migrate repeatedly to support his large fam-
ily, Lech had worked in several countries abroad, loved to travel, could 
make himself understood by sign language and asserted that people every-
where were different. He pointed out that he had worked for 10 different 
German employers and 3 Polish ones, and they had all behaved differently 
to each another. On the other hand, stressing the connections between 
them, Lech pointed out that building work was basically the same in every 
country: ‘You put one brick on top of another.’ Similarly, Joanna, a 55-year-
old unemployed manual worker in Limanowa, who occasionally worked 
in a garden centre in Manchester and who had good relations with her 
English workmates (one of whom she mentioned to be learning Polish), 
asserted that work was work: which country it took place in was ‘irrele-
vant’ to her.
Kuhn (2012, 1005) cites Pichler (2009) to the effect that, in 
Kuhn’s paraphrase, ‘while highly educated people generally hold highly 
cosmopolitan attitudes, there is a much greater variance in attitudes 
among low-educated people. They seem to be more influenced by per-
sonal experiences.’ The important point here is that the outcome hangs 
on migration as a personal experience (i.e. on the particularities of each 
person’s personality traits, migration circumstances and transnational 
social field).
As already discussed in chapters 3 and 7, the principle of exchange 
and equality is important in facilitating successful social remitting. In par-
ticular, migrants and their stayer associates are more likely to welcome 
contact with foreigners if they do not feel that they are always in some-
one else’s home, and can invite foreigners back to Poland and welcome 
them with hospitality. Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiedzki (2009, 130), 
for example, writing about live-in domestics in Leuven, describe how they 
became family friends of their employers and invited them to Poland, lead-
ing those employers to see Poland as ‘green instead of grey’. Ahmadov 
and Sasse (2016, 17), in their interviews with 22 Poles in the United King-
dom and 12 of their close contacts in Poland, found that:
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for most of the interviewees with international (including partly 
British) networks this wish to inform includes taking their friends 
to Poland. The resulting increase in awareness about Poland among 
non-Poles from the host society represents an indirect and as yet 
underappreciated form of social remittances. It is mirrored by the 
knowledge about life in the UK exhibited by many of the interviewed 
family members and friends in Poland.
Among my sample, Tomasz from Grajewo, for example, recounted how 
his two employers had separately visited him in Poland, describing how 
rural north-east Poland looked through their German eyes.
I was driving the car, and we saw a horse and cart. It was a few years 
back, when that was a normal sight in Grajewo, but in Germany 
horses are just for leisure. And he said ‘Wait, wait!’ and quickly got 
out his camera and took a picture . . .  He was amazed. In the West 
agriculture is different, here in the Mazury Region it was like in the 
nineteenth century; the German had only heard about such things 
from his grandparents.
Lucyna, who had returned from Dublin two years previously, 
explained how her family was still in touch with many Irish friends and 
had recently invited one family with six children to stay with them in 
Wrocław. Thanks to their belief in ‘Polish hospitality’ they would not let 
their friends stay in a hotel. Wanda, a 63-year-old Wrocław retired social 
worker whose daughter had married a British man, similarly described 
how even when her son-in-law’s parents had insisted on staying in a hotel 
in Wrocław, she had made sure to extend constant ‘Polish’ hospitality: they 
ate all their meals at her house. Wanda also described how she and her 
daughter swapped packets of flower seeds, a botanical exchange that to 
Wanda symbolised the intertwining of Polish and English culture. Simi-
larly, in August 2016, Iwona, a 34-year-old psychologist and Italophile, 
described how her Italian relatives were currently holidaying and enjoying 
hospitality in Lublin.
They were in Kraków two years ago. They saw Krakow. Paulo’s 
mother wanted to see Auschwitz, so they visited that part of Poland, 
and Paulo was at a Polish wedding, a friend’s wedding, so they saw 
all of that. Last year they spent two weeks at the seaside, here in 
Poland, so they saw the seaside, with the children. They visit my par-
ents, and see Lublin. On Sunday they are coming to our house for 
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dinner because on 1 September they’re flying home . . .  . They went 
to a country fair . . .  . They do sightseeing when they’re here.
In other cases, Polish students living abroad invite their friends and 
classmates of various nationalities to stop over with their parents based 
in Polish tourist destinations. For example, Maria and Sławomir listed a 
string of friends of their daughter’s from her student days abroad who had 
stayed in their flat or (when this overflowed) their allotment shed in 
Warsaw. They recalled all their nationalities and concluded ‘those were 
splendid times’. When Beata attended her son’s wedding in Spain, she 
found that she already knew many of the guests because she had hosted 
them in Wrocław. Rosalia, a former Erasmus student, framed her activity 
in the Erasmus Student Network in Wrocław in terms of exchange:
Usually if someone comes back from abroad, if we’re talking about 
Erasmus, because that’s what I have had more dealings with, as soon 
as they come back they want to meet foreigners [here] . . .  . When 
I came back [from Lithuania to Poland] and began working with 
Erasmus students all the events I organised were to promote Poland.
Similarly, grandparents on visits abroad to look after grandchildren 
take the opportunity to publicise Poland. Ewa, mentioned in chapter 7 for 
her visits to the United States, recounted a story of chatting to a hospital 
nurse, her daughter’s colleague, about Wrocław, and subsequently, as an 
encouragement to visit, sending the nurse a postcard and a Polish flag. 
Both made their way, apparently permanently, onto the hospital notice-
board. School visits abroad, even from small towns, are also opportunities 
for gestures of Polish hospitality. For example, Halina, aged 57, unem-
ployed and married to a factory worker in Limanowa, from a family where 
no one had migrated, mentioned approvingly that her daughter had stayed 
with a ‘very nice’ French Moroccan family to whom she had sent a spe-
cially baked loaf of rye bread.
Obviously it is easier for those Poles who live in tourist destinations 
such Warsaw, Wrocław or Lublin to meet and refresh their acquaintance 
with foreigners, particularly when, as in all the above-mentioned cases, 
this is convivial contact, often at home. Additionally, migration experience 
can serve to support projects for Polish cities to rediscover and memorial-
ise their multi-ethnic past. Galent and Kubicki (2010, 223), writing about 
Wrocław, observe that ‘it is very characteristic that most of the “new urban 
middle class” started discovering the German heritage of the city relatively 
recently and often after the experience of living in other cities’. They quote 
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an interviewee who mentions, ‘I had no idea about the history of Wrocław, 
I discovered it when I lived in Berlin, I was really shocked that everything 
was nearly the same’ (Galent and Kubicki 2010, 230). They suggest that 
a significant share of inhabitants perceives the biggest and most Polish 
dynamic cities as vibrant and to some extent cosmopolitan centres of cul-
ture (epitomised in the official tag, ‘Wrocław the meeting place’), but also 
as part of transnational space. This transnational space is understood as 
a single European space with circulating cultural influences.
Some locals, however, do not have a stake in such projects (see, e.g. 
Fleming 2012 on Łódź). Wrocław, the 2016 European Capital of Culture, 
is also well known for its far-right activists. Moreover, an increased 
number of micropublics (see chapter 4) are marked by intolerance – micro-
publics such as far-right organisations and websites, where returnees can 
spread racism acquired abroad. Wiesław, whose comments on Sri Lankans 
were quoted above, was a barman, giving him ample opportunity to spread 
his views. The formation of a racist transnational social space was a phe-
nomenon commented upon by Marek, a lecturer interviewed in Wrocław, 
reporting a conversation overheard after a nationalist youth march:
The daughter was explaining to her mother the issue of whether she 
should go abroad. And she said she’d like to go if only she didn’t feel 
such a patriot (she was a nationalist here). But she’d heard that in the 
UK there were Polish nationalist groups and if she did migrate she’d 
join up with them. See what’s happening! It’s a bit of a paradox . . .  . 
Even nationalists are happy to migrate so they can join up with 
other nationalists.
In other cases, return migrants or visitors might like to diffuse ideas 
about tolerance, but fail to do so because they anticipate resistance (Gara-
pich 2016b). Residents sense a contrast between their local area and 
places abroad – although they can often extend the contrast beyond the 
local area to ‘Poland’ as a whole, as in the following statement by Jan, aged 
25, a returnee from Sweden and other countries to Limanowa: ‘I like the 
way of life abroad. Here in Poland it’s a tiny bit intolerant, of course you 
can’t generalise, but we have a slightly different mentality’. Particularly 
for LGBT people, location in Poland can be very significant. Marek, a 
return migrant from London to Poznań and then Warsaw (interviewed in 
English) made the following observation:
In England, yeah, people are open-minded, tolerant, and I’m think-
ing other, more sincere, open. You can speak what you think. In 
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Poland, no, oh no, no! . . .  Poznań is quite safe and tolerant place; 
there are some gay clubs, but in Poland the most safe and good place 
to live for the guy is Warsaw . . .  It’s better than it was and it’s chang-
ing year by year. Young people are tolerant, but older they’re think-
ing something strange. My grandmother still thinks that gay are like 
krasnaly ‘dwarves’, my family don’t know about me, no, cos I know 
what they think about that.
Finally, it is hard to avoid the impression that shallow, rather than 
deep cosmopolitanism, is a common outcome of migration experience. 
People who generalise on the basis of their own migration experience, 
even when trying to avoid stereotypes, nonetheless often hold certain 
essentialist assumptions that national character is inborn and unchang-
ing. It is normal for non-social scientists to believe that national character 
‘really exists’ in some objective way. In the words of Fox and Miller-Idriss 
(2008, 539), these are ‘taken-for-granted understandings of the nation . . . 
understandings of the nation cloaked by the fog of common sense’.
robert (AGed 34, lublin): I was curious and I tried to observe 
everything . . .  I don’t want to generalise about all Dutch people, 
but those I knew, and I knew quite a big group . . .  [He describes 
some characteristics]
Anne: But do you think there is a Polish culture and a Dutch culture, 
a Polish way of behaving and a Dutch one? Perhaps there is some-
thing in common?
robert: I don’t see any similarities. Europe, yes. The Christian cul-
tural area. Protestantism in Holland, Catholicism in Poland. Dutch 
people don’t go to church much. We always go. Anything in com-
mon? [thinks] I didn’t see similarities. Perhaps I’m mistaken. But 
similarities? . . .  Out of curiosity, do you see any similarities 
between England and Poland?
Dorota, another 34-year-old well-educated Lublin interviewee, mentioned 
that she was ashamed of Poles in the United Kingdom, adding: ‘But I also 
saw all the vices (przywary) of other nations! English people’s laziness, 
and dirt, and food wasting. The hastiness and carelessness of Syrians, the 
chaos, lots of different things, French self-absorption, each nation some-
thing. But each has splendid features too.’ It is hardly surprising to find 
that common sense essentialism inhibits acceptance of hybridity and 
understanding of the interconnectedness between people, irrespective 
of their ethno-national belonging. In fact, this may well be particularly 
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characteristic of well-educated returnees who prided themselves, while 
abroad, in finding out about different ‘mentalities’.
4. Religion: Polish trends
Church attendance and self-declared religiosity11 in Poland are high com-
pared with elsewhere in Europe. Surveys indicate a slight decline in 
some dimensions of religiosity since EU accession in 2004, although over 
90 per cent of Poles in Poland continue to believe in God: 92 per cent in 
2014 compared with 96 per cent in 2005 (Boguszewski 2015a, 37). Most 
go to church at least once a month, though weekly church attendance has 
become a minority habit since about 2000, with self-reported attendance 
standing in 2015 at 47 per cent. According to European Values Survey 
data, 92 per cent of Poles in 2012 identified as Roman Catholics, though 
people under 30 were slightly less likely to do so (90 per cent).12 On the 
other hand, they are more dogmatic, being more likely than middle-aged 
people to believe that ‘the only acceptable (słuszna) religion is my religion’ 
(36 per cent in 2012).13
However, Poles increasingly consider their faith to be their own 
affair, not needing mediation by the Church, with 52 per cent in 2014 
agreeing that ‘I am a believer in my own way’, an impressive increase of 
20 percentage points since 2005. Only 39 per cent stated that ‘I am a 
believer and I adhere to the Church’s teachings’ (cf. 66 per cent in 2005) 
(Boguszewski 2015a, 40). More people now believe one can be religious 
without attending church (Marody and Mandes 2012, 198), and an 
increasing majority, while remaining opposed to rights for sexual minor-
ities, do not observe the Church’s teachings on sex, birth control and 
divorce, and would like the Church to revise them (Roguska 2015). To 
some extent they also celebrate commercialised ‘new’ and non-religious 
holidays, imported from the West, such as Hallowe’en and Valentine’s Day. 
However, Łaciak (2015, 54–8) reports hostile opinions towards these 
holidays among the Arcimowicz, Bieńko and Łaciak (2015) survey 
respondents. The exception was Chełmno, one of the fieldwork sites. 
Here, interviewees enthusiastically supported the town’s recent efforts, 
with EU funds, to rebrand itself as a town for lovers, taking advantage of 
local relics of St. Valentine.
National averages are unhelpful for understanding religiosity in geo-
graphically divided Poland, since religious adherence is much higher 
outside large cities and in the east. Nine out of ten inhabitants of Podkar-
pacie attend church at least once a month, compared with half in West 
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Pomerania, or in cities of over 500,000 (Czapiński 2015a, 267). However, 
only a minority even of villagers (19 per cent) and right-wing voters (27 
per cent) uncritically accept the Church’s moral teachings (2013 figures, 
Grabowska 2015c, 159).
Norris and Inglehart (2004, 131) argue that ‘there has been a long-
term decline of religiosity across succeeding generations in post-Commu-
nist Europe’ as societies become more affluent and secure, but they also 
argue that this decline is less marked in some countries: ‘It is the more 
homogenous religious cultures, exemplified by the role of Catholicism in 
Poland, which have best-preserved faith in God and habitual church 
attendance.’ If Norris and Inglehart are correct that religious homogene-
ity is a key factor perpetuating faith in God and church attendance in 
Poland, one might expect exposure to religious variety abroad, as a result 
of mass migration since 2004, to weaken this trend.
5. Migration influences on religion in Poland
Polish migration to more secularised countries in western Europe has an 
impact on sections of the Catholic Church, in the sense that it promotes 
alarm  –  alarm about encroaching materialism, about permissiveness, 
about atheism, and about a general loss of Polish identity. A study of 
Church documents and press releases from 2006 to 2013 uncovered con-
sistent and comprehensive condemnation of migration; only twice did 
senior Church figures refer to its positive effects (Lisak 2015, 118–9). 
Globally, migration does not in itself have a predictable effect on religios-
ity. Many migrants maintain their religious beliefs unchanged, some 
become less practising, and in some cases less believing, while others find 
religion becoming more important to them. One would expect the same 
to be true of Poles, although Mole et al. (2017) and Röder and Lubbers 
(2015), regarding Poles in the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Neth-
erlands, suggest some increase in religious practice over time spent 
abroad. Religiosity among Poles abroad is discussed in chapter 9. The 
main argument is that religious belief seems to become more individual-
ised and privatised as church attendance declines and as Poles become 
more familiar with other faiths or simply with different versions of Roman 
Catholicism.
If one accepts Grabowska’s (2015b) argument that the most impor-
tant religious trend is that belief and church attendance continue to be high 
overall in Poland, then a search for migration influences should presum-
ably concentrate on reasons why migration helps maintain these still 
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impressive numbers. It is not hard to find such reasons. Many Poles abroad 
have ample opportunities to maintain transnational ties and lead a ‘Polish’ 
life, without having to engage with non-Polish variants of religious 
practice. Those who do not attend church often have practical motiva-
tions. All in all, it seems probable that many Polish return migrants have 
not found their faith disturbed. This is why they attend church as normal 
after they return, and their return maintains the proportion of practis-
ing religious people in the local population. Moreover, people often come 
back to rural and small-town locations where social sanctions for non- 
attendance at church remain strong, and it is easiest simply to slot back 
into old habits, as suggested by my interviews and observations and, 
for example, by Grabowska, Garapich, et al. (2017) and Krasnodębska 
(2012, 132). In their study of three small towns, Grabowska, Garapich, 
et al. (2017, 92) contrast Pszczyna, where ‘lapsed Catholics or agnostics 
openly declared that they no longer practice their Catholic religion’, with 
Trzebnica and Sokółka, where return migrants seemed to be under more 
pressure to conform. For example, in Trzebnica neighbours were unwel-
coming when children who had returned from the United Kingdom 
tried to go trick-or-treating on Hallowe’en (Grabowska, Garapich, et al. 
2017, 165).
Nonetheless, even in the most Catholic parts of Poland the trend 
is towards condoning behaviour that does not conform to strict Catho-
lic teachings on family life. One reason is the pragmatic acceptance of 
migration as a livelihood strategy, even if this means going against tradi-
tional gender norms. 55 per cent of respondents in my 2008 opinion poll 
in Podkarpacie agreed that it was acceptable for lone mothers in finan-
cial difficulties to temporarily leave their children to work abroad (White 
2017, 69). The value accorded to higher education in contemporary 
Poland trumps conventions about mothers not migrating and led inter-
viewees to condone migration to pay for adult children’s education. Indi-
vidual female interviewees expressed the view that women, including 
themselves, should take advantage of opportunities to work abroad even 
at the expense of their wifely roles.
If I . . .  can’t find work . . .  and because my husband [a coach driver] 
is hardly ever at home . . .  I’ll get my mother-in-law [a cleaner in Ger-
many] to fix something up . . .  My husband isn’t keen on it. Even 
though he’s not at home a lot, he prefers me to be there when he is! 
(Luiza, Limanowa)
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6. Conclusion
Galent and Kubicki (2010, 217), describing Poland soon after EU accession, 
made the following argument:
Polish urban centres are going through a much more dynamic pro-
cess of social change than the population of smaller towns and vil-
lages, where a multicultural environment and pluralism is present 
only via stereotypical images and where cultural or social strange-
ness is still seen through the prism of threat, whereas in the case of 
urban culture this heterogeneity and strangeness are associated with 
such positive meanings such as creativity and innovation.
Considering the mass exposure to foreign countries of smaller towns and 
villages in recent years, it seems that Galent and Kubicki’s analysis may 
now be out of date. Of course, cities, especially the largest ones, have a 
particularly high share of well-educated, well-travelled, well-off and lib-
eral inhabitants, so it is hardly surprising if cities also score highly on indi-
cators of openness. Their residents also have more opportunities than 
most Poles to rub shoulders with foreigners in Poland. Nonetheless, as 
argued in chapter 7, migration also has a levelling role. Given the right 
type of conditions abroad, migration experience can shape more tolerant 
attitudes towards diversity, even among small-town residents and villag-
ers, and even among working-class urban Poles who might not otherwise 
have much exposure to difference. This is particularly the case in some 
‘super-diverse’ cities abroad, where there is no dominant ethnic group, and in 
convivial settings where Poles and others spend time together enjoyably. 
As direct, lived experiences, these can leave a strong impression on migrants 
and visiting stayers, supporting Kuhn’s (2012) assertion that less educated 
people become more open to difference mostly as the result of personal 
experiences. In some cases their attitudes can be classed as ‘deep cosmo-
politanism’, since they include a ‘recognition of interconnectedness’ – for 
example, when they reject racism because they encounter it abroad, so 
can put themselves in the shoes of others. Migration therefore serves as 
an ‘eye-opener’ for individual members of social groups who, as a majority, 
often show up as intolerant in survey data.
Although such limited survey evidence as exists tends to support the 
idea that Polish migrants are more likely than not to acquire more 
open-to-difference attitudes abroad, and although the massive recent 
increase in English-language knowledge makes Poles well placed to get 
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to know and understand foreign cultures, of course it is important not to 
exaggerate trends towards openness in Poland. Many of the changes 
towards more tolerance captured in Polish national survey data are quite 
small scale, and there are also counter-trends. Migration (particularly 
when migrants have difficult experiences abroad, for example in their 
workplaces, or have little meaningful contact with local people) can also 
support the spread of intolerance. Since few Poles would argue that migra-
tion is economically harmful for individual households, anti-migration 
discourse in Poland naturally focuses on cultural threats to national iden-
tity, which can reinforce racism and homophobia brought back to Poland 
by return migrants and their visitors.
Religion, too, is often associated with socially conservative opinions, 
although religiosity in Poland is changing, particularly in some locations. 
When return migrants who have lost the habit of church attendance 
abroad return to a large Polish city or a region such as West Pomerania, 
they are more able to continue not to attend church regularly than if they 
return to a village or one of the more religious regions of eastern Poland. 
Overall, it seems, religious belief, partly as a result of migration and expo-
sure to religious difference abroad, is becoming more personalised and 
less mediated by the Catholic Church. Hence it should not be assumed that 
continuing high levels of self-identification as Catholics among Poles 
equates to agreement with the more intolerant views expressed by some 
priests, or is a barrier to the adoption of more tolerant attitudes to diversity.
Overall, this chapter has illustrated once again how helpful it is to 
apply the insights of receiving country scholarship to understand the 
impact of migration on sending countries. It also illustrates again the 
diversity of ‘Poland’. On the one hand, openness to difference cannot 
be understood without reference to socio-demographic characteristics 
such as age, gender and level of education. On the other hand, trends in 
religiosity have to be understood in the context of geography.
Notes
1 A Pew Research Center survey (2017, 43) conducted in the second half of 2015 
found that 57 per cent agreed and 34 per cent disagreed that ‘it is better for us if 
society consists of people from the same nationality, and who have the same religion 
and culture’.
2 Preparedness to house refugees in Poland had also dipped in the mid-1990s, but 
had been rising since 1996 (Hall and Mikulska-Jolles 2016, 4–5). However, the 
refugee flows (resulting mostly from the wars in Chechnya) and the international 
political situation were very different in the 1990s, making the periods hard to 
compare. CBOS surveys show Poles are readier to accept Ukrainian refugees than 
non-Europeans. For more discussion, see chapter 10.
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 3 See, e.g. Mau, Mewes and Zimmermann (2008) and Kuhn (2015). Unfortunately 
‘trans national’ is used slightly differently by different scholars.
 4 Those with over 500,000 population: Warsaw, Kraków, Łódź, Wrocław and 
Poznań. Gołębiowska (2014, 24–5) comments that ‘previous research consistently 
finds that subgroup differences in tolerance are related to one’s area of residence, 
but little is known about why these differences occur. The principal explanation for 
the link is that a greater proportion of urban residents report greater openness to 
diversity because they have greater opportunities for exposure to diversity’.
 5 See, for example, Omyła-Rudzka (2017, 8) on attitudes to other nations, and 
Omyła-Rudzka (2015, 7) on whether it is possible to have two home countries. In 
the latter case, young respondents were also especially likely to agree that it was.
 6 Respondents were aged 17–21, in formal education. Unfortunately the questions 
about tolerance in 2013 and 2016 were not the same as had been asked in the 
previous study, Youth 2008 (CBOS 2009).
 7 The assumption that cosmopolitanism is a feature only of elites is also linked to 
the somewhat different understanding of ‘cosmopolitan’ as someone participating 
in elite consumption practices.
 8 German, however, has slightly declined, as indicated in the sources referenced in 
this section.
 9 2005 was the first year that Diagnoza Społeczna gathered data on language 
competency, and their report presents ‘active and passive knowledge’ as one 
combined figure.
 10 School curriculums in some countries are more geared towards teaching tolerance 
of diversity, and Gołębiowska (2014, 19–20) argues that Poland has not been a 
leader in this respect.
 11 Borowik (2010, 273) argues that if Polish respondents answered surveys more 
honestly, levels of religiosity in Poland would seem comparable with those in 
other Catholic European countries such as Spain, Ireland and Italy.
 12 Question V144.
 13 EVS Question V154. <30:36.4%, 30–49:25.3%, >50:45.5%. This question was 
not asked in previous surveys.
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Polish society abroad
Anne White
1. Introduction
This chapter argues that one result of migration from Poland in recent 
years is the formation of ‘Polish society abroad’. Society abroad is not a 
unique historical phenomenon. In the Polish case it is foreshadowed by 
early twentieth-century Polish society in the United States, analysed by 
Thomas and Znaniecki in The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1918–
20, 1984). However, ‘society’ would not be a suitable label for other Poles 
abroad, such as refugees from World War II and the communist regime. 
They could better be described as a diaspora, according to criteria dis-
cussed in chapter 3, since many were characterised by a strong collective 
ethos, a ‘passionate commitment to remaining Polish’ (Temple 2001, 389) 
and a sense of exile from the homeland (Burrell 2006; Lehr 2015; Sword 
1996; Sword, Davies and Ciechanowski 1989). They were also much more 
separate from Polish society in Poland. As late as the 1980s, many Poles 
abroad maintained a strong anti-communist identity. They took a keen 
interest in the Solidarity movement and its suppression, sending aid to 
Poles in Poland (Burrell 2002, 66–7). The impression of a united anti-com-
munist Polishness was perpetuated by diaspora organisations that spoke 
on behalf of fellow Poles, though many younger Poles assimilated into 
the receiving societies and often referred to their parents as living in a 
‘time warp’ (Sword 1996, 216). Today, Polish society in foreign countries 
such as the United Kingdom can be considered to some degree a micro-
cosm of Polish society in Poland, even if it also has specific local charac-
teristics.
Since migrants are not usually referred to as ‘societies’, the term 
needs justification. I explain why it might be less misleading than other 
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terms, and, if used carefully and not too literally, provide an analytical 
lens. Previous chapters have mentioned how social change occurs among 
Poles abroad, and the circulation of influences between Polish society in 
Poland and elsewhere. However, the focus in those chapters was on indi-
vidual migrants as social remitters. The term ‘Polish society abroad’ is a 
guide to understanding these phenomena collectively.
The chapter is not about social change in receiving societies, 
although this has an impact on Poles abroad, most obviously when 
 hostility is directed at migrants, as in Ireland and the United Kingdom 
following the 2008 global economic crisis and the ensuing austerity 
policies. Nor does the chapter discuss the impact of Poles on receiving 
societies, since this is not within our remit. Such impacts can be signifi-
cant, ranging from indirect political consequences such as Britain’s exit 
from the EU to more inconspicuous changes in practice, which constitute 
social remittances and deserve further research. One example would be 
the reversal in the decline of breastfeeding in Ireland. This is a direct 
result of migration and the high rates of breastfeeding among Poles and 
other EU migrants (Brick and Nolan 2014), which increases the share of 
breastfeeding mothers in Irish society. Qualitative research is needed to 
show whether there is cultural diffusion as Polish practices spread among 
ethnic Irish women. Polish grandmothers on birth visits encourage 
their daughters in Ireland to breastfeed (Kerrins, Share and Williams 
2016), but does the example of Polish women breastfeeding encourage 
ethnic Irish mothers to do the same? Do Polish mothers support Irish 
friends who are also mothers to continue breastfeeding?
This chapter discusses why Poles living abroad today can be consid-
ered part of ‘Polish society’, and analyses the particular characteristics of 
Polish society abroad. Poles abroad today are often believed, and some-
times seem to be, more liberal, less religious and more individualistic than 
Poles in Poland. They are therefore sometimes seen as ‘less Polish’ by Poles 
who have a normative view of Polish identity as Catholic, unique and not 
combinable with other identities. Poles living abroad have to take into 
account such expectations, so they do influence the nature of the Polish 
migrant experience, as discussed in this chapter. However, if we view 
Polish migrants abroad in a different way, as mobile members of two or 
several modern European societies, people whose mobile and migrant 
identities are often more significant than their Polishness, we gain a better 
sense of what Polish society abroad is like. First, rather than seeing it as 
more individualistic, it would be better to see it as offering more choice of 
lifestyles and livelihoods. Second, it is important to look beneath shared 
nationality and see internal differences within the Polish population 
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abroad based on cultural capital, income, age, gender, sexual orientation 
and place of residence. Agency and mobility are not distributed equally 
among Polish migrants, and intersections between Polish and other iden-
tities crucially affect the nature of society abroad.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses contours 
of the ‘society abroad’ concept. Section 3 briefly describes an alterna-
tive approach, constructing typologies of Polish migrants, which was 
appropriate when the recent migration wave began, but which is now 
outdated. Section  4 investigates the idea that Polish society abroad is 
socio-demographically a microcosm of Polish society in Poland, although 
to some extent differently stratified. Section  5 examines migration as 
escape from social control, but considers how nonetheless Poles are con-
scious of the gaze of other Poles abroad. Section 6 discusses the Catholic 
Church and, more generally, the changing Polish cultural spaces span-
ning Poland and foreign countries. These often have typically migrant 
rather than Polish features; for example, the already sizeable body of post-
2004 Polish migrant fiction can be seen as a subsection of global migrant 
literature. Finally, Section 7 examines how ‘diaspora’ organisations and 
institutions evolve and how new organisations, institutions and networks 
emerge that are typical for ‘society abroad’ – society which, as I have 
argued, is socio-demographically complex and tightly tied both to Poland 
and the receiving country. This includes social movements that span 
borders, actively working for social change in Poland.
2. The concept of ‘society abroad’
As this book has shown, there is a social space encompassing Poland and 
other countries, in particular popular destinations such as Ireland, Norway, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. To draw a sharp line at the state 
borders of Poland would be artificial, considering how often Poles com-
municate with friends and family across borders, or visit Poland or foreign 
countries for healthcare (Goodwin, Polek and Goodwin 2013; Osipovic 
2013), shopping, and so on, or swap their places of residence between 
Poland and foreign countries, despite an overall trend towards settlement 
in western Europe (White 2017, 237–40). Polish migrants often possess 
a sense of living lives in ‘Poland’ despite being far away. As described in 
chapter 7, stayers in Poland also feel they are living their own lives partly 
in foreign countries. In many cases Polish migrants resemble commuters. 
For example, Main (2016a, 75) describes how a woman based in Berlin, 
‘who has two small children, went every month for a week or two to visit 
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her parents in Poznań. She laughed that she visited them more often than 
her brother living in Warsaw.’
Empirical research suggests that most first-generation Poles abroad 
consider themselves Polish, even if they redefine what that means (e.g. 
Kempny 2010; Kusek 2015; Ryan 2010; White 2017; Wojtyńska 2011). 
They are positioning themselves as individuals in relation to some wider 
Polish entity. They often feel distant towards the Polish state (Fiń et al. 
2013), so this wider entity is the Polish nation. Their Polishness is a social 
identity, so it might seem obvious to see them as part of the society of their 
nation-state. A longitudinal survey among UK Poles asked directly whether 
respondents considered themselves on a four-point scale a ‘member of Pol-
ish society’; average agreement was 2.87 in 2007 (when respondents had 
been in the United Kingdom under three months) rising to 3.17 in 2009 
(Goodwin 2009). However, this survey was unusual: methodological 
nationalism, which still prevails in the social sciences, leads to the assump-
tion that the geographical bounds of a society are the nation-state’s bor-
ders. The convention is therefore that migrants are no longer members 
of their societies of origin. Thomas and Znaniecki, the pioneers of quali-
tative migration research, claimed, for example, that ‘the immigrant is no 
longer a member of the society from which he came, since he lives in the 
midst of American society’ (1918–20, 1984, 239). This has generally been 
assumed to be true by subsequent generations of scholars.
With regard to membership of the receiving society, Kucharczyk 
(2013, 10), in his introduction to a groundbreaking study of Polish civil 
society in the United Kingdom, argues that ‘Poles are becoming an inte-
gral part of the fabric of British society’. Nonetheless, migrants usually find 
it hard to gain acceptance as full members, at least not until they acquire 
citizenship. There is an expectation among scholars, policymakers and 
ordinary people that non-naturalised immigrants, who live outside the 
borders of their nation-state but are not full members of the receiving soci-
ety, should be grouped under some extra-societal ethnonational minor-
ity label. It is not so clear how to label such minority groups. Migrants are 
often assumed by themselves and others to belong to a ‘community’ or 
‘diaspora’. Both terms imply groups with tight interpersonal ties and a 
strong sense of common identity, based on ethnicity. In the United King-
dom, the usual term is ‘ethnic communities’. In countries and localities 
where multiculturalism is practised, official policy is to help ethnic com-
munities nest comfortably within the receiving society. In other places, 
where there is pressure to assimilate, migrant populations may feel 
collectively excluded from the mainstream, which can enhance a sense 
of shared collective identity (Portes and Sessenbrenner 1993). However, 
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as chapter 3 demonstrated, a strong sense of collective identity among 
co-ethnics abroad should not be taken for granted. The term ‘diaspora’ 
(and by extension also ‘community’) tends to represent an ideal type rather 
than reality (Morawska 2011), and empirical evidence suggests that 
migrants from CEE in western Europe today do not form actual diasporas.
Poles commonly distinguish between ‘Poles’ (in Poland, or just vis-
iting abroad) and ‘Polonia’ (Poles living permanently abroad).1 However, 
it seems strange to use a term that implies that a Pole in Berlin is part of 
the same community as a Pole in Melbourne, but lives a separate life from 
Poles in Poznań. Moreover, there is so much repeated and temporary 
migration, of indeterminate length, and it is so hard to say what counts 
as ‘settling’, that ‘living’ and ‘visiting’ abroad are often hard to distinguish. 
Given the realities of mobility and transnational existences today, com-
mon sense and empirical evidence suggest that migrants cannot be neatly 
sorted away from Poland and into some ‘community’, ‘diaspora’ or ‘Polo-
nia’ box.
Garapich (2013, 20–3) argues that Polish communities (as he terms 
them – społeczności) outside Poland today form an intrinsic component 
of Polish society as a whole. Discussing Polish sociologist Marody’s para-
digm of ‘three Polands’ – privatised Poland, state Poland and Poland on 
welfare benefits – Garapich suggests that a fourth Poland is ‘Poland in 
migration’. Hence the impact of contemporary migration on already 
existing Polish populations abroad is also part of the consequences of 
migration for ‘Poland’. Rakowski similarly notes (2016, 38) that a group 
unmentioned in Marody’s paradigm is ‘those unemployed who take farm-
ing and construction jobs in the EU countries’. Dunin-Wąsowicz (2013, 
101–2) refers to post-accession migration as a ‘fluid and dynamic social 
phenomenon of transnational dimensions which “happens” between 
Poland and the UK’.
Although ‘Poland in migration’ is a helpful concept, especially if the 
purpose is to position this population vis-à-vis Poles in Poland, I prefer 
‘Polish society abroad’ for several reasons. First, ‘Poland in migration’ 
seems to privilege Poles’ migrant identities. While these are important, 
nonetheless it is questionable whether they are of paramount importance 
in all situations, especially as people settle abroad. Using the term ‘Polish 
society abroad’ helps avoid seeing individual Polish people primarily as 
migrants. Second, using the word ‘society’ draws our attention to the social 
locations of Poles abroad – the social structures and power relations that 
to some extent shape people’s lives, such as a sense of social pressure from 
other Poles. Thinking sociologically also suggests the need to consider pro-
cesses of ‘resocialisation’ (Mole et  al. 2017) that may occur under the 
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influence of both the receiving society and co-ethnics abroad. Third, and 
bringing the discussion back to the main approach adopted in this book, 
using the term ‘Polish society abroad’ sheds light on the lives of Poles 
abroad by using information from Polish sociology about Polish society in 
Poland.
3. The stage of typology making, 2004–13
Around the time of Poland’s EU accession, UK-based researchers tended 
to sort Polish migrants into specific migrant types rather than seeing the 
phenomenon as Polish society arriving in the United Kingdom. The most 
popular typology, devised by Garapich (Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich 
2007), divided Poles into ‘hamsters’, or target earners on one-off visits; 
‘storks’, or circular migrants; ‘stayers’, intending to remain for the long 
term, though perhaps retiring to Poland; and, the largest category, ‘search-
ers’, or those with flexible plans. In other words, Poles in the United King-
dom were viewed not as a microcosm of Polish society in Poland but in 
terms of their migration motives and intentions. These did, however, imply 
a certain socio-demographic baggage, particularly with reference to social 
class and age. Young and well-educated people, in particular, fell mostly 
into the ‘searcher’ category. Luthra, Platt and Salamońska (2014), using 
the term ‘migrant classes’, applied a similar typology to the United King-
dom, Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands. They identified student, 
family and ‘adventurer’ types alongside the circular, temporary and 
settled labour migrants.2 Other scholars, writing about different coun-
tries, have advocated slightly different typologies. Engbersen et al. (2013), 
for example, taking as their point of departure the strength of migrants’ 
transnational ties, identified ‘bi-nationals’, settlers, ‘footloose’ and cir-
cular migrants in the Netherlands.
Typologies can be useful analytical tools, especially for small-scale 
qualitative research, but they are inherently problematic because they 
accentuate boundaries between individuals, however much their creators 
explain that individual migrants cross from group to group. Typologies 
tend to privilege certain clusters of identities (e.g. ‘flexible university grad-
uate’, ‘poorly integrated seasonal worker’). By contrast, for example, 
Main (2016a, 66), writing about Berlin and Barcelona, suggests that
a combination of expectations and aspirations make up migration 
motivations, which in the case of Polish women migrating to Berlin 
and Barcelona have been found to centre on education, relationships, 
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employment and a desire for adventure. The four are not mutually 
exclusive, rather the dimensions are differently accentuated in 
individuals’ own life stories.
Similarly, I found that mothers with little education from small towns, on 
the face of it ‘typical labour migrants’, often displayed a hedonistic and 
adventurous streak, despite the fact that they framed their migration 
decisions as being for the good of their families (White 2010a). Szczy-
gielska (2013, 226) found similar mixed attitudes among her middle-aged 
women migrants from Starachowice,3 as did Małek in her 2011 study of 
women working in Italy.
Even if typologies were helpful in understanding migration to the 
United Kingdom circa 2004, they have outlived their usefulness. Many 
Poles are now more or less settled, in the United Kingdom and other West 
European countries, so thinking of them primarily by original migra-
tion intentions is unhelpful. Moreover, typologies cannot capture their 
many intersecting identities. These are better analysed using standard 
sociological approaches. Many analysts of Polish migration in recent 
years almost entirely avoid typologies, preferring, for example, to follow 
Bourdieu (e.g. Garapich 2016c; Lopez Rodriguez 2010; Nowicka 2013). 
They explain migrants’ different trajectories with reference to their pos-
session of varying, mutually transferable economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic capital. Partly in connection with this social capital approach, 
there has been a tendency to see Polish society abroad as consisting of 
networks, linking Poles to each other and to the receiving society (e.g. Bell 
2016; Gill and Bialski 2011; Ryan 2016; Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2008), as well as, 
less often, to the sending country (e.g. Nowicka and Krzyżowski 2017; 
White and Ryan 2008).
Divisions within migrant populations are sometimes unnoticed by 
receiving country analysts, but when migrant populations produce their 
own sociologists and anthropologists these shine a light on stratification 
and hierarchies. This has happened in the case of Polish migration to the 
United Kingdom, which in the past few years has produced its own ‘Pol-
ish social scientists abroad’ (White 2016c). A social anthropological 
approach is more common in this extensive scholarship than a focus on 
overarching social structures, with a more qualitative approach to sociol-
ogy than is common in Poland (Bucholc 2016). However, Polish sociology 
in Poland is also changing in a more qualitative direction, partly thanks 
to transnational influences.
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4. Polish society in the United Kingdom and other 
countries as a microcosm of society in Poland
This section discusses some statistical information, although statistics with 
regard to shifting populations are by nature inaccurate. This is especially 
true considering that Poles commonly do not deregister from their place 
of residence in Poland; use informal networks to migrate abroad; and in 
some countries, notably the United Kingdom, do not need to register when 
they arrive.
The size of the Polish population in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, where Labour Force Survey data suggest that 984,000 Polish 
nationals lived in the first quarter of 2016 (Hawkins and Moses 2016, 3), 
is a particular reason to use the term ‘Polish society abroad’. By con-
trast, it would not be helpful to talk about Polish ‘society’ in countries, such 
as New Zealand, where there are small numbers of Poles (Goodwin 
2017). In addition, geographical dispersion within the main receiving 
countries means that even if the word ‘community’ were used, it would 
have to be in the plural. For example, Poles are scattered across Iceland, 
inhabiting even the remotest areas (Raczyński 2015, 46); the same is 
true of Ireland (Bojarczuk and Mühlau 2018, 102) and the United King-
dom (Harris, Moran and Bryson 2012, 212; ONS 20114). Okólski and 
Salt (2014, 12) write that ‘the varied geography of the movement, affect-
ing regions and communities not normally associated with immigration 
as well as the common honeypots like London, has made for a rich tapes-
try of analysis’. Poles in the United Kingdom find themselves in a country 
characterised by even higher levels of regional inequality than Poland 
(Herbst 2012, 50), directly affecting their opportunity structures and life 
chances (see, e.g. Knight, Lever and Thompson 2014 or 2017 on different 
locations in Wales). Moreover, complex patterns of ethnic diversity, inter-
twined with different levels of economic deprivation, infrastructure 
and politics and  different local histories of race relations (Robinson 
2010), create a ‘rich tapestry’ whereby locations vary in terms of the mix 
of conflict and conviviality between ethnic groups (Karner and Parker 
2011). As a result, migrants are made to feel welcome to very different 
degrees in different locations, as evidenced by local results of the Brexit 
referendum in June 2016. In turn, different locations can influence 
Polish migrants’ changing attitudes towards ethnic diversity.
UK Polish society is a cross-section of Polish society in Poland, in the 
sense that Poles originate from all over Poland. This is illustrated, for 
example, in Nestorowicz’s (2010) analysis of the Polish population of 
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Glasgow (Anacka et  al. 2011, 125). Such diversity reflects the wider 
trend towards international migration occurring from all Polish regions 
(Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski 2009, 107; Kostrzewa and Szałtys 
2013, 52), although migration from the biggest cities was most marked 
in the period around EU accession (Czapiński 2015a, 244).
People from opposite corners of Poland are thrown together so that, 
paradoxically, it is often by coming to the United Kingdom that they appre-
ciate the complexities of Polish society in Poland. Kempny describes how 
she had to rethink her assumptions about ‘Polish culture’ when she encoun-
tered the claim that there were 13 dishes at Christmas dinner from 
another migrant in Belfast (2012, 48). I personally witnessed an argument 
between residents of Gryfice and Katowice who asserted that Halloween 
trick-or-treating was respectively commonplace and unknown in ‘Poland’.
Also striking is the increasing socio-demographic diversity of Polish 
people in the United Kingdom. In some other countries, the Polish popu-
lation has more specific socio-demographic features. In particular, Poles 
in Italy have traditionally been mostly female carers, though the popula-
tion has become more diverse recently.5 With regard to the United King-
dom, it is often suggested that immediately after EU accession, Polish 
migration was also fairly selective, with young university graduates dis-
proportionately well represented. Okólski and Salt (2014, 21) observe 
that ‘in the post-accession period, a stylised portrait of a Polish migrant 
heading for the UK is that of a young male, highly educated, and origi-
nating from an urban area’. However, this is just a ‘stylised portrait’, since 
university graduates were never the majority (Okólski and Salt 2014, 18). 
The most significant change between 2004 and 2017 is that more older 
Poles have come to the United Kingdom, although the average age is nat-
urally lower than among Poles in Poland. In 2016, around 69 per cent of 
people born in Poland living in the United Kingdom were aged 25–49, and 
a quarter were aged 30–34 (Hawkins and Moses 2016, 6).
Family reunification in the United Kingdom became a mass phenom-
enon soon after 2004 (White 2017), and, with a few years’ delay, in Ire-
land (Bojarczuk and Mühlau 2018, 102), Norway (Friberg 2012) and 
other destinations. As discussed in chapter 6, the birth rate among Poles 
in Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom is higher than in Poland. This 
connects to the fact that in Poland couples put off childbearing, or decide 
against having more than one child, for economic reasons (Galbraith 
2008; Kotowska et al. 2008, 826; Prorok 2015; Staszyńska 2008, 54). In 
Poland, it seems that, among the youngest age groups, it is the less edu-
cated women who are least likely to give birth or aspire to having more 
than one child (Gromada 2016, 13). The trend is different in the United 
195PolISH SoCIety AbroAd
Kingdom and Ireland, where couples feel sufficiently financially secure to 
have more children (Heath, McGhee and Trevena 2015; Klimek 2017).
As discussed in chapter 6, the most basic social unit, the Polish family, 
is often transnational, and this is one of the strongest arguments for 
considering ‘Polish society’ to exist abroad. Poles have caring duties in 
other countries, and socialisation is a transnational matter, as ‘floating 
grandmothers’ (Bojarczuk and Mühlau 2018, 103), sisters and other rel-
atives based in Poland help to bring up Polish children living abroad, 
through frequent visits or by receiving children in Poland during the 
holidays. Poles living abroad also have caring duties towards their own 
parents. Krzyżowski (2013), for example, writes about Poles in Iceland 
and Austria caring for older parents in Poland, such as by helping 
organise their medical care. He illustrates that differences between the 
receiving countries influence this culture of care: social remittances 
occur because Polish society in Iceland has acquired more faith in institu-
tional care from Icelanders, contrasting with the expectation of family 
caregiving in Austria and Poland. As Kordasiewicz and her co-authors 
make clear, it is not simply the case that a Polish demographic trend (its 
ageing society) is exacerbated by migration; rather, Polish society (both 
generations, located in Poland and abroad) is having to rethink caring 
practices as ‘cultures of care of countries of origin and destination inter-
twine’ (Kordasiewicz, Radziwinowiczówna and Kloc-Nowak 2018, 89).
Poles in countries such as the United Kingdom also represent a 
cross-section of society in Poland, in the sense that they are increasingly 
diverse occupationally. Poles have penetrated the entire economy, and 
every level of income and occupation is represented, though many Poles 
performed humbler jobs immediately after their arrival in the United King-
dom. The 2011 census showed 10 per cent of Polish-born people in 
managerial or professional positions (Haynes and Galasińska 2016, 
50–1). Upward social mobility, which may be hard to achieve today in 
Poland (Domański, Pokropek and Żółtak 2015) is also an expectation and 
to some extent a reality among Poles in the United Kingdom (see esp. 
Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich 2007; Gałka 2016; Haynes and Galasińska 
2016; Parutis 2011). Nonetheless, it seems that on average Poles in Brit-
ain and Ireland still work below their qualifications (Kaczmarczyk and 
Tyrowicz 2015; Voitchovsky 2014).
However, interviewees often express a pragmatic attitude: money, 
not status in the foreign society, is the key consideration. The important 
thing is to feel comfortably off relative to how you were in Poland. For 
example, Jerzy, a bus driver I interviewed in Bath in 2012, observed, ‘Here, 
if someone wants to work, I’ve noticed, as an ordinary bus driver, even if 
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it’s a low status job (zawód taki niski) you can live, you have money to pay 
the bills, go on holiday, if you want to work. In Poland it’s a hard job, low 
paid.’ Marzena, a return migrant, interviewed in Wrocław, who had lived 
in Bristol, described a friend who had been cleaning in the United King-
dom for 10 years, commenting, ‘She comes from a small town where there 
aren’t any prospects – so in England, as a cleaner, she is “somebody” ’.
Migration offers opportunities for travel, for example, which people 
did not always enjoy when they lived in Poland. Malwina moved from a 
small town to Bristol and commented in 2009: ‘We’ve been to Cardiff, to 
Weymouth, down there, everywhere around Bristol, we’ve been to all the 
sights . . .  Me, my husband and our daughter. Or sometimes with our 
friends, taking two or three cars . . .  I want to see things . . .  In Poland I 
haven’t visited lots of places. This is my chance.’ Poles can expect that by 
working in the United Kingdom they will achieve a ‘normal’ life (Galasińska 
and Kozłowska 2009), as opposed to the ‘abnormality’ that characterised 
their previous lives in Poland. (Fehérváry (2002) describes similar atti-
tudes in Hungary). Comparisons are not just made with previous lives, 
since – as discussed in chapter 3 – status is often also enhanced in the sense 
that many labour migrants feel upwardly mobile relative to their contacts 
who still live in the country of origin (Garapich 2016c, 166, 187).
By contrast, some newly arrived educated Poles prefer to emphasise 
their status vis-à-vis other Poles abroad, reproducing class borders brought 
from Poland. Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiedzki (2009, 40–1, 88–9), 
found that Polish students in Leuven, like the students in London inter-
viewed by Andrejuk (2011), constructed boundaries between themselves 
and labour migrants and denied they had anything in common with 
Polish workers. By contrast, working-class Poles stressed what united 
them with other local Poles, for instance living in low-quality housing, or 
attending mass together. Pawlak (2016, 64) reports similar ‘othering’ by 
professional Poles of manual workers in Oslo. Among other examples, 
Elgenius (2017, 276–7) quotes a banker in London: ‘We have so much to 
offer: Polish people are clever and professional. I don’t want them to 
think that we are all builders or manual workers’. In her article about 
Glasgow, Piętka (2011) comments on how her socially diverse interview-
ees reported social stratification and wariness of other Poles among the 
local Polish population to the extent that they could not be considered to 
constitute a singular ‘community’.
Social stratification intersects with the stratification delimiting dif-
ferent migrant generations. Garapich, in his aptly titled book London’s Polish 
Borders (2016c), argues that Polish professionals position themselves 
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within pre-existing hierarchies, associating themselves with the 1940s 
diaspora and their descendants, organisations and patriotic values. In 
turn, some of these established diaspora members have a tendency to 
‘other’ the recent arrivals, whom they describe as ‘backward’ and 
‘post-communist’ (Elgenius 2017, 268). Though it might be stretching 
terms to describe Polish society in the United Kingdom as being riven by 
class or generational conflict, there can be tensions, including between 
members of different generations of migrants (see, e.g. Bielewska 2012, 
on Manchester; Fomina 2009, on Bradford; Galasińska 2010a, on the 
Midlands). Anti-immigrant sentiment on the part of some second- and 
third-generation Poles testifies to how well they have imbibed certain 
‘Little British’ attitudes. For example, the second-generation representa-
tive of a provincial Polish organisation complained to me in 2009, using 
British tabloid newspaper terminology, about the ‘tsunami’ of Poles arriv-
ing from Poland.
However, as already mentioned, recent Polish migrants are scattered 
across the United Kingdom, and this means they find themselves in many 
locations without pre-existing Polish communities. Several of my inter-
viewees in the UK provinces noted the spirit of camaraderie that pre-
vailed among small groups of pioneering migrants around 2004. In such 
locations, friendships with individual longer-established Poles could be 
eagerly embraced. Raczyński (2015, 118–9) notes a similar phenomenon: 
he states that, unlike in other Scandinavian countries, in Iceland there is 
no established Polish diaspora and therefore no tensions between differ-
ent waves of migrants. As the number of Poles grows in foreign destina-
tions, however, stratification and boundary drawing within the Polish 
population increase. Marzena, mentioned above, who lived in Poland but 
often went back to Bristol to visit, claimed that
there are people who earn more money and don’t want to keep in 
touch with people who clean and build. Nowadays [in 2016] I see a 
distinct division. In the past, although some people wanted to be bet-
ter, all the same they always kept together. There were fewer of 
them. Now there are lots and lots of them and there are definite sub-
groups, like social strata.
Kusek (2015, 110), writing about professionals in London, suggests 
that the situation is rather one in which individual professional Poles occa-
sionally interact with a ‘Polish community’ that consists largely of labour 
migrants:
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Out of several characteristics shared by these participants, their low 
levels of interaction with non-professional Polish migrants was most 
interesting . . .  The participants of my study indicated that, although 
they were familiar with the Polish neighborhoods in London, they 
saw themselves as customers rather than members of the core Polish 
migrant community. For example, Artur said: ‘I visit a Polish commu-
nity maybe twice a year: usually when I need my [car] oil changed I 
go to a Polish mechanic in Hammersmith.’ Together, and in a gener-
alised and simplified sense, the labor migrant and professional 
migrant communities create a micro-replica of the Polish society in 
the context of London itself, and draw from similarly distinct expe-
riences from home.
Fomina (2009) similarly writes about the ‘parallel worlds’ of middle- 
and working-class Polish migrants in Bradford, while Toruńczyk-Ruiz 
(2008, 37) reports how in Amsterdam professional migrants are hardly 
aware of the presence of other Poles, although working-class Poles report, 
‘You don’t feel that you are abroad, there are so many Poles’.
Social exclusion also marks parts of Polish society abroad. Cities 
such as Oslo (Mostowska 2013) and London (Garapich 2011) contain a 
homeless Polish population. Poles abroad, even officials, sometimes 
conflate homeless people and criminals (Garapich 2016c, 305). There is 
an opinion circulating in Poland that Polish criminals are disproportion-
ately well represented among migrants. For example, Gorzelak (2008, 
25) reports a key informant mentioning that his town had become more 
law abiding because ‘the hooligans [“shaved heads”] have gone off to 
England’.
An intriguing but unanswerable question is how far Poles in certain 
foreign countries present a microcosm of Polish society in Poland in terms 
of attitudes and opinions. Election results that suggest, for example, an 
unusually high level of support for nationalist parties among Poles in the 
United Kingdom, are not helpful guides, because of low proportions reg-
istering and voting.6 A study of Poles (n=172) who arrived in the United 
Kingdom in 2007, the year when the largest number came to Britain, 
found that on arrival they were less traditional and conformist and more 
focused on self-direction and having an ‘exciting life’ than the average 
young7 Polish person, making them more like British people. After two 
years, their value for self-direction had increased still further and was 
higher than for British people. Bardi et al. (2014, 143–4) suggest this 
could be because ‘they found that they had more opportunities to pur-
sue self-direction values such as freedom and originality, and as a result 
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of the ability to pursue these values, they became more important to 
them’. This would accord with research showing how Polish migrants 
appreciate the ‘work-to-live’ culture and opportunities for boundaryless 
careers (Grabowska 2016; Szewczyk 2014) as well as less hierarchical 
workplaces.
Bartram (2013) discusses whether migrants report more happiness 
than stayers when asked the question, ‘Taking all things together, how 
happy would you say you are?’ A comparison of European Social Survey 
data about migrants in western Europe and stayers in CEE uncovered sig-
nificant variety across origin countries. The clearest finding was specifi-
cally about Poles: ‘Polish emigrants are significantly less happy than 
stayers; when we adjust for positive selection (happier people are more 
likely to migrate), there is support for the conclusion that this difference 
represents a decrease for Polish emigrants’ (167, 169).
5. Migration as choice, escape from social control  
and merging into the receiving society
Of course, many Poles abroad would not like to think of themselves as 
belonging to ‘Polish society’ in the sense of being constrained within spe-
cifically Polish social structures, or indeed playing out roles or even shar-
ing values held by the majority of the population in Poland. In all places 
and periods of history, migration is often an escape route and a way of 
cutting social ties for individuals. For example, women can escape from 
domestic violence at home and initiate unofficial separations or even 
divorce (Urbańska 2014, 258). For young people, it is an escape from 
parental control. Rafał, whom I interviewed in Lublin, described his first 
job in London, standing in Trafalgar Square with a placard advertising 
pizzas: ‘I felt very good because I was free, I was on the street and no one 
was breathing down my neck, threatening me or telling me what to do’. 
Although, as mentioned above, Heath, McGhee and Trevena (2015) report 
that Polish couples were taking the opportunity of being in the United 
Kingdom to settle down and have families earlier than would be possible 
in Poland, Mole et al. (2017, 212) claim that among the CEE population 
in the United Kingdom there is ‘less social pressure to marry – especially 
on women’. Parents who stay in Poland are frustrated by their inability to 
influence migrants’ behaviour in this respect. For example, when I inter-
viewed Sławomir and Maria in Warsaw in 2016, he mentioned that their 
daughter, who lived abroad, often asked when they were coming to visit 
her: ‘Maria says, “I’ll come, but to play with the children.” “Whose children 
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will you play with?” “Yours.” “Mine?? In that case you probably won’t be 
coming.” ’ Maria confirmed, ‘We have those conversations.’ Also in War-
saw in 2016, Anita complained to me about her children living abroad:
What about a wedding, what is it with these young people 
today? . . .  I phone and ask, ‘Daughter dear, when are you getting 
married?’ ‘Give me a break!’ I phone my son – ‘When’s it going to 
be?’ ‘Mum, leave me alone! I don’t have time for that [expletive 
deleted]’ . . .  . Young people don’t get married nowadays, I don’t 
know what it is.
Garapich (2016d) writes about the complementary auto-stereo-
types of Poles abroad: on the one hand, the self-reliant, dependable 
individual with a model work ethic; on the other, the untrustworthy, 
individualistic and envious co-worker. As discussed in chapter 7, some 
Poles abroad deliberately shun contact with other Poles. In particular, 
Mole (2015) suggests that LGBTQ Poles positively prefer to avoid fellow 
Poles, whom they assume might be hostile to sexual minorities. Proba-
bly more often, Poles abroad do not avoid, but also do not deliberately 
seek contact with other Poles. For example, Ewa, a 30-year-old single 
professional interviewed by Louise Ryan in 2006, commented about her 
friends:
Oh, a few definitely are Polish, yes, you naturally build up those rela-
tionships, but also Canadian, Japanese, British, Irish. Actually it 
wasn’t really an issue, their nationality, it just happens that they are 
my friends. I never looked for Polish friends. It is silly to look for the 
same nationality. If you are moving to another country, you want to 
learn something, you don’t want to find exactly the same what you 
just left.
Elsewhere in the interview Ewa commented, ‘People are more free here. 
I can be more free . . .  I always like to go my own way and I feel I can do 
it easily, no one is shocked’ (White and Ryan 2008, 1494–5).
As mentioned in chapter 4, Poles are struck by differences in work-
places abroad and in Poland. My interviewees commented particularly on 
the more relaxed, less hierarchical workplace and institutional relation-
ships that they encountered abroad (see also Cieślik 2011; Karolak 2016; 
White 2014a). For example, Lucyna, a nursery school teacher in Poland 
who had worked in Lidl supermarket in Ireland, explained her greater 
sense of agency in Ireland:
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Parents felt they had an equal say in how the pre-school was run . . . 
whereas in Poland the head teacher runs things more her own 
way. . . .  After I returned I read some Internet postings by Lidl work-
ers and definitely [it’s different in Poland. In Ireland] the managers 
treated us like partners . . .  whereas in Poland employees are treated 
more instrumentally.
To existing members of the receiving society, and the Polish individuals 
themselves, it often seems like they are simply becoming part of the major-
ity society and embracing a new, and in some respects more relaxed, way 
of life:
The local culture and lifestyle was attractive for Polish women both 
in Barcelona and Berlin. They mentioned easy access to culture, rec-
reation areas, sport and a healthy lifestyle. Some women also val-
ued key features of a multicultural society as it made it easier for 
them to fit in . . .  . Several women liked the more relaxed attitude 
to appearance and material status in comparison with prevalent per-
ceptions among their peers in Poland. (Main 2016a, 76)
Main (2016a, 199) also argues that Polish women feel empowered by 
having more awareness of healthcare choices thanks to moving abroad. 
Goodwin, writing about Polish women in New Zealand (2017, 256) 
reports a similar kind of liberation to that sensed by Main’s interviewees 
in Berlin or Barcelona. Goodwin mentions, for example, that women feel 
free to go to bars and restaurants on their own and that, after an initial 
sense of shock, they like the greater freedom New Zealand parents accord 
children. New Zealand can seem very foreign in this respect. One inter-
viewee commented, for instance, ‘A Polish mother would never let her 
child put dirty shoes on a chair in a restaurant, a New Zealand mother 
would’ (2017, 166). Lack of scrutiny from other Poles is a factor enhanc-
ing Polish women’s sense of freedom:
The Polish community in New Zealand is very homogenous in terms 
of class background and education (mainly due to strict immigra-
tion procedures and logistic difficulties of moving so far), and very 
small. All of these factors, combined together, make Polish women’s 
behaviour less scrutinised (including by their families, who are too 
far away to be a disciplinary force in a case of any transgressions), 
but also unburdened by any negative ethnic and class stigmatisation. 
(Goodwin 2017, 269–70)
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As shown for example by Pustułka (2013), many Polish people pre-
fer to spend their leisure time in regular British organisations without any 
ethnic conditions on membership. Leszek, for example, a 29-year-old pro-
fessional from Kraków interviewed in Bath in 2012, claimed that ‘because 
I want to improve my English, I’m trying to make more friends, English 
friends, and somehow operate within British society’. To this end he had 
joined a rock-climbing society, which helped him form trusting friendships 
with English people as well as providing hands-on familiarity with the 
British landscape. Wojciech, interviewed in Grajewo in 2012, was a Real 
Madrid supporter who had travelled all over Spain to matches and gained 
a geographically wide-ranging knowledge of the country. Migrants who 
do not participate in co-ethnic organisations can be hard to find, and often 
pass unnoticed by researchers (Moroşanu 2013, 2165). In their survey of 
Poles living in 11 foreign countries – accessed via Polish Internet portals, 
and therefore more likely to be engaged in Polish activities abroad – Fiń 
et al. (2013, 56) found that only 19 per cent of post-accession migrants 
were involved in diaspora organisations, although this rose to 24 per cent 
of those who had lived abroad over 5 years.
However, even Poles who immerse themselves in the receiving 
society and do not have much contact with other Poles will sometimes 
be reminded of their Polish identity by others. Goodwin shows that Pol-
ish women in the United Kingdom assume themselves to be under cer-
tain social pressure from other Poles to dress and bring up their children 
according to Polish norms (Goodwin 2017, 270). Garapich (2016c, 225, 
231–3), and other researchers have also commented on how Poles try 
to identify other Poles on the street or in public transport (as seems to 
be common for other nationalities as well, such as Romanians) and 
how they feel anxious about being identified as Polish.8 Fomina (2009, 
17) found that some of her interviewees kept away from the Polish 
church in Bradford partly because they felt ‘under observation’ by fellow 
parishioners.
Poles living abroad are also to some extent under transnational 
social pressure, for example, because of the expectation to ‘pull’ friends and 
family abroad, in line with the conventions mentioned in chapter  7. 
Urbańska (2015, 287–92) refers to a ‘culture of suspicion’ and cites exam-
ples of Polish married women being spied upon by neighbours from their 
Polish home localities, with gossip relayed back. On the other hand, 
Krasnodębska (2012, 132) found that women return migrants she inter-
viewed in Opole Silesia were scrupulous about not telling tales in Poland 
about fellow migrants’ behaviour abroad. To conclude: however much 
individuals in countries with large Polish populations refuse to believe 
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that they are part of some Polish community abroad, there are situations 
where they are ascribed ethnic identities by other Poles and therefore 
they sense that certain expectations and prejudices accompany these.
6. The role of religion and Polish-migrant  
cultural identities
Moving from Poland abroad, Poles are leaving a country where symbols 
of religiosity are publicly present – for example, congregations overflow-
ing into the churchyard during mass, crosses in schools, wayside shrines, 
initials of the Three Kings chalked onto front doors. In some cases they 
move to a country, like Italy or Spain, where Catholicism is also the major-
ity religion and Catholic Poles have a sense of being integrated into the 
majority group simply by virtue of Catholic identity (see Galent, Godde-
eris and Niedźwiedzki 2009, on Belgium). In many countries, however, 
Catholicism is not the majority religion, and this poses both integration 
strategy problems (would it be better to avoid the Catholic Church in the 
interests of integrating into mainstream society?) and practical problems 
(where to go to mass?). In such countries, local Catholic churches can be 
welcoming because they are keen to supplement their congregations, as 
in Norway, where most adherents of the Catholic Church are migrants, 
with Poles now the largest category (Erdal 2017). Overall, the interna-
tional Catholic Church recognises that it is the responsibility of the 
receiving country Church to support migrants, if necessary through ethnic 
parishes.
Nonetheless, Catholicism is viewed as a universal religion, and these 
parishes are supposed to be bridges into the receiving society, though not 
for assimilation (Ryan 2017, 296–8). In some countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, the Catholic Church has welcomed the arrival of additional 
parishioners but also been concerned about potential separatism of newly 
arrived ‘Easyjet priests’, who ‘come with their cultural baggage and agenda 
(spiritual and institutional)’ and sometimes try to create Polish ethnic 
enclaves in regular parishes (Trzebiatowska 2010, 1057). Krotofil 
(2013, 108–26) suggests that, as was sometimes also the case in the Cold 
War period (Lehr 2015, 204–5), priests prefer to discourage integra-
tion because they see their main role as keeping Polish identity safe from 
competition, not believing in the possibility of mixed identities even 
outside the religious sphere and worrying about moral contamination. 
She quotes a priest complaining, ‘We’ll be dealing with a great degrada-
tion of all the  values we bring from Poland’ (2013, 108). Similarly, 
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Grzymała-Moszczyńska, Hay and Krotofil quote a parishioner who 
observed, ‘Our priests stress that Poles should not integrate but remain in a 
Polish social context while living and working in the UK.’ However, they 
point out that some Polish parishioners have the opposite expectation: 
priests should aid adaptation (2011, 227–9).
Mąkosa (2015, 186), using Polish Catholic Mission data, suggests 
that around 2015 the proportion of Polish migrants attending mass was 
10 per cent for England and Wales; Lisak (2015, 106) gives a figure of 8 
per cent for 2010. Erdal (2017, 270) reports that in Bergen, Norway, about 
20 per cent of registered Polish church members attend Sunday mass. 
Lisak (2015, 105) calculated that 5–7 per cent of the local Polish Catho-
lic population was attending Polish mass in Dublin, Cork and Galway in 
2012, with 12 per cent attendance in the smaller town of Tralee, ‘where 
social life is less anonymous’. Raczyński (2015, 190–1, 207–9) argues that 
in Iceland different Poles go in opposite directions – they either become 
more religious, especially at first, when both priests and co-worshippers 
support their adaptation to the new environment, or less practising. Reli-
gion becomes a more private affair; Poles distance themselves from the 
Catholic Church as an institution and in some cases refer to themselves 
simply as ‘Christians’. They even treat the Catholic and Lutheran churches 
as equivalents to the extent that they may christen one child in one Church, 
and the next in the other.
Considering that the clearest change in religious trends in Poland 
itself is towards a personalisation of religion, the evidence collected about 
Iceland and the United Kingdom can be used to argue, as I did in chap-
ter 8, that this personalisation may be reinforced to some extent by migra-
tion influences. Polish migrants in Krotofil’s UK survey were ‘increasingly 
ceasing to believe that regular church attendance is fundamental to their 
faith’ (2013, 203). Krotofil found (2013, 264) that most interviewees did 
consider faith in God very important to their identity (for some, it became 
increasingly important), but this did not necessarily have to be mediated 
by the Church. Lisak (2015, 116) similarly criticises Polish Catholic hier-
archy expectations that in Ireland Poles would spontaneously collect 
together to form parish ‘communities’. As Raczyński (2015, 180, 208–9) 
argues with reference to Poles in Iceland, religion was becoming a private 
matter. Koralewska further suggests that different types of ‘emancipation’ 
abroad follow parallel tracks (Koralewska 2016, 31). Polish women in Ice-
land, reflecting on the role of institutionalised religion and rejecting it to 
some extent, combine this with reflection upon and rejection of traditional 
gender roles. Many types of non-institutionalised religious practices are 
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invisible to outsiders. Transnational religious activities among Poles in 
Norway include reading Catholic media from Poland and taking part in 
Norwegian-Polish simultaneous rosary prayers (Erdal 2017, 276).
Individualisation of personal religiosity is mirrored and reinforced 
by a parallel trend among migrants abroad towards individualisation in 
celebrating religious holidays. As noted by Wojtyńska (2011, 118), with 
regard to Poland as well as other countries, ‘patterns of celebrating are 
rather a matter of individual choice, therefore related to projects of iden-
tity construction. They depend for instance on the importance given by 
an individual to tradition or one’s religiosity. Frequently, detached from 
worship, religious holidays are gradually turning into family celebrations 
and part of leisure time’. For Poles abroad, like migrants of all nationali-
ties, celebrating holidays as they did in Poland is often an important way 
to remember their links with their homes in Poland and sometimes to ‘per-
form’ their Polish identity in the company of other Poles. For example, 
Izabela, a return migrant to Wrocław, described to me how her friends 
who were Jehovah’s Witnesses had met up in Dublin to share the Christ-
mas wafer together – in this case, a Polish rather than a religious act, since 
she was not a Catholic. Wojtyńska (2011, 121) describes remote fishing 
villages in Iceland where joint celebrations of Christmas and Easter are 
important for Poles. Individualisation of family holidays is happening in 
Poland, but the process is more dynamic abroad, since opportunities and 
motivations for adding in non-Polish traditional elements are even greater, 
as is the possibility (and pressure from children) to celebrate addi-
tional, local holidays. Wojtyńska (2011, 123, 125) notes that Poles eat 
doughnuts on Tłusty Czwartek (Fat Thursday) but then have cream puffs 
with Icelanders on Bolludagur. She further quotes an interviewee who 
presented her migration to Iceland as a culinary escape: ‘In Poland one 
has to eat carp on Christmas. I hate it. It is not good. Here [in Iceland] 
I don’t even try to have fish. We can make our own menu and eat for 
example reindeer meat.’
Polish society, despite the imaginings of some priests, is obviously 
not an object that can be transferred to a new place and remain unchanged 
by its surroundings. Hence the most important questions seem to be how 
Polish culture in migration evolves alongside and within (for example) 
British or Icelandic society, and how this evolution relates to change in 
Poland. Thomas and Znaniecki (1918–20, 1984) explored the first part 
of this puzzle when they analysed Polish society in the United States before 
World War I. They saw the emergence of a hybrid ‘Polish-American soci-
ety’ (240) which would gradually de-Polonise. Garapich’s monograph on 
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twenty-first-century London similarly analyses how ‘transnational social 
fields merge two societies together’ (2016c, 20).
Many researchers, usually implicitly, seem to assume that it is the 
migrant status of Poles abroad that particularly shapes their lives in this 
hybrid world. By contrast, non-scholars, not having the benefit of compa-
rable knowledge about non-Polish migrant groups, would probably most 
often point to the ethnic factor: Polish community life, in particular, is as 
it is because it is specifically ‘Polish’. For example, a culture of suspicion 
among Poles abroad, discussed in chapter 7, is regularly presented by 
stayers and migrants alike as something uniquely and painfully Polish. 
However, studies of Albanians (King et al. 2014), Colombians (Guarnizo, 
Sanchez and Roach 1999) and Romanians (Vicol 2017) suggest that some 
other migrant groups are equally suspicious of co-ethnics. If some migrant 
groups display more solidarity than others, this is connected to aspects of 
their migrant experience such as likelihood of encountering discrimina-
tion (Portes and Sessenbrenner 1993) or the socio-demographic cohesive-
ness of the population abroad (Guarnizo, Sanchez and Roach 1999).
The two identities, ethnic and migrant, need to be distinguished. It 
is the migrant identity that brings certain types of social change among 
migrant populations. One aspect of being a migrant, as discussed above, 
is freedom from social control, insofar as this takes place. Collectively, this 
results in what Thomas and Znaniecki termed ‘social disorganisation’: 
Poles in the United States were partly released from the social control of 
the Polish village, even while maintaining transnational ties to Poland. A 
second consequence is often downward social mobility and stigmatisation 
by the majority population, and sometimes also by earlier waves of co- 
ethnic migrants. A third consequence of being a migrant is the need to 
engage in a process of establishing status and identity vis-à-vis other 
co-ethnics abroad, both one’s own generation and other waves. Finally, 
being a migrant almost always involves renegotiating one’s individual 
sense of ethnic identity, so it becomes a dual identity, or even a form of 
hybridity that is more than the sum of its two parts.
To illustrate this last point, as argued throughout this book, migrants’ 
decisions are often informed by pragmatism rather than patriotism. This 
applies to eating habits, as to other spheres of life, such as parenting 
(Pustułka 2014). Polish migrants can choose to eat Polish or experiment 
with non-Polish food. Migrants, who tend to be busy people, often eat what 
is easiest. This consideration (which creates a hybrid Polish-non-Polish 
menu) overrides the ‘ethnic’ aspect of their eating patterns, as was illus-
trated in my interview with Judyta and Dariusz in Bristol in 2011:
207PolISH SoCIety AbroAd
JudytA: Mostly Polish. English sometimes too. I don’t go to Polish 
shops the whole time. And you can get Polish food in the ordinary 
supermarkets. I buy mostly English food.
Anne: But there are families where it’s considered very important to 
eat Polish.
dAriusz: The important thing is to eat!
On a collective level, this is the merging of two societies that Gara-
pich (2016c) describes. It is the hybrid, or ‘same but different’, quality, not 
just of individual Poles but also of Polish society abroad, that is most 
intriguing, particularly the attitudes, practices, informal institutions, and 
so forth, that characterise society in migration, even if many Poles living 
abroad are only faintly aware of some of these. Attitudes, practices and 
institutions develop over time, relating both to trends in Poland and to 
those in the receiving society. For example, it is not just the case that indi-
vidual Polish women see different models of gender relations abroad; 
they also discuss these, face-to-face and on Internet forums (Siara 2009) 
while also being in touch with friends who may be adopting more part-
ner-like approaches towards the division of household labour in Poland.
Cultural change brought about by migrants from the receiving to the 
sending country, or vice versa, can be hard to identify and track, particu-
larly considering that Poland and countries such as the United Kingdom 
are already part of the same cultural space. This is considerably influ-
enced, for example, by popular culture from the United States. As Woj-
tyńska (2011, 124) points out with reference to Poles in Iceland: ‘Many 
keep various linkages with their previous homes. Thus, they follow 
changes that are occurring in Poland and innovations. . . .  Consequently, 
it is difficult to judge the source of influences, if they come from Iceland 
or Poland or maybe popular culture’ – which can be common to both. Sim-
ilarly, Kusek (2015, 113) writes that:
Clubs, bars, and nightlife elitism is a particularly significant exam-
ple of a lifestyle feature of Polish professional migrants. This indi-
cates continuity in their behaviors between Poland and the UK. As 
the life of Polish elites in Poland becomes increasingly similar to 
that of global elites, similarly to shopping or golf, it is difficult to 
decide whether cool nightclubs and bars are significant for migrants 
due to their experience in the UK, or if they are also an extension 
of their life from Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, or other large Polish 
cities.
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Recent Polish migrants have also produced a copious literary out-
put,9 so that Polish society in the United Kingdom, for example, has its own 
Polish migrant literature there; the same is true for other countries, such 
as Ireland and Germany (Kosmalska 2016; Kosmalska and Jarniewicz 
2016; Pleßke and Rostek 2013; Rostek and Uffelman 2011). The subject 
matter of much of this literature is life in transnational social space. The 
writers who produce this literature are a mix of return migrants, current 
migrants and non-Poles, and the literature falls within overlapping 
national traditions, as well as being located within the wider international 
genre of migrant fiction.
7. Institutions, organisations and networks:  
Evolving from diaspora to Polish society abroad
If society is envisaged as ‘happening’ across national borders, complete 
with income, class, gender, age and other social divisions and hierarchies, 
it becomes readily apparent why so-called diasporas do not display the sol-
idarity they are supposed to. They are simply too plural, too diverse and 
too stratified. As mentioned in chapter 7, Poles tell sociologists that they 
are a predominantly divided society, with few unifying attributes. Hence 
it is unsurprising to find fault lines in Polish society abroad. However, this 
specifically Polish condition is exacerbated, as argued above, by the 
migrant situation. At the same time, co-ethnic migrants of any national-
ity often find themselves trying to collaborate, for emotional and practi-
cal reasons, although facing many difficulties along the way  –  as, for 
example, Gill (2010) details in his aptly titled article ‘Pathologies of 
Migrant Place-Making’.
Polish institutions in the United Kingdom, with which this section 
is mostly concerned, are impressively numerous. This is thanks largely to 
the hard work and sacrifice of Poles who arrived in the United Kingdom 
in the 1940s, founding churches, educational and professional organisa-
tions, clubs and social centres, scouts, dance troupes, retirement homes, 
charities and much else (Elgenius 2017; Lehr 2015; Sword 1996).10 It is 
also thanks to the efforts of more recent waves of migrants. Polish insti-
tutions are the envy of other CEE migrants living in Britain, who see Poles 
as being better organised. New formal Polish institutions include new 
businesses and media outlets (Garapich 2008) as well as the more tradi-
tional clubs and Saturday Schools.11 With regard to informal organisations 
and networks, Pustułka (2013, 113) distinguishes between those whose 
members meet face-to-face to pursue common interests; those that have 
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a purely online existence; and groups that organise one-off or cyclical 
events. Different institutions and organisations address the needs of 
different sections of Polish society, needs that to some extent overlap but 
that also come into conflict.
The adaptation of existing diaspora organisations and the creation 
of new ones are migrant endeavours and usually analysed as such. How-
ever, class and generation are also highly relevant, as Garapich (2016c) 
discusses in his warts-and-all portrait of Poles in London. Garapich (cor-
respondingly with Kusek’s findings, see above) suggests that organisations 
such as Polish Professionals or Polish City Club are deliberately elitist. 
Garapich (2016c, 303) quotes a member of Polish Professionals who 
asserted, ‘We want to be elite, we want to create elites.’ Other institutions, 
such as Saturday schools, are more inclusive, although the well-estab-
lished schools faced challenges after 2004 in adjusting to catering mostly 
for children arriving straight from Poland (Praszałowicz et al. 2012). Vol-
untary work in Polish institutions also plays a role in re-establishing 
social status temporarily lost in migration. It can help educated but newly 
arrived Poles stuck in manual jobs to lead a parallel life as Saturday school 
teachers, for example, maintaining the middle-class status they enjoyed 
in Poland. In UK British society, they are at the bottom of the ladder. In 
UK Polish society, they are middle class.
Polish organisations also divide according to how important they 
consider integration with the wider British society. For example, trade 
unionists have to decide whether to make common cause with British 
workers. Dunin-Wąsowicz and Garapich (2016, 75) quote an activist – a 
proponent of ‘deep cosmopolitanism’ – who commented, ‘I once had the 
idea of founding such a union but it turned out to be a mistake because it 
is divisive, it can’t unite us. In every demonstration we take part as mem-
bers of the GMB, a British union, because Brits have the same problems 
as we do.’
The raison d’être of traditional diaspora organisations was to be 
islands of Polish culture; for example, in Saturday school it is mandatory 
to speak Polish. Today there is a divide between Polish activists, world-
wide, over their functions – as illustrated, for example, at the 2014 inter-
national conference of Saturday school teachers in Kraków. Are they still 
intended to preserve a cherished ‘Polish identity’, perceived as an identi-
fiable object to be held or lost? Alternatively, are they expected to engage 
with the majority society and construct new forms of hybrid Polishness? 
In the United Kingdom, they are formally regular British institutions – 
supplementary schools like those teaching many other languages – and 
in this respect not ethnic ‘bubbles’. Some UK Saturday schools (though 
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my impression from reading websites is that they are in a minority) 
emphasise the school’s role in helping pupils and parents function 
equally well in Polish and British UK society, in other words developing 
their British alongside their Polish identities. The John Paul II School in 
Liverpool, for example, includes among its aims:
To promote Polish culture to broader public by participating in and 
organising cultural and social events aimed at integrating wider 
communities in Liverpool; To support existing and newly arrived 
Polish and bilingual children and their parents by providing them 
with the advice about British Education System, the Curriculum as 
well as other aspect of life in Britain.
Different opinions about Saturday school functions can reflect changing 
priorities of individual parents as they become more settled and their chil-
dren grow up abroad. Teaching Polish to Polish children can be seen as 
fulfilling an emotional need to connect with Polish identity and perhaps 
also a patriotic duty towards the Polish nation, but it also has many prac-
tical functions, such as supporting bilingualism as an asset for future life 
in the United Kingdom; helping older children acquire additional GCSE 
and A-level qualifications, which will improve their overall life chances in 
the United Kingdom; or simply enabling children, especially younger chil-
dren, to spend a morning with Polish friends.
Poles abroad to some extent also participate in social action focused 
on Polish events and causes, sometimes alongside non-Poles. The death of 
Pope John Paul II provoked extensive spontaneous demonstrations. Polish 
migrants occasionally mobilise around their own causes, as shown by 
mass protests in the United Kingdom against double taxation and for right-
hand-drive cars to be registrable in Poland (Garapich 2016a, 106) or to 
preserve Polish language exams in UK schools. In 2015, the Polish Blood 
campaign to donate blood to the National Health Service highlighted 
Poles’ contribution to life in the United Kingdom, with the aim of coun-
tering anti-migrant propaganda in sections of the UK press and politics.12 
Poles abroad also participate in Poland-based protest movements. Binnie 
and Klesse (2013, 1108–9), in their article about LGBT activism, use Tar-
row’s (2005, 29) term ‘transnational activists’ to denote ‘people and groups 
who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in conten-
tious political activities that involve them in transnational networks of 
contacts and conflicts.’ In particular, in October 2016 demonstrations took 
place in London, as elsewhere outside Poland, to support the Black Mon-
day women’s strike and demonstrations against the proposed tightening 
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of the abortion law. In July 2017, demonstrations throughout Poland 
defending the independence of the Supreme Court were complemented 
by rallies in front of Polish embassies across Europe – including non-Pol-
ish, pro-EU activists. The Committee for Defence of Democracy, KOD, a 
movement formed to represent a broad coalition of opposition to the Law 
and Justice government, has organised events in cities across Europe as 
well as North America and Australia (Karolewski 2016).13
8. Conclusions
Many Poles in western Europe who arrived after 2004 are already fairly 
well-settled. The Polish-born population living abroad increasingly resem-
bles a microcosm of Polish society in Poland, especially in countries like 
the United Kingdom, where it is not only demographically diverse but also 
socially stratified. Many migrants do not consider themselves to belong 
to a diaspora or ‘Polish community’ abroad, with its connotations of small-
ness, closeness and solidarity, although they are conscious of other Poles 
living around them, and use Polish media, services, and the like in the for-
eign country to a greater or lesser extent. (In some cases, they merely 
consider themselves occasional consumers of Polish services.) Poles 
with weaker foreign-language knowledge lead more Polish lives, which 
sometimes build on the tradition of the old diaspora organisations – for 
example, through Saturday schools – but often have nothing to do with 
them, and are thoroughly transnational.
Thanks to their (varied) transnational ties, Poles abroad often 
feel themselves part of Polish society in Poland, but each person has dif-
ferent ties to Poland and feels the connection differently, in different sit-
uations. Social change among Poles abroad and social change in Poland 
are linked, partly through social activism, but mostly through a more elu-
sive process of resocialisation and mutual cultural influence, including the 
social remittances (senso stricto) that travel between the two societies, 
Polish society abroad and Polish society in Poland. At the same time, 
these often reinforce global/American popular cultural influences. The 
societies are also in a sense ‘complementary’. For example, Poles frequently 
express concern that the birth rate in Poland is low, and, since Poles come 
abroad partly because it is seen as a ‘normal’ place to start and support a 
family, one can see the high birth rate in the United Kingdom as a reac-
tion to economic constraints on family size in Poland. According to the 
logic of ‘Polish society abroad’, it might even make sense to view births in 
the United Kingdom as contributing to the overall Polish birth rate (rather 
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than diminishing it, as discussed in Janta 2013, 86). However, this raises 
a further question mark, since it is rather hard to imagine what can happen 
to ‘Polish society abroad’ in the second generation, when ties to Poland 
may be weaker. This is a salutary reminder that mass EU mobility is a 
recent phenomenon, so any analysis, lacking the benefit of hindsight, 
must remain provisional.
Notes
 1 Babiński and Praszałowicz (2016, 96–7) suggest that the term ‘Polonia’ should be 
reserved for Poles who self-identify as Polonia, which they believe would exclude 
most post-2004 migrants, as well as Poles stranded in countries such as Belarus 
and Ukraine as a result of Polish border changes in 1945.
 2 The survey, in 2009–10, questioned over 3,500 Poles who had arrived within the 
last 18 months. They found that different countries attracted different types of 
migrant, from different parts of Poland.
 3 Population about 50,000, north of Kraków.
 4 CT0552 2011 Census - Origin Destination Migration - Ethnic Group Polish 
(write-in), at https:// www . ons . gov . uk / peoplepopulationandcommunity 
/ populationandmigration / internationalmigration / adhocs / 006418ct0552201
1censusorigindestinationmigrationethnic grouppolishwritein, last accessed 26 
June 2017.
 5 According to GUS 2016 (460), among Poles temporarily resident for over six 
months abroad in other European countries in 2015 men outnumbered women 
everywhere except in Italy. On diversification, see Kowalska and Pelliccia (2012).
 6 See, e.g. http:// parlament2015 . pkw . gov . pl / 350 _ Wyniki _ Sejm _ zagranica / 0 / 82 / , 
last accessed 9 December 2017. Fifty-five thousand UK Poles voted in Polish 
parliamentary elections in October 2015.
 7 They were compared with respondents in the European Social Survey 2006–7 
born after 1965 (Bardi 2009).
 8 Discussion at Romanian Migration Workshop, UCL SSEES, 28 April 2017.
 9 For a virtual archive of ‘The Polish Diaspora in the UK and Ireland: Migrations 
in Literature and Culture since 2004’, see http:// emigracja . uni . lodz . pl / en / . Last 
accessed 9 December 2017.
 10 For a timeline showing the main London organisations founded 1939–2015, see 
Elgenius (2017, 264).
 11 As of July 2016 there were currently at least 146 schools in the United Kingdom, 
located in all major towns (Polska-szkola.pl), including many which before 2004 
had no Polish communities at all. Some of the following section draws on my 
observations as a volunteer teacher of English to Polish adults at Saturday schools 
in Bath, since the academic year 2008–9, when the first school was created.
 12 For discussion of various campaigns, see Elgenius (2017, 270–1).
 13 http:// wyborcza . pl / 7,75398,22136166,w - niedziele - andrzej - duda - odwiedzi 
- legionowo - bede - tez - protestujacy . html. Last accessed 9 December 2017.
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The impact of migration into 
Poland by non-Poles
Anne White
1. Introduction
This shorter chapter is included for the sake of completeness, although the 
impact of migration by non-Poles into Poland is less than the impact of 
migration by Polish citizens in the opposite direction, together with their 
circular and return migration. Poland is interesting, nonetheless, as a case 
study of a place that has been considered a future ‘immigration1 country’, 
despite its history shaped by refugee exodus and labour emigration. Schol-
ars such as Iglicka (2001) predicted even before EU accession that 
Poland would become a country with net in-migration. It seems likely 
that all EU member states eventually do become immigration countries, 
thanks to rising prosperity, as happened in such typical sending countries 
as Ireland and Spain. According to the usual pattern (Castles and Miller 
2009, 33), this would be temporary labour migration followed by other 
types such as family reunification, lifestyle and educational mobility. 
However, a wave of emigration by Irish people and Spaniards after the 
2008 global economic crisis suggests the wisdom of not assuming the 
switch to immigration country status is forever. Moreover, it is possible to 
be a major sending and receiving country simultaneously, as in the case of 
the United Kingdom – a dual identity that is also a potential outcome for 
Poland. Finally, a third migration identity, common in CEE, is as a transit 
country for migrants hoping to reach popular destinations in western 
Europe. In the words of a Chinese migrant interviewed by Uehling (2004, 
79), ‘Ukraine is the border between China and England.’
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The number of migrants legally entering the Polish labour market 
was fairly steady through most of the post-transition period (Górny et al. 
2010, 212). However, the acceleration of Ukrainian migration to Poland 
in recent years (Kaczmarczyk and Górny 2017) suggests that the process 
of Poland’s transformation into an immigration country is well under way 
and by 2017 may already have been achieved. By 2015 probably over one 
million Ukrainians worked in Poland (Chmielewska, Dobroczek and 
Puzynkiewicz 2016), roughly the same number as Poles resident in the 
United Kingdom, a country nearly twice the size. However, Ukrainian 
migrants, despite their increasing socio-demographic diversity (Grzymała- 
Kazłowska and Brzozowska 2017, 105), have created fewer institutions 
and are less settled than Poles in the United Kingdom. Most Ukrainians 
can work in Poland only temporarily.2 Hence it is premature to think of 
‘Ukrainian society in Poland’. Potentially, Poland might also acquire new 
migrant populations through receiving refugees under EU-brokered 
agreements, but official policy (at time of writing in 2017) was not to do 
so. To date, Poland’s main experience has been with Chechen refugees in 
the 1990s. In 2015 Poland granted refugee status to only 349 asylum seek-
ers (Klaver et al. 2016, 6). Often, refugees seem to think of Poland as a 
transit country rather than as a permanent home.
The impact of immigration literature, written with reference mostly 
to Western countries, is partly about population change simply in terms 
of numbers of immigrants and their share in the overall population stock. 
This numerical change can also be considered an aspect of social change 
in Poland, and accords with the ‘adding pieces to the patchwork of Polish 
society’ definition of social change adopted in this book. The addition of 
non-Poles to the population is particularly important in a country that 
since World War II has been almost mono-ethnic. The receiving country 
impact literature further suggests that many popular assumptions, such 
as that migrants are net recipients of state services, or make it harder for 
local people to find work, or do not ‘want to integrate’, are not borne out 
by evidence. Real potential direct impacts can instead include: a net con-
tribution to government revenues in the receiving country (if migrant 
labour is predominantly legal) and even some GDP growth;3 a supply of 
labour for jobs that are unappealing to natives;4 a need for integration 
support services such as language teaching to facilitate migrants’ ‘active 
engagement’ in society (Ager and Strang 2008, 172), since integration is 
a two-way process involving efforts by the receiving society as well as 
migrants; and greater cultural diversity, together with the accumulation 
of multiple transnational ties linking the receiving country to migrants’ 
countries of origin. The mediated impacts of migration, where politicians 
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and media interpret immigration as a threat, ‘translating it into a politi-
cal issue’ (Mudde 2012, 1–2), are a growth in intolerance and support for 
right-wing parties, and the spread of myths about migrants bringing dis-
ease, stealing jobs and living off the welfare state.
This chapter is not concerned with tourism to Poland. Chapter 8 
mentioned the impact of visits by foreigners to individual families in 
Poland, and tourism collectively does have a large impact on certain cit-
ies, reinforcing the impact of temporary residents such as foreign students 
and employees of international companies. For example, Galent and 
Kubicki (2010, 217) quote an interviewee observing,
We had the feeling that the whole world was coming to Krakow. 
What’s more, yesterday, when I was at the radio, a guy came in who 
wrote a tourist guide in the 80s and quoted the fact that during the 
time of Gierek Krakow had 80,000 foreign tourists per year. Now we 
have 8 million, which speaks for itself.
Other destinations, such as Wrocław, have also seen a marked increase in 
tourists since 2004 (Dolińska and Makaro 2013, 44). Dolińska and Makaro 
(2013, 45) suggest that tourists form ‘an important part of the local social 
landscape . . .  [and even if their contact with the city is superficial] the 
mass influx of tourists . . .  increases openness to other cultures’.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2, on the ‘prospect’ 
channel of migration impact, is followed by discussion in Section 3 of the 
actual numbers and distributions of different migrant groups, policies 
towards these groups of migrants, and their integration experiences. 
These are important both in their own right (since migrants are new, 
additional members of Polish society), but also because of their impact on 
ethnic Poles. Section 4 briefly discusses migration policies, a topic which 
divides public opinion. Section 5 addresses how in- and out-migration 
impacts intersect. I argue that the impacts – direct and mediated – seem 
largely as to be expected from the experience of other receiving countries 
in Europe. However, the ‘prospect’ channel of impact is particularly strong 
at the moment. So is Poland’s particular identity as an emigration coun-
try, because of the holes this creates in the labour market (although many 
immigrants do jobs, such as paid domestic work, that most Poles avoid). 
The Polish case also shows how important it is to see migrants as a varied 
category: the impact of Syrians, Ukrainians and Vietnamese people is 
different.
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2. The impact of migration as prospect
Kapur (2010, 14) argues that one type of migration influence is a prospect 
channel, an especially significant channel in CEE. Even without immi-
gration, the prospect of receiving immigrants can cause social change 
in a potential receiving country. In particular, in CEE today it sharpens 
Euroscepticism  –  with negativity about EU-related in-migration and 
out-migration in some cases reinforcing one other. It also influences reac-
tions to those few migrants already present, usually in a negative way, 
although there can be a backlash against this by anti-racist activists in 
defence of tolerance and human rights.
This process illustrates well how migration impact is mediated rather 
than happening directly and spontaneously. The literature on impact in 
established receiving countries such as the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom stresses the importance of the media and politicians in shaping 
public perceptions of immigration, with consequences for incidence of 
hate crimes, election results, and so forth. As Hall and Mikulska-Jolles 
(2016) illustrate in their portrait of young anti-immigration Poles, the dis-
course of hate, which is widespread in social media, has an overwhelm-
ing impact, and can cancel out positive impressions gained through 
individual personal encounters with immigrants (see below).
It is often asserted that nationalism in CEE is more ‘ethnic’ and less 
‘civic’ than in the West, and that the region is worse prepared to receive 
migrants, and generally less tolerant. This is a problematic line of argu-
ment, in view of widespread intolerance and ethnic nationalism in west-
ern Europe, and because ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ varieties of nationalism are 
empirically hard to separate. In the case of Poland, it is clearly untrue that 
Poles have always been hostile to receiving refugees, in principle, and 
opinion polls up to 2015 showed the reverse. When Chechens represented 
the main refugee flow to Poland, in the 1990s, they did not provoke Islam-
ophobia or fears about security, and, particularly because they were 
anti-Russian, they were generally welcomed. Right-wing political parties 
in the presidential and parliamentary election year of 2015 made immi-
gration an election issue for the first time and were quick to associate 
refugees with a terrorist threat. However, as Hall and Mikulska-Jolles 
(2016) show, among young people, who imbibe much of their informa-
tion from the Internet – like young people elsewhere in Europe – voters 
for all parties are frightened by the prospect of an influx of refugees.
Polish policies towards immigration have developed reactively 
(Grzymała-Kazłowska and Łodziński 2008, 19). Since for many years 
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Poland experienced little in-migration, but was expected to receive 
more, the country became ‘a laboratory for testing various integration 
solutions’ (Stefańska 2015, 25). Writing before the refugee crisis, Ste-
fańska (2015, 8) comments that ‘a lack of interest in in-migration by the 
wider public fosters the elaboration of Poland’s integration policy in a 
more technocratic way’. As of 2016, Poland had no integration policy or 
strategy, although one had been in the process of being developed under 
the 2007–15 Civic Platform governments (Klaver et al. 2016, 8).
A final point regarding the ‘prospect’ impact channel is that, as noted 
in chapter 8, residents of the biggest Polish cities are convinced that their 
cities are becoming more multicultural and often welcome this trajec-
tory. In their monograph The Multiculturalism of Monocultural Wrocław, 
Dolińska and Makaro, having considered every possible objective marker, 
conclude (2013, 53) that ‘ethnic diversity in the city is simply small-scale’. 
Attempts to revive the multicultural identity of cities like Wrocław, Łódź 
and Kraków are largely historical memory projects. Nonetheless, Dolińska 
and Makaro show that Wrocław residents interviewed in 2011 both 
believed their city to be multicultural and located this multicultural qual-
ity in the present and future. They associated multiculturalism with stu-
dents and foreign companies and anticipated the increasing diversity of 
their city’s population would continue.
3. Migration’s contribution to increasing ethnic  
diversity in Poland
According to the 2011 census, 96 per cent of the population of Poland 
self-defined as Polish (GUS 2012, 107). Minorities in Poland are mostly 
not migrants, but long-established national and ethnic5 minorities such 
as Jews, Belarusians, Germans and Roma. National and ethnic minorities 
and minority languages (e.g. Kashubian) enjoy certain rights, but, as else-
where in the EU, these rights do not extend to migrants (on the parallel 
case of the Czech Republic, see Sloboba 2016). To some extent minori-
ties are geographically concentrated within Poland, especially Belarusians 
in the east and Germans in Silesia. The German minority, however, has 
been shrinking, as Germans have left to live and work abroad. In the 2011 
census 126,000 people self-identified as Germans compared with over 
150,000 in 2002 (GUS 2012, 107), even though in 2011 it was possible 
for the first time to record a dual Polish and German identity in the cen-
sus (and 2 per cent of the population did so). Szczepański (2013, 87) notes 
that Germans who had lived in poor conditions on state farms and worked 
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for the Soviet armed forces have largely emigrated, which has had the 
further effect of diminishing the problem of these pockets of deprivation 
in Poland. He also suggests (2013, 84) that there has been a kind of hol-
lowing out of German identity among Germans who remain. Although 
older German people in Poland care about their German identity, mid-
dle-aged people care less because they were well-indoctrinated by the 
communist regime and moreover are ‘occupied by their work, often west 
of the Polish border’. Moreover, since Germany opened its labour market 
to Poles in 2011, non-German Poles are equally free to work in Germany, 
so having German ethnicity is no longer an advantage for would-be 
migrants (Heffner and Solga 2013, 44).
Foreign citizens (excluding temporary labour migrants) officially 
constitute about 0.5 per cent of Poland’s population (Stefańska 2015, 7). 
Around 2014, even Warsaw, with 20 per cent of Poland’s foreign popula-
tion, had only 2–3 per cent foreigners (Winiarska 2015, 48). However, as 
suggested above, the number of Ukrainians working in Poland has recently 
increased dramatically, and they come to work in all sectors of the labour 
market, in different parts of Poland, although originally they were espe-
cially concentrated in Warsaw and in Lublin Region in the east (Janicki 
2015; Kaczmarczyk and Górny 2017; Kawczyńska-Butrym, Ogryzko- 
Wiewiórowska and Butrym 2012). The growth in labour migration in 
recent years is indicated by the issue of permits and registration of 
employer applications, which has risen very sharply since 2005 (Brandt 
2016, 39). In 2015 county (powiat) job centres registered 782,222 
employer applications, and in the first 6 months of 2016, 634,321; 97 per 
cent were for Ukrainians (Feliksiak 2016, 1).
The increased number of foreign residents is important as a trend 
in its own right. However, how Poles become conscious of and react to this 
diversification is also a form of social change. Spatial concentration within 
particular streets is not essential for a minority to create the impression of 
constituting an ethnic enclave, particularly if migrants are visible in 
catering and at markets: people in Warsaw are conscious, for example, 
that there is a Vietnamese population (Piekut 2012). The sudden influx 
of more foreigners often creates a strong impression. For example, there 
was a near fivefold increase in the number of foreigners registered as 
living in Wrocław between 2002 and 2012 (Bielewska 2015, 158), and by 
spring 2017 the city council estimated that one in ten residents of the city 
was Ukrainian (Wrotniak-Chałada 2017). Interviewees in Wrocław and 
Lublin in 2016 made comments such as ‘In this shopping mall you can 
meet lots of Ukrainian ladies who have come to do shopping’, ‘Most people 
working in the restaurants in Lublin Plaza [shopping mall] are Ukrainian’, 
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and ‘The majority of Politics and International Relations students at the 
Marie Curie University [Lublin] are from Ukraine’. In Wrocław, Marek 
commented: ‘There’s a quiet, gradual influx of new arrivals . . .  people 
working in international companies, or Ukrainians working at shopping 
centre tills . . .  the Ukrainian presence is very obvious, you can tell by the 
accents you hear at the tills . . .  . That’s a silent transformation.’ In 
Bemowo, a suburb of Warsaw, Celina observed:
At first when there were those [Polish] shops [in England around 
2006] but not many. When you went into the shop, when you 
heard Polish being spoken, oh wow, that was nice, ‘Cześć (hi)!’ But 
now it’s every day. Like it’s an everyday thing for me to hear 
English spoken in shops here. I don’t notice, because it’s normal . . .  . 
There are lots more foreigners than eight years ago [when I left 
Poland].
Overall, in 2016, 33 per cent of Poles claimed to know foreigners living 
in Poland, compared with 30 per cent in 2004 and 25 per cent in 1999 
(Feliksiak 2016, 2). Unsurprisingly, most often these foreigners were 
Ukrainian: 17 per cent of Poles knew Ukrainians living in Poland, com-
pared with 6 per cent in 2010. Other nationalities were barely represented. 
After Ukrainians, Poles were most likely to know Germans (4 per cent) 
(Feliksiak 2016, 3).
As in other countries, Poles exaggerate the number of immigrants, 
at least in the case of groups whom they fear. So, for example, a survey in 
2015 revealed that the average Poles supposed Muslims to account for 
5 per cent of the Polish population, whereas less than 0.1 per cent of the 
population is Muslim (Pędziwiatr 2015). However, as mentioned in chap-
ter 8, up to 20 per cent of Poles know Muslims personally (Pędziwiatr 
2015), which suggests a migration effect, since unless they live near cen-
tres with Chechen refugees most of these contacts must be Muslims met 
abroad.
4. Immigration and integration policies
The chapter is not primarily about policy (discussed, e.g. in Grzymała- 
Kazłowska and Łodziński 2008; Górny et  al. 2010; Matyja, Siewiers-
ka-Chmaj and Pędziwiatr 2015). However, it is worth noting that countries 
that do not self-identify as ‘immigration countries’ commonly lack well- 
defined policies for integrating migrants. Poland is such a country, lacking a 
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well-defined national integration policy (Lesińska 2015, 16–7). Grzymała- 
Kazłowska (2015, 468) suggests:
Such a negligence of integration policy seems to result from the fail-
ure of recognition of emerging ethno-cultural diversity in the Polish 
society and the conviction that Poland is a transit country with a 
very limited scale of settlement immigration and ‘unproblematic’ 
immigration of migrants of European origin. In such a situation, 
immigrants have to choose either to assimilate (which is expected in 
the case of culturally close groups) or to develop their own ethnic 
system of support (as in the case of the Vietnamese, who, from this 
point of view, are left without any other choice).
In states that do not self-identify as immigration countries, it is often 
local authorities who take the lead, as has also happened in Poland. This 
includes joint action by cities, with the Union of Polish Metropolises issu-
ing a statement in 2017 that ‘united we can work on producing an appro-
priate culture for accepting migrants, make our cities more open and 
integrative, and enhance development, innovation and competition’ 
(Chołodowski 2017). The bigger Polish cities tend to have liberal local gov-
ernments and, as discussed in previous chapters, usually have their own 
identity and marketing-based reasons for noticing and promoting their 
ethnic diversity. This is the background against which they have actually 
become more diverse. Integration projects are often run by Polish (not 
migrant-led) NGOs with EU funding, and have tended to be concentrated 
particularly in Warsaw and Lublin, and more recently Gdańsk – the cities 
that have shown the greatest commitment to refugee integration (Klaver 
et al. 2016; Stefańska 2015). Some job centres try to support refugees 
(e.g. in Białystok), although they are not really equipped to do this (Klaver 
et al. 2016, 20).
Since most reception centres for asylum seekers (‘foreigners’ cen-
tres’) are in remote locations and few asylum seekers study Polish lan-
guage (Klaver et al. 2016, 10–11), Poles are not very likely to interact with 
refugees. Refugees, despite being few in number (and often moving on to 
third countries), experience considerable problems integrating, notably 
into the housing market, where they face discrimination (Klaver et al. 
2016, 18). As for labour migrants, even second-generation Vietnamese 
people with university degrees living in Poland often work in the Vietnam-
ese ethnic economy in trade or catering (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2015, 473).
Poland’s location on the Schengen border helps determine its 
immigration control and integration policies. It has attempted to keep 
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Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians on short-term contracts and in 
the temporary migrant category, and they are therefore assumed to have 
limited integration needs, especially in view of linguistic and other 
kinds of cultural similarity to Poles. However, temporariness often masks 
circulation – a state of ‘permanent temporariness’ (Lesińska 2015, 14), 
where foreigners’ working lives are conducted in Poland. Despite cultural 
advantages, they are often not as well-integrated as might be expected. For 
example, Ukrainians frequently become stuck in jobs for which they are 
overqualified because they find it hard to achieve official recognition for 
their qualifications (Janicki 2015). Language differences do constitute a 
barrier to integration, since the languages are not mutually intelligible, and 
Polish takes time to learn (Kawczyńska-Butrym, Ogryzko-Wiewiórowska 
and Butrym 2012, 43). Many Ukrainians have been working in the shadow 
economy. Kindler and Szulecka (2013, 658), citing sources from the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, remark that ‘the unlawful employment 
of foreigners is claimed to exceed the numbers of registered foreign work-
ers by approximately ten times’. However, this share should be decreasing 
as it becomes easier for Polish employers to employ foreigners legally. 
Ukrainians often manifest distrust of fellow Ukrainians, and they have not 
created many co-ethnic institutions to defend their interests. By con-
trast, Vietnamese people often belong to associations of co-ethnics and 
have a much stronger ethos of self-help within ‘Little Vietnam in Warsaw’ 
(Grzymała-Kazłowska 2015, 481–3).
Integration depends not only on official measures but also on accept-
ance by the majority population, which, in Poland as elsewhere, tends to 
take the view that immigrants should make most of the effort in the inte-
gration process (Winiarska 2015, 46). Grzymała-Kazłowska and 
Brzozowska (2017, 118) found that Ukrainian ‘migrants were constructed 
as culturally and socially similar but not always close and rather inferior’. 
On the other hand, many settled Ukrainians are married to Poles, speak 
excellent Polish and are hardly distinguishable from Poles (Grzymała- 
Kazłowska 2015). For visibly other foreigners, the increase in hate speech 
and acts of violence against migrants in 2016–17 (Klaver et al. 2016, 32–3) 
made Poland a more dangerous place. To some extent these simply brought 
out into the open the fact that black people persistently suffered from 
abuse in places such as Wrocław,6 even if ethnic Poles had not been par-
ticularly aware of it. A mere 17 per cent of Wrocław residents, for example, 
could remember witnessing signs of racial hatred such as verbal and 
physical abuse of black people in 2015–16 (Kłopot et al. 2016).
Anti-racist and pro-refugee organisations have also become more 
active and attracted more public support in recent years. On the occasion 
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of the Day of Solidarity with Refugees in 2016, for example, demonstra-
tions were organised by Bread and Salt in 25 locations across Poland (Kla-
ver et al. 2016, 33), and the appeal to participate was signed by hundreds 
of institutions and organisations.7 On a more permanent basis, places such 
as Kazimierz, the former Jewish quarter in Kraków (Lehrer 2013) and the 
Spanish Bookshop in the centre of Wrocław self-identify as islands of 
tolerance and constitute gathering places for foreigners as well as LGBT 
people.8 The main refugee organisation in Wrocław, Nomada, tries to pro-
tect the interests of local Romanian Roma, raise consciousness about the 
plight of refugees, and educate the public about migration more generally.9
5. Intertwining of ‘emigration’ and ‘immigration’ 
influences
The most obvious interconnection between out-migration and in-migra-
tion is the need to hire foreign labour because of Poles leaving and creat-
ing gaps in the Polish labour market; however, as chapter 5 discusses, this 
is only part of the reason for the rising number of job vacancies explaining 
the presence of Ukrainian workers in Poland. Other labour market 
effects include the evolution of international migration into immigration 
as Polish women working as carers in Germany move back to Poland to 
open care homes for Germans – so-called ‘Grandma export’ (Goździak 
2016). Changing legislation clarifying the rules for dual citizenship in 
Poland (Pudzianowska 2017) both reflects and affects out-migration and 
in-migration trends. Many social remittances also circulate between 
Poland and foreign countries, which the presence of migrants in Poland 
itself helps to entrench.
Chromiec, in her book about organisations promoting intercultural 
dialogue in Poland, points out that, even in the years immediately after 
EU accession, activists were either people who had spent time abroad or 
were migrants themselves (2011, 207). In Wrocław in 2016, Marek, an 
activist and academic, confirmed, ‘People working with refugees today 
were all abroad at some stage.’ Even for non-activists in the main Polish 
cities, the increasing presence of non-Poles as neighbours presents small-
scale opportunities for cultural learning similar to those in cities abroad. 
The obverse of Poles’ surprise at smiling strangers in foreign countries 
(see chapter 7) is immigrants’ surprise at unsmiling Poles, but this is not 
necessarily a sign of hostility – it may happen because Polish neighbours try 
not to seem curious about the newcomers (Winiarska 2015, 50). Winiarska 
(2015, 49) describes her migrant interviewees as ‘representatives of rather 
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collectivistic cultures, whose expectations of social relations in the neigh-
bourhood are different to those of the more individualistic Poles’. Some 
of her Polish interviewees (2015, 51) claimed to modify their behaviour 
thanks to the example of foreign neighbours:
They [the Vietnamese] were always smiling so wide in the corridor, 
that these smiles and good humour were contagious. Many times 
after meeting them I kept smiling to myself. . . .  I sometimes notice, 
I’m speaking sarcastically now, that some neighbours also start to 
smile. Unnaturally, but they try! And that is an improvement. Poles 
are very gloomy and we could learn a lot about cheerful mood and 
politeness from Asians. (Female, 40, Polish)
My own research uncovered several examples of how return migrants 
were able to empathise with immigrants in Poland, as in the following 
quotation:
leszek: Where I work on building sites you only meet Ukrainians 
and Poles . . .  Lots of skilled workers have gone to Britain and Ire-
land and there aren’t enough in Poland. But the wages went up 
because there weren’t enough working hands. Then when they let 
Ukrainians come to Poland all the little branches of different com-
panies began importing Ukrainians. Because why give Poles 15 
or 20 zl. [pay per hour] if a Ukrainian will take 10 zl.
mAlWinA: And they’re happy to get it.
leszek: And they work twice as fast. Because a Pole wants to work 
8 hours a day, and there’s a norm that you aren’t allowed to work 
more than 10 hours. But a Ukrainian would work for 14 hours . . . 
Whole minibuses, coachloads of Ukrainians are coming . . .  It’s 
the same principle as Poles going to Germany, or England. Now 
Ukrainians and Russians are coming to Poland. He’ll make as 
much here in one month as he would in three months at home. 
It’s the same comparison we made.
Return migrants often like using their language skills, have friendly 
feelings towards Westerners and welcome the cultural diversity they see 
in Polish cities. Lucyna (Wrocław 2016) for example, suggested: ‘With 
regard to knowing foreign languages, a lot has changed in Poland, and 
in general in cities a lot of people can understand. Any foreigner could 
make themselves understood on the street even if the level of the English 
might not be so high.’ Her impression was that the greater number of 
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foreign students made local people more trustful: ‘They are seen as “our” 
[students].’
Individual migrants in smaller locations can also bring social remit-
tances, as in the following example, where a student in Wrocław was talk-
ing about her home town in central Poland (population 60,000):
mAJA: In my town there are two pizzerias belonging to two different 
Italians. They are completely separate people . . .  Their wives are 
Poles.
Anne: So did those Polish women go and work in Italy?
mAJA: Apparently so. And now they run restaurants together. 
Honestly, the pizza tastes really different. Because we have more 
of all that cheese. In those other restaurants where I live, they’re 
covered in cheese and all sorts of stuff, but in the Italian places 
they have a really thin pizza base, and it’s absolutely delicious. 
And the price is hardly different. In a small town you can’t charge 
much, and the prices are affordable. So they get lots of custom. 
Now the other restaurants . . .  don’t have so much custom.
6. Conclusion
Poland has limited experience with integrating refugees and  –  as in 
other neighbouring countries in CEE – the national government is cur-
rently not prepared politically to receive them. City governments and a 
large section of civil society are more welcoming. Most Poles believe that 
Poland needs immigrant labour.
Integration of labour migrants to date has been impeded by assump-
tions that their migration is temporary. This is typical of new immigra-
tion countries. Integration of labour migrants has also been impeded by 
assumptions about their cultural affinities with Poles and/or capacity for 
self-help. This is typical of many societies. Poor integration of migrants 
(as everywhere) is often related to the jobs they do and could be better 
viewed as social exclusion. However, despite integration problems, immi-
grants and immigration do have impact on Poland. Poland is currently 
(2017) experiencing a wave of immigration from Ukraine, creating a rap-
idly evolving situation, which makes it hard to write about the topic. The 
following impacts may be observed.
In keeping with trends all over the world, immigration impels city 
authorities to develop ‘integration’ policies (or, as they would be consid-
ered in the United Kingdom, ‘social cohesion’ policies). Polish cities, as 
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well as some smaller towns, have in any case in recent years accentuated 
their multicultural identity. Though to date this has been largely a memo-
rialisation project, it is now acquiring real flesh as cities do become more 
ethnically diverse.
Impact does not include Poles in Poland finding their jobs taken by 
immigrants. One might argue that it is too early to be sure of this, but it 
seems inherently unlikely given that, because of the dual nature of the 
labour market, this rarely happens on a significant scale in immigration 
countries. Neither does it seem to include Poles worrying that their jobs 
will be taken by immigrants, and in fact they are becoming ever more 
accepting of the usefulness of immigrant labour for Poland, which is likely 
to be directly connected to their appreciation of the usefulness of Polish 
migrants’ contributions to foreign economies.
With regard to the prospect channel of migration impact, before 
2015 Poles generally displayed a welcoming attitude towards refugees 
from armed conflict. Since 2015 they have become very hostile to the idea 
of receiving refugees. This should be seen not as a direct impact of the 
Syrian refugee crisis but as an artefact of right-wing politicians and 
movements – in other words, it is a kind of mediated impact, similar to 
impacts in Western immigration countries. The mediated prospect of 
refugee migration has impact in the sense that it helps nationalist parties 
acquire and maintain power and discredit anti-nationalist and liberal oppo-
sition voices. It also reinforces a pervading atmosphere of nationalism in 
Poland, often dressed up as ‘patriotism’, as in ‘patriotic clothing shops’. 
The mediated prospect of refugee migration has impact in the sense that 
it helps nationalist parties spread soft Euroscepticism, and it joins up with 
attempts by some priests to paint migration to western Europe as Brus-
sels luring Poles into exploitation, immorality and gender ideology. 
However, it seems almost impossible that anti-immigration sentiment 
could lead (by analogy with the UK case) to Polexit. Surveys show that 
most Poles remain convinced that Poland’s future is within the EU.
As return migrants and stayers living in transnational fields become 
more open to difference, contact with foreigners in Poland itself gives 
them the opportunity to reflect on similarities with Poles’ own situation 
as migrants and also to practise foreign language skills and other cultural 
knowledge learned abroad. Hence it plays some part in entrenching 
greater openness. Since, according to surveys, most Poles do not know for-
eigners in Poland, but do travel and in many cases work or study abroad, 
the impact of assocating with foreigners in foreign countries must be 
greater. It seems that, at least for the moment, the main impacts of in- 
migration are to fill gaps in the Polish labour market and to add to the 
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ethnic diversity of the resident population. However, the unexpected scale 
of recent Ukrainian migration – apparently still increasing at time of 
writing in September 2017 – makes the situation hard to assess.
Notes
1 In general, except in set phrases such as ‘immigration country’, I try to avoid using 
the word ‘immigration’. This has connotations of migration for settlement, whereas 
many migrants arrive in receiving countries with plans to stay only temporarily.
2 Up to 1 January 2018 (when rules changed) Ukrainians, like citizens of other 
Eastern Partnership countries, were allowed to work in Poland up to six months 
a year, without applying for work permits. The only precondition was for a future 
employer to register a declaration of willingness to employ a foreigner, and then 
have a contract signed.
3 On the United Kingdom see, e.g. Dustmann and Frattini (2014).
4 On the United Kingdom see, e.g. Migration Advisory Committee (2014).
5 Minorities without a nation-state, such as the Tatars and Roma, are officially 
considered to be ‘ethnic’.
6 Information from Nomada activist, Wrocław, 2016.
7 http:// solidarnizuchodzcami . pl / apel / .
8 Personal observation and interview with LGBT activist in 2016.
9 Nomada website, http:// nomada . info . pl / ? lang​=​en.
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Developing an ‘inside-out’ approach
A transnational sociology of sending countries
Anne White
Now I’m trying to make my [women] friends into rebels – don’t be 
scared, just go ahead and do it! If I can change anything it will be in 
my own environment, among people near me. You couldn’t on a big 
scale like the whole city . . .  I try to show my friends that there is a dif-
ferent way of looking at things, a different way to live, and you can be 
more open and assert your own rights.
Lucyna, return migrant from Ireland living in Wrocław, 2016
This final chapter reflects briefly on our experience of developing an 
inside-out approach to understand the impact of migration on sending 
countries, combining qualitative and quantitative data. We have argued 
throughout the book that Polish society, and therefore Polish social 
change, can only be understood with reference to Polish stayers’ links to 
Poles living abroad. Our puzzle, however, was to understand how those 
small individual links could connect to wider processes of change occur-
ring throughout society.
As mentioned in earlier chapters, Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011, 
3) pose this puzzle in terms of how social remittances ‘scale up’ to ‘influ-
ence regional and national changes’. Their question, with its focus on 
change starting at the local level, runs counter to the assumptions of 
policymakers who wish to ‘harness the diaspora’ (see chapter  3) and 
organise migrants, particularly business elites, to provide change top-
down. Taking a lead from Levitt, our book has investigated the process 
of grassroots social remitting in detail, especially in chapter 4. We have 
shown how social remittances could ripple out from migrant to stayer and 
then from stayer to stayer, particularly if there is a sense of reciprocity, 
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when recipients of new ideas give something in exchange. Non-migrants 
should feel that they are making contributions of their own, and that 
the sending country has something to give to the receiving society, as well 
as vice versa. Previous scholars have understood that ‘circularity’ is impor-
tant in social remitting, but often without finding evidence; we were able 
to find examples in our research of how a consciousness of reciprocity 
makes social remittances more acceptable in the particular domain where 
social remitting takes place, be it family, workplace or local community. 
However, social remittances are not identical to their twins – economic 
remittances. In most cases it is unrealistic to try to track them very far. 
Moreover, the social impact of migration includes many indirect influences 
(e.g. various gender equality impacts documented in our book), which 
cannot helpfully be labelled social remittances.
Therefore, instead of seeing influence as proceeding ‘up’ or ‘down’, 
we adopted a third approach and investigated how migration sat side-by-
side with other determinants of change. This seemed a more helpful way 
of viewing the relationship. We applied an inside-out approach and 
mapped different social and economic trends occurring inside Polish soci-
ety before looking ‘out’ across international borders to consider how 
migration might be contributing to those trends. We also considered the 
various other, non-migration influences that might be at play. Sometimes 
it seemed possible only to say that migration was one of various factors. 
However, in writing the book, we became more conscious of how migra-
tion influences might be conceptualised relative to other determinants of 
change.
We identified three relevant aspects of the relationship between 
migration and social change. The first aspect is the social and geographi-
cal location of change: we have been interested in those particular places 
where migration influences are more important, vis-à-vis other factors, as 
influences for change. In particular, we showed examples of migration 
leading to changes in views and behaviour among people without higher 
education and/or living in small towns and villages. The second aspect is 
the type of factor causing change. For example, in many cases of social 
change, migration influences can be categorised as supply-side or demand-
side factors. This helps us see how they back up other supply-side or 
demand-side factors. For instance, returning to the first trend presented 
in this book, the theme of migrants’ relatives learning English, migration 
creates an additional demand for English-language courses in Poland. 
Table 7.3 presents this idea as a diagram; it would have been possible to 
organise the content of other chapters into similar tables.
229develoPInG An ‘ InSIde-out’  APProACH
The third aspect to consider is whether migration influences push 
forward or hold back the tempo of change that is already happening for 
other reasons. Migration clearly helps add to the number of Poles who are 
confident in foreign languages, so it accelerates that particular trend. In 
other areas, change in a particular direction can seem surprisingly slow, 
for example rising levels of generalised trust. It seems that migration is a 
factor pulling in the reverse direction, diminishing trust in strangers 
among some sections of Polish society.
Since our aspiration was particularly to identify migration’s contri-
bution to the most significant overall changes taking place in Poland as a 
post-communist society, it was important to begin by having a good over-
view of change in our sending country. We have argued that Polish society 
is becoming more open and equal, although we know that both claims, 
especially the former, will raise some eyebrows. We have justified our claim 
with detailed evidence from the publicly available and well-respected 
CBOS and Social Diagnosis (Diagnoza Społeczna) surveys. It is important 
to possess such data, given that more displays of intolerance on the streets 
and the Internet in Poland in recent years have led to a great deal of lib-
eral pessimism.
However, survey evidence is always superficial and imperfect; tol-
erance and equality are both multidimensional phenomena; and there 
also exist counter-trends. We have tried not to see change as simple and 
unidirectional, and especially not to fall into the trap of viewing change 
as a catching-up process with Western countries, which themselves exhibit 
plenty of inequality and intolerance. Other than in chapter 5 (on the 
labour market) we have also tried not to make normative statements, 
although it proved impossible to ignore the normativity of others and, 
especially in chapter 6, we do distance ourselves from certain migration 
myths. Analysis is not usually helped by claims that things are good or bad. 
However, having provided our analysis, we hope policymakers can use 
some of our evidence. It should be of interest on different levels: EU, 
national, regional and local.
In order to map social change in Poland, the first step in our inside-
out approach, we had the advantage of being able to consult extensive 
publicly available survey data, as well as some quantitative data from our 
own projects. This was essential, but our attempts to mix migration 
research with mainstream sociology would have been much easier if there 
had been more overlap between the two disciplines in the past. One of our 
main arguments is that, in order to understand the impact of migration 
on Country X, migration scholars and mainstream sociologists need to 
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collaborate. Data about the migration experience of survey respondents 
could helpfully be included in social surveys on every topic, alongside age, 
sex and so on. Qualitative sociologists could also be more alert to the fact 
that their research subjects live in transnational social fields and, when 
they investigate specific areas of social change, keep an eye open for any 
migration influences.
In our project, we enjoyed the advantage of being able to rely on a 
large body of Polish migration scholarship, both quantitative and quali-
tative. This is a blossoming field of migration research. Before we began, 
we knew a great deal from other researchers’ and our own findings about 
the transnational social space encompassing Poland and other European 
countries. This made it easier to conceptualise how migration influences 
occur, and to explore our interviewees’ transnational fields. Since social 
change is a mutual process between Poland and Polish society abroad, 
understanding the contours of society abroad (particularly in some coun-
tries, notably the United Kingdom, Ireland and Norway, and to a lesser 
extent Belgium and Iceland) was essential.
Because of overlapping content, in practice it was sometimes diffi-
cult to decide which information should be placed in chapter 9 (‘Polish 
society abroad’) and which in earlier chapters. However, the two-pronged 
approach was essential, more particularly because it enhanced our abil-
ity to bring into play the receiving country scholarship on diversity and 
cosmopolitanism. Without this literature on the impact of migration on 
receiving societies, and the emerging literature on social remittances cir-
culating between countries with regard to attitudes to diversity, it would 
have been harder to apply an inside-out approach and analyse how migra-
tion might be contributing to trends towards more openness in Poland 
(insofar as this process is taking place).
We hope that our research can be replicated and extended in other 
countries with a great deal of migration, such as Romania or Lithuania, 
or even countries outside the post-communist region; this depends on the 
availability of a sufficient body of migration and sociological literature on 
interrelated themes. There is scope for many small-scale studies of indi-
vidual places and different types of change, but also for large countrywide 
studies with multiple fieldwork sites. Ideally, these would be long-term 
anthropological studies, allowing the researchers to see those connections 
between migration and change in everyday life that might not be con-
sciously realised by local people, and that they would be unlikely to men-
tion when interviewed by a visiting sociologist.
There are also many additional aspects of change in Poland that we 
hope can be covered in future research and that we did not have time or 
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space to cover thoroughly here – even though we found evidence of vari-
ous migration influences. We particularly regret being unable to explore 
in greater detail topics such as civil society, education, popular culture, 
changing fashions in given names and English-language influences on 
Polish. We would also have liked to have compared more systematically 
different Polish regions, cities and towns.
Finally, as noted at the beginning and end of chapter 2, our book has 
been about society in change, not how society has or was changed. Given 
that we have no adequate temporal perspective on our subject matter, we 
do not make any predictions about the shape of change in the future. 
We hope that mobility-driven change will continue to happen and that 
the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU will not constitute such a water-
shed that after 2019 it will be possible to look back with hindsight 
at 2004–19 as a well-defined time of mobility-induced change – change 
that we will soon be able to assess from a sufficiently removed perspec-
tive. Mobility will presumably continue unchecked between Poland and 
continental Europe. However, even here the nature of social change 
wrought by migration is likely to evolve. As that generation of Poles who 
moved and settled in western Europe after 2004 grows older, and as 
these first-generation migrants increasingly have children and grand-
children born abroad, the transnational social space will inevitably be 
transformed. Longitudinal research will therefore be essential in order 
to understand the EU as an evolving ‘laboratory of migration’.
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